Turn an exposed container daemon or an over-privileged container into host compromise — a Docker API on 2375/2376, a mounted docker.sock, or a privileged/`-v /:/host` container. Load when you find an open Docker/containerd socket, port 2375/2376, a container you can run images in, or you landed insi
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You can reach a container control plane you shouldn't: an unauthenticated Docker API on 2375/tcp
(or 2376 without client-cert auth), a mounted /var/run/docker.sock inside a container you
control, membership in the docker group, or a privileged/host-mounted container. Any of these is
effectively root on the host. Complements cloud-container-escape (which focuses on kernel/runtime
breakouts); this one is about the daemon/socket as the vector.
The Docker daemon runs as root and will build/run any container with any mount you ask for. Anyone
who can talk to its API or socket can start a container that bind-mounts the host filesystem
(-v /:/host) or runs --privileged — then read/write host files, add a root user, or chroot in.
There's no privilege boundary between "can use the daemon" and "root on the host".
Remote API: curl http://<host>:2375/version and /containers/json — a response = unauthenticated control.
In-container socket: ls -la /var/run/docker.sock; docker CLI or curl --unix-socket.
docker group: id | grep docker.
Point the CLI at the daemon (remote): export DOCKER_HOST=tcp://<host>:2375 then docker ps.
Mount the host and take root — run a container bind-mounting the host root and act on it:text
docker run -v /:/host --rm -it alpine chroot /host sh
From there: add a privileged user, drop an SSH key into /root/.ssh/authorized_keys, read
/etc/shadow, or (Windows host) pull NTDS/SAM.
Privileged-container escape (already inside one): --privileged exposes host devices —
mount the host disk (fdisk -l → mount /dev/sdaN /mnt) or abuse cgroups release_agent to run
a command as root on the host.
Pull secrets from the daemon: image layers, env vars (docker inspect), and other containers'
filesystems often hold credentials → pivot with recon/cloud-*.
2376 is usually TLS + client-cert — if it rejects you without a cert, it's not the open one;
2375 is the plaintext/no-auth port to look for.
Read-only or restricted socket mounts may allow listing but not run — check what verbs work
before assuming full control.
Non-destructive by default — creating containers/users changes host state; on bounty confirm
RCE minimally (e.g. read a root-only file) and stop, per reporting-triage-validation.
Clean up every container, image, and user you create.
Read or write a host-only resource from your mounted/escaped context (e.g. /etc/shadow, a file in
another user's home, or a root-owned path) — proving host-level access from the container plane.