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How it works
noorqureshi/cloud-docker-api-abuseLinux, cloud e container

cloud-docker-api-abuse

⁨Turn an exposed container daemon or an over-privileged container into host compromise — a Docker API on 2375/2376, a mounted docker.sock, or a privileged/`-v /:/host` container. Load when you find an open Docker/containerd socket, port 2375/2376, a container you can run images in, or you landed insi⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/cloud-docker-api-abuse

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
2ci9wo8IRV…hnYk5rBQ==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchettoda5bacc1…d5d564c4
da5bacc1f79d…30afd5d564c41 file · ⁦1.9 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cloud/cloud-docker-api-abuse@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

You can reach a container control plane you shouldn't: an unauthenticated Docker API on 2375/tcp (or 2376 without client-cert auth), a mounted /var/run/docker.sock inside a container you control, membership in the docker group, or a privileged/host-mounted container. Any of these is effectively root on the host. Complements cloud-container-escape (which focuses on kernel/runtime breakouts); this one is about the daemon/socket as the vector.

Why it works

The Docker daemon runs as root and will build/run any container with any mount you ask for. Anyone who can talk to its API or socket can start a container that bind-mounts the host filesystem (-v /:/host) or runs --privileged — then read/write host files, add a root user, or chroot in. There's no privilege boundary between "can use the daemon" and "root on the host".

Method

  1. Confirm the vector.
    • Remote API: curl http://<host>:2375/version and /containers/json — a response = unauthenticated control.
    • In-container socket: ls -la /var/run/docker.sock; docker CLI or curl --unix-socket.
    • docker group: id | grep docker.
  2. Point the CLI at the daemon (remote): export DOCKER_HOST=tcp://<host>:2375 then docker ps.
  3. Mount the host and take root — run a container bind-mounting the host root and act on it:
    text
    docker run -v /:/host --rm -it alpine chroot /host sh
    From there: add a privileged user, drop an SSH key into /root/.ssh/authorized_keys, read /etc/shadow, or (Windows host) pull NTDS/SAM.
  4. Privileged-container escape (already inside one): --privileged exposes host devices — mount the host disk (fdisk -l → mount /dev/sdaN /mnt) or abuse cgroups release_agent to run a command as root on the host.
  5. Pull secrets from the daemon: image layers, env vars (docker inspect), and other containers' filesystems often hold credentials → pivot with recon/cloud-*.

Gotchas

  • 2376 is usually TLS + client-cert — if it rejects you without a cert, it's not the open one; 2375 is the plaintext/no-auth port to look for.
  • Read-only or restricted socket mounts may allow listing but not run — check what verbs work before assuming full control.
  • Non-destructive by default — creating containers/users changes host state; on bounty confirm RCE minimally (e.g. read a root-only file) and stop, per reporting-triage-validation.
  • Clean up every container, image, and user you create.

Verify success

Read or write a host-only resource from your mounted/escaped context (e.g. /etc/shadow, a file in another user's home, or a root-owned path) — proving host-level access from the container plane.

References

Docker Engine API docs; docker.sock escape write-ups; MITRE ATT&CK T1610/T1611. Kernel/runtime breakouts: cloud-container-escape.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellSìSì
Usa la reteSìSì
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c5da5bacc1Firmata–

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