hardware-ot-ics
Assess OT/ICS environments — PLC, SCADA, DCS, HMI — safely and passive-first: Purdue-model zoning, industrial protocol discovery (Modbus, S7, DNP3, EtherNet/IP), mirrored-traffic analysis, and read-only verification. Load for an authorized engagement touching industrial control networks, engineering
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/hardware-ot-icsWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package6ac96bc6…7b0cbd5a
6ac96bc6202a…20ca7b0cbd5a1 file · 2.9 KBScanLow1 finding
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/hardware/hardware-ot-ics@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
The engagement touches an industrial environment — PLC/RTU controllers, SCADA/DCS, HMIs,
engineering workstations, historians, jump hosts, or the IT/OT boundary (firewall rules, data
diodes). A misstep here can cause physical harm, not just downtime. Load tradecraft-scope-roe
and require the written authorization to spell out: the site and network segments, whether active
scanning is allowed, and whether writing coils/registers is allowed — the default for both is
NO. Work passive-first; nothing touches a PLC's state until the scope explicitly says so.
Why it works
Industrial protocols (Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP) predate hostile networks: they run in
cleartext with no authentication (CWE-306), so anyone who can reach the port can read process
state — and usually write it. That's exactly why the assessment itself is the risk: a high-rate
scan or a stray write can trip a control loop or a safety instrumented system (SIS). Mirrored
traffic and offline artifacts reveal the same exposure with zero packets injected.
Iron rules (MUST)
- Never write coils/registers to a PLC unless the authorization explicitly permits it.
- No high-rate scanning of production OT segments — low rate, maintenance window only.
- Never touch SIS paths or anything in a safety loop.
- Prefer, in order: read-only identification → traffic mirroring → offline firmware/config analysis.
- An anomaly or unexpected device response → stop immediately and notify the site contact.
Method
- Zone and inventory (paper-first). Sketch the Purdue levels L0–L5: field devices → basic control → supervisory → site DMZ → enterprise. Build the asset list — PLC/RTU/HMI/engineering workstation/historian/jump host — and the expected protocol/port baseline for the authorized segments only (identification, not exploitation): Modbus/TCP 502, S7comm 102, EtherNet/IP 44818, DNP3 20000.
- Passive capture. Take a SPAN/mirror-port PCAP from an authorized tap:
tshark -i <iface> -w ot-mirror.pcap. Dissect it with Wireshark's ICS dissectors (modbus, s7comm, enip, dnp3) — you learn the live devices, the masters/slaves, the function codes in use, and any cleartext credentials without sending a single packet. A proprietary protocol on the wire goes toreverse-eng-protocol. - Offline audit. Review exported controller configuration and engineering projects (TIA Portal, RSLogix/Studio 5000 exports) offline. Record default credentials and unauthenticated cleartext protocols (Modbus has none) as findings — observe and document; change nothing.
- Limited active checks — only if the scope says yes. During the agreed maintenance window,
at low rate (
nmap -Pn -n --max-rate 20 -p 502,102,44818,20000 <host>, plus targeted NSE identification such as--script modicon-info,s7-info,enip-info), prefer read-only function codes, capture evidence for every step, and stop + escalate at the first anomaly. - Firmware and patch surface. Map controller firmware versions to known CVEs (never blind-flash
firmware). Pull images for offline analysis with
reverse-eng-firmwareandreverse-eng-binary-triagerather than probing the live controller. - Report with physical consequence. Every OT finding states its process/physical impact
(what an attacker could make the plant do), and distinguishes remotely exploitable issues from
ones requiring physical or control-network access. Lateral movement into the IT side follows
network-pivoting-tunnelingand theaddomain skills as usual.
Gotchas
- A port scan is an active act on OT. Some PLCs fault or reboot under ordinary scan rates — mirrored traffic first, always. Don't run default-parameter web/network scanners against OT segments; the profiles are wrong and the risk is real.
- "No response" may mean you hurt something, not that nothing's there — if a device goes quiet mid-test, stop and notify; check with the site before resuming.
- Most ICS tooling assumes an isolated lab network — stage and rehearse tools in a lab VLAN or on a mirrored feed, not on the production segment.
- Default creds and no-auth protocols are findings, not invitations — log them, prove reachability minimally, never exercise a write "to demonstrate".
- Confirm the emergency contact and rollback plan exist before any active phase — including the maintenance window and who can halt the test.
Verify success
You can produce: the Purdue-zone sketch with a reconciled asset inventory, the observed protocol/port baseline from passive capture, a findings list with physical-impact framing (remote vs physical reachability stated per finding), and — for any authorized active step — a step-by-step evidence trail showing read-only behavior and zero unplanned state changes.
References
NIST SP 800-82 (ICS security); ATT&CK for ICS; Wireshark ICS dissector docs; reverse-eng-firmware.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md5.8 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 6ac96bc6 | Signed | – |
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