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How it works
noorqureshi/hardware-ot-icsMobile, firmware e hardware

hardware-ot-ics

⁨Assess OT/ICS environments — PLC, SCADA, DCS, HMI — safely and passive-first: Purdue-model zoning, industrial protocol discovery (Modbus, S7, DNP3, EtherNet/IP), mirrored-traffic analysis, and read-only verification. Load for an authorized engagement touching industrial control networks, engineering⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/hardware-ot-ics

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
IgdA98+o30…GkNIZIDw==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto6ac96bc6…7b0cbd5a
6ac96bc6202a…20ca7b0cbd5a1 file · ⁦2.9 KB⁩
ScansioneBasso1 segnalazione
  • Link a domini esterni
Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/hardware/hardware-ot-ics@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

The engagement touches an industrial environment — PLC/RTU controllers, SCADA/DCS, HMIs, engineering workstations, historians, jump hosts, or the IT/OT boundary (firewall rules, data diodes). A misstep here can cause physical harm, not just downtime. Load tradecraft-scope-roe and require the written authorization to spell out: the site and network segments, whether active scanning is allowed, and whether writing coils/registers is allowed — the default for both is NO. Work passive-first; nothing touches a PLC's state until the scope explicitly says so.

Why it works

Industrial protocols (Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP) predate hostile networks: they run in cleartext with no authentication (CWE-306), so anyone who can reach the port can read process state — and usually write it. That's exactly why the assessment itself is the risk: a high-rate scan or a stray write can trip a control loop or a safety instrumented system (SIS). Mirrored traffic and offline artifacts reveal the same exposure with zero packets injected.

Iron rules (MUST)

  • Never write coils/registers to a PLC unless the authorization explicitly permits it.
  • No high-rate scanning of production OT segments — low rate, maintenance window only.
  • Never touch SIS paths or anything in a safety loop.
  • Prefer, in order: read-only identification → traffic mirroring → offline firmware/config analysis.
  • An anomaly or unexpected device response → stop immediately and notify the site contact.

Method

  1. Zone and inventory (paper-first). Sketch the Purdue levels L0–L5: field devices → basic control → supervisory → site DMZ → enterprise. Build the asset list — PLC/RTU/HMI/engineering workstation/historian/jump host — and the expected protocol/port baseline for the authorized segments only (identification, not exploitation): Modbus/TCP 502, S7comm 102, EtherNet/IP 44818, DNP3 20000.
  2. Passive capture. Take a SPAN/mirror-port PCAP from an authorized tap: tshark -i <iface> -w ot-mirror.pcap. Dissect it with Wireshark's ICS dissectors (modbus, s7comm, enip, dnp3) — you learn the live devices, the masters/slaves, the function codes in use, and any cleartext credentials without sending a single packet. A proprietary protocol on the wire goes to reverse-eng-protocol.
  3. Offline audit. Review exported controller configuration and engineering projects (TIA Portal, RSLogix/Studio 5000 exports) offline. Record default credentials and unauthenticated cleartext protocols (Modbus has none) as findings — observe and document; change nothing.
  4. Limited active checks — only if the scope says yes. During the agreed maintenance window, at low rate (nmap -Pn -n --max-rate 20 -p 502,102,44818,20000 <host>, plus targeted NSE identification such as --script modicon-info,s7-info,enip-info), prefer read-only function codes, capture evidence for every step, and stop + escalate at the first anomaly.
  5. Firmware and patch surface. Map controller firmware versions to known CVEs (never blind-flash firmware). Pull images for offline analysis with reverse-eng-firmware and reverse-eng-binary-triage rather than probing the live controller.
  6. Report with physical consequence. Every OT finding states its process/physical impact (what an attacker could make the plant do), and distinguishes remotely exploitable issues from ones requiring physical or control-network access. Lateral movement into the IT side follows network-pivoting-tunneling and the ad domain skills as usual.

Gotchas

  • A port scan is an active act on OT. Some PLCs fault or reboot under ordinary scan rates — mirrored traffic first, always. Don't run default-parameter web/network scanners against OT segments; the profiles are wrong and the risk is real.
  • "No response" may mean you hurt something, not that nothing's there — if a device goes quiet mid-test, stop and notify; check with the site before resuming.
  • Most ICS tooling assumes an isolated lab network — stage and rehearse tools in a lab VLAN or on a mirrored feed, not on the production segment.
  • Default creds and no-auth protocols are findings, not invitations — log them, prove reachability minimally, never exercise a write "to demonstrate".
  • Confirm the emergency contact and rollback plan exist before any active phase — including the maintenance window and who can halt the test.

Verify success

You can produce: the Purdue-zone sketch with a reconciled asset inventory, the observed protocol/port baseline from passive capture, a findings list with physical-impact framing (remote vs physical reachability stated per finding), and — for any authorized active step — a step-by-step evidence trail showing read-only behavior and zero unplanned state changes.

References

NIST SP 800-82 (ICS security); ATT&CK for ICS; Wireshark ICS dissector docs; reverse-eng-firmware.


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteSìSì
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

  1. InfoLink · Link a domini esterni

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c56ac96bc6Firmata–

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