ctf-crypto
CTF crypto challenge playbook — read the provided encryption script like a spec, attack RSA parameter weaknesses, XOR/multi-time-pad oracles, and homemade ciphers with math tooling (z3, sympy, sage). Load when the handout is .py/.sage math, n/e/c values, or an "encryption service" on nc. Signals: "c
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalações+3 em 7 dias27 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 22 horas
Instalar
Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/ctf-cryptoGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacote13fd879d…b643c88d
13fd879d798b…6f46b643c88d1 arquivo · 3.1 KBVarreduraBaixonenhum achado
Fontegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/ctf/ctf-crypto@ee0e0c5
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When it applies
The handout is a short encryption script (chall.py, rarely sage), a set of numbers
(n, e, c / intercepted ciphertexts), or an nc service that encrypts/signs things for you.
This skill covers the CTF shapes — reading the script for the flaw, XOR games, homemade ciphers,
and math tooling. For the deep attack mechanics it defers to crypto-rsa-attacks and
crypto-oracle-attacks; run the RSA battery there first.
Why it works
CTF crypto is a code review against math: the script is short, self-contained, and contains
exactly one mistake the author planted — a reused nonce, a factorable n, an invertible
homegrown round function, or an oracle the service hands you. Find the one line that looks
"clever" and the challenge is usually done; the rest is algebra.
Method
- Read the script as a spec, top to bottom. Note exactly what's given (printed values) and
what's hidden (keys, seeds, flag). The flaw is almost always in: key/nonce generation
(
randominstead ofsecrets, timestamp seeds,getPrimewith small bits, reusedk), the composition (same key twice, encrypt-then-leak-something), or the padding (raw RSA, ASCII armor that leaks length). - Triage encodings before crypto. Half of "crypto" challenges are encoding stacks: base64/32/ 85, hex, morse, brainfuck, base-N with a custom alphabet, repeated base64. CyberChef's magic wand or a quick decode loop settles these in minutes — don't reach for sage on a base85.
- RSA → run the known battery. Extract
n, e, c; hand the key to RsaCtfTool + factordb, then check the CTF-specific shapes explicitly (crypto-rsa-attacksfor mechanics):- Multiple keys/ciphertexts in one file →
gcdpairwise (shared prime), common modulus (samen, twoe), or Håstad broadcast (same message, smalle, severaln). pandqgenerated from a weak PRNG / shared high bits /q = next_prime(p)→ Fermat or regenerate the PRNG stream.- Extra printed values (
d mod (p-1),p+q,dp, partial bits ofp) → Coppersmith-style recovery (sage) or direct algebra; these "hint leaks" are the intended path.
- Multiple keys/ciphertexts in one file →
- XOR challenges.
- Single-byte XOR: brute all 256 keys, score by English frequency (
xortoolautomates). - Repeating-key XOR: guess key length by Hamming distance / index of coincidence, solve each column as single-byte.
- Multi-time pad (same keystream XORs several messages, classic
otpreuse): crib-drag — XOR two ciphertexts and guess words ("the ", "flag{") at each position; each confirmed crib extends the keystream. - XOR with a known plaintext anywhere (a known header, the flag format
flag{) recovers keystream bytes directly.
- Single-byte XOR: brute all 256 keys, score by English frequency (
- Encryption services are oracles — script them.
ncservice that encrypts your input:- Your input prepended to the flag, ECB → byte-at-a-time flag recovery (
crypto-oracle-attacks). - Same plaintext always → same ciphertext: codebook lookup / chosen-plaintext mapping.
- Decrypt-anything-but-the-flag → malleability games: bit-flip CBC, RSA blinding
(
c·r^e mod n, unblind the result). - It always helps to send structured probes: all-zero blocks, single-byte deltas, length sweeps (leaks block size and mode).
- Your input prepended to the flag, ECB → byte-at-a-time flag recovery (
- Homegrown ciphers → model, don't guess. Custom rounds (add-rotate-xor, matrix mods,
LFSRs, "Feistel-ish"): symbolically execute or invert them.
- Linear operations over GF(2) → write as linear equations, solve with z3 or sage.
- Small state (LFSR) → Berlekamp–Massey from a known keystream.
- S-box + permutation networks → differential or just brute the tiny key space the author used.
- Ask: is every step invertible given the key? Then the only question is the key space — brute 16/24/32-bit keys before doing anything clever.
- Bring the math tools. z3 for constraint-shaped problems (flag bytes satisfying check
equations); sympy for modular algebra and small discrete logs; sage for lattices (LLL /
Coppersmith / hidden-number problems);
long_to_bytes/bytes_to_longendianness discipline throughout.
Gotchas
- The printed "leak" is intentional. If the script hands you
hint = p ^ qorleak = d & ((1<<512)-1), that's the solve path — stop looking for a second bug. - Python
randomis not crypto —random.seed(time.time())or Mersenne Twister output visible anywhere → clone the state (624 consecutive 32-bit outputs fully recover MT19937). eandphimistakes — wrong totient (usingnfor(p-1)(q-1)) makes a key that looks right but fails; verify by decrypting a known value (crypto-rsa-attacks).- Multi-prime RSA (
n = pqr) — factorization tools still work; rememberphi = (p-1)(q-1)(r-1). - Encoding is not encryption — if "ciphertext" decodes cleanly to printable text, keep peeling encodings before assuming a cipher.
- Byte-vs-int conversion bugs in your solver — leading zero bytes vanish in
bytes_to_long; pad the recovered plaintext back to the expected length.
Verify success
The recovered plaintext contains the flag in the event's format, and you can re-derive it deterministically (script reproduces the key/plaintext from the given artifacts, not from luck).
References
Mechanics: crypto-rsa-attacks (factordb, Fermat, Wiener, Håstad), crypto-oracle-attacks
(padding oracle, ECB byte-at-a-time, length extension); tooling: z3, sage (LLL/Coppersmith),
xortool, CyberChef. Triage via ctf-methodology.
Arquivos desta versão
- SKILL.md6.2 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Não | Não |
| Roda comandos no shell | Não | Não |
| Usa a rede | Não | Não |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
A varredura não encontrou nada para apontar nesta versão.
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 13fd879d | Assinada | – |
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