ctf-crypto
CTF crypto challenge playbook — read the provided encryption script like a spec, attack RSA parameter weaknesses, XOR/multi-time-pad oracles, and homemade ciphers with math tooling (z3, sympy, sage). Load when the handout is .py/.sage math, n/e/c values, or an "encryption service" on nc. Signals: "c
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa
Installa
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/ctf-cryptoScrive in ~/.notholy/skills dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.
FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchetto13fd879d…b643c88d
13fd879d798b…6f46b643c88d1 file · 3.1 KBScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/ctf/ctf-crypto@ee0e0c5
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
When it applies
The handout is a short encryption script (chall.py, rarely sage), a set of numbers
(n, e, c / intercepted ciphertexts), or an nc service that encrypts/signs things for you.
This skill covers the CTF shapes — reading the script for the flaw, XOR games, homemade ciphers,
and math tooling. For the deep attack mechanics it defers to crypto-rsa-attacks and
crypto-oracle-attacks; run the RSA battery there first.
Why it works
CTF crypto is a code review against math: the script is short, self-contained, and contains
exactly one mistake the author planted — a reused nonce, a factorable n, an invertible
homegrown round function, or an oracle the service hands you. Find the one line that looks
"clever" and the challenge is usually done; the rest is algebra.
Method
- Read the script as a spec, top to bottom. Note exactly what's given (printed values) and
what's hidden (keys, seeds, flag). The flaw is almost always in: key/nonce generation
(
randominstead ofsecrets, timestamp seeds,getPrimewith small bits, reusedk), the composition (same key twice, encrypt-then-leak-something), or the padding (raw RSA, ASCII armor that leaks length). - Triage encodings before crypto. Half of "crypto" challenges are encoding stacks: base64/32/ 85, hex, morse, brainfuck, base-N with a custom alphabet, repeated base64. CyberChef's magic wand or a quick decode loop settles these in minutes — don't reach for sage on a base85.
- RSA → run the known battery. Extract
n, e, c; hand the key to RsaCtfTool + factordb, then check the CTF-specific shapes explicitly (crypto-rsa-attacksfor mechanics):- Multiple keys/ciphertexts in one file →
gcdpairwise (shared prime), common modulus (samen, twoe), or Håstad broadcast (same message, smalle, severaln). pandqgenerated from a weak PRNG / shared high bits /q = next_prime(p)→ Fermat or regenerate the PRNG stream.- Extra printed values (
d mod (p-1),p+q,dp, partial bits ofp) → Coppersmith-style recovery (sage) or direct algebra; these "hint leaks" are the intended path.
- Multiple keys/ciphertexts in one file →
- XOR challenges.
- Single-byte XOR: brute all 256 keys, score by English frequency (
xortoolautomates). - Repeating-key XOR: guess key length by Hamming distance / index of coincidence, solve each column as single-byte.
- Multi-time pad (same keystream XORs several messages, classic
otpreuse): crib-drag — XOR two ciphertexts and guess words ("the ", "flag{") at each position; each confirmed crib extends the keystream. - XOR with a known plaintext anywhere (a known header, the flag format
flag{) recovers keystream bytes directly.
- Single-byte XOR: brute all 256 keys, score by English frequency (
- Encryption services are oracles — script them.
ncservice that encrypts your input:- Your input prepended to the flag, ECB → byte-at-a-time flag recovery (
crypto-oracle-attacks). - Same plaintext always → same ciphertext: codebook lookup / chosen-plaintext mapping.
- Decrypt-anything-but-the-flag → malleability games: bit-flip CBC, RSA blinding
(
c·r^e mod n, unblind the result). - It always helps to send structured probes: all-zero blocks, single-byte deltas, length sweeps (leaks block size and mode).
- Your input prepended to the flag, ECB → byte-at-a-time flag recovery (
- Homegrown ciphers → model, don't guess. Custom rounds (add-rotate-xor, matrix mods,
LFSRs, "Feistel-ish"): symbolically execute or invert them.
- Linear operations over GF(2) → write as linear equations, solve with z3 or sage.
- Small state (LFSR) → Berlekamp–Massey from a known keystream.
- S-box + permutation networks → differential or just brute the tiny key space the author used.
- Ask: is every step invertible given the key? Then the only question is the key space — brute 16/24/32-bit keys before doing anything clever.
- Bring the math tools. z3 for constraint-shaped problems (flag bytes satisfying check
equations); sympy for modular algebra and small discrete logs; sage for lattices (LLL /
Coppersmith / hidden-number problems);
long_to_bytes/bytes_to_longendianness discipline throughout.
Gotchas
- The printed "leak" is intentional. If the script hands you
hint = p ^ qorleak = d & ((1<<512)-1), that's the solve path — stop looking for a second bug. - Python
randomis not crypto —random.seed(time.time())or Mersenne Twister output visible anywhere → clone the state (624 consecutive 32-bit outputs fully recover MT19937). eandphimistakes — wrong totient (usingnfor(p-1)(q-1)) makes a key that looks right but fails; verify by decrypting a known value (crypto-rsa-attacks).- Multi-prime RSA (
n = pqr) — factorization tools still work; rememberphi = (p-1)(q-1)(r-1). - Encoding is not encryption — if "ciphertext" decodes cleanly to printable text, keep peeling encodings before assuming a cipher.
- Byte-vs-int conversion bugs in your solver — leading zero bytes vanish in
bytes_to_long; pad the recovered plaintext back to the expected length.
Verify success
The recovered plaintext contains the flag in the event's format, and you can re-derive it deterministically (script reproduces the key/plaintext from the given artifacts, not from luck).
References
Mechanics: crypto-rsa-attacks (factordb, Fermat, Wiener, Håstad), crypto-oracle-attacks
(padding oracle, ECB byte-at-a-time, length extension); tooling: z3, sage (LLL/Coppersmith),
xortool, CyberChef. Triage via ctf-methodology.
File di questa versione
- SKILL.md6.2 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | No | No |
| Esegue comandi shell | No | No |
| Usa la rete | No | No |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 13fd879d | Firmata | – |
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