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mukul975/hunting-saas-sso-token-abuseAPI, SaaS e identità

hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse

⁨Hunts for stolen-session and OAuth/PRT token replay (T1550.001) by correlating Microsoft Entra ID SigninLogs SessionId/UniqueTokenIdentifier fields and Okta System Log sso/session events to spot impossible travel, refresh-token reuse, and token use from anomalous ASNs. Use when hunting MFA-bypass vi⁩

v1.03 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni36,3K StelleApache-2.0sincronizzato 12 ore fa

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

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Pacchetto03516262…3706f138
0351626227ce…9d403706f1385 file · ⁦11.1 KB⁩
ScansioneMedio2 segnalazioni
  • Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
  • Link a domini esterni
Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse@54a7988

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

Overview

Adversaries increasingly bypass MFA not by defeating it but by stealing the artifacts issued after a successful authentication — session cookies, OAuth access/refresh tokens, and Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs). With a stolen token an attacker replays the existing session ("pass-the-cookie" / token replay), inheriting the victim's authenticated state across federated SaaS without ever prompting for credentials or MFA. Mandiant's M-Trends reporting and Microsoft/Okta incident data both highlight token theft as a dominant cloud lateral-movement technique, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token.

Detection relies on correlating identity telemetry rather than watching for failed logins. In Microsoft Entra ID the key tables are SigninLogs (interactive), AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs (where replayed cookies/refresh tokens commonly surface), and AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs. Entra now exposes linkable identifiers — SessionId and UniqueTokenIdentifier — that let a hunter stitch every artifact derived from one root authentication event together and spot a single session being used from multiple IPs, ASNs, or device fingerprints. In Okta the System Log carries authentication.sso, policy.evaluate_sign_on, and user.session.start events with a deviceToken/session context; the same session token appearing from divergent IPs/user-agents is the tell. Okta Identity Threat Protection (ITP) can natively flag "suspected session hijacking."

This skill provides a hypothesis-driven hunt: baseline normal session behavior, then look for impossible travel within a single session, refresh-token reuse, token use from anomalous infrastructure (hosting/VPS ASNs), and SaaS access patterns inconsistent with the user's device. Source: MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001; Microsoft Entra ID sign-in log documentation; Okta System Log reference; Mandiant M-Trends.

When to Use

  • Threat hunting for MFA-bypass via stolen tokens/cookies across Entra ID and SaaS
  • Investigating an alert for impossible travel, anomalous OAuth grant, or token reuse
  • Validating detection coverage for T1550.001 after a phishing/AiTM incident
  • Building Sentinel/Splunk/Okta detections for session-token replay
  • Post-incident hunting to scope SaaS lateral movement from a compromised identity

Prerequisites

  • Entra ID sign-in logs flowing to a queryable store (Microsoft Sentinel / Log Analytics):
    bash
    # Confirm the diagnostic settings export SigninLogs + non-interactive logs to a workspace
    az monitor diagnostic-settings list --resource \
      /providers/Microsoft.aadiam/diagnosticSettings -o table
  • Okta System Log access via API or SIEM ingestion:
    bash
    curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS $OKTA_API_TOKEN" \
      "https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType eq \"user.session.start\"&since=2026-06-01T00:00:00Z"
  • An IP enrichment source (GeoIP + ASN/hosting-provider classification)
  • Read access to the SIEM (KQL for Sentinel, SPL for Splunk)
  • Python 3.9+ for the helper script (requests for the Okta API)

Objectives

  • Baseline normal per-user session behavior (IPs, ASNs, devices, SaaS apps)
  • Correlate Entra sign-in artifacts by SessionId / UniqueTokenIdentifier
  • Detect a single session used from multiple IPs/ASNs (token replay)
  • Detect impossible travel within one authenticated session
  • Detect refresh-token reuse and anomalous OAuth grants
  • Hunt Okta System Log for reused session tokens across contexts
  • Produce findings and feed confirmed patterns into standing detections

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

ID Name Use in this skill
T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token Core technique — replaying stolen OAuth tokens/cookies
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie The cookie theft that precedes pass-the-cookie replay
T1528 Steal Application Access Token Acquisition of OAuth tokens via phishing/illicit consent
T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts Replayed tokens grant valid-account access to SaaS
T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials Follow-on persistence after token abuse

Workflow

1. Correlate Entra sign-in artifacts by session

Stitch interactive, non-interactive, and SP sign-ins for one session to see the full chain.

kusto
union SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where isnotempty(SessionId)
| summarize IPs=make_set(IPAddress), Apps=make_set(AppDisplayName),
            Locations=make_set(tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)),
            Count=count() by SessionId, UserPrincipalName
| where array_length(IPs) > 1

2. Detect a single session used from multiple ASNs (token replay)

kusto
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| extend ASN = tostring(parse_json(tostring(NetworkLocationDetails))[0].networkType)
| summarize distinctIPs = dcount(IPAddress),
            ipset = make_set(IPAddress) by SessionId, UserPrincipalName
| where distinctIPs >= 2

3. Detect impossible travel within one authenticated session

kusto
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress,
          City=tostring(LocationDetails.city),
          Country=tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion), SessionId
| order by UserPrincipalName, TimeGenerated asc
| serialize
| extend prevCountry = prev(Country), prevTime = prev(TimeGenerated),
         prevUser = prev(UserPrincipalName)
| where UserPrincipalName == prevUser and Country != prevCountry
        and datetime_diff('minute', TimeGenerated, prevTime) < 60

4. Detect token use from hosting/VPS infrastructure

Replayed tokens are frequently used from datacenter ASNs, unlike the user's residential/corporate ranges.

kusto
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ResultType == 0
| extend asnOrg = tostring(parse_json(tostring(AutonomousSystemNumber)))
| where IPAddress in (toscalar(externaldata(ip:string)["<hosting-asn-iplist>"]))
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress
kusto
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where OperationName in ("Consent to application", "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
                          "Add delegated permission grant")
| extend app = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, app, Result

6. Hunt the Okta System Log for reused session tokens

A single Okta session (deviceToken) used from divergent IPs/clients indicates hijack.

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS $OKTA_API_TOKEN" \
  "https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType eq \"policy.evaluate_sign_on\"&since=2026-06-15T00:00:00Z" \
  | jq -r '.[] | [.authenticationContext.externalSessionId, .client.ipAddress, .client.userAgent.rawUserAgent] | @tsv' \
  | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn

7. Splunk equivalent for Okta session reuse

spl
index=okta eventType="policy.evaluate_sign_on"
| stats dc(client.ipAddress) as ip_count
        values(client.ipAddress) as ips
        values(client.userAgent.rawUserAgent) as agents
        by authenticationContext.externalSessionId actor.alternateId
| where ip_count > 1

8. Triage and respond

For confirmed token abuse, revoke sessions and rotate, then promote the hunt to a rule.

bash
# Revoke all refresh tokens / sessions for the user in Entra
az rest --method POST \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<userId>/revokeSignInSessions"

See scripts/agent.py to pull Okta logs and flag reused session tokens automatically.

Tools and Resources

Resource Purpose Link
MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001 Technique reference https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001/
Entra sign-in logs schema KQL hunting field reference https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-azure-monitor-sign-ins-log-schema
Azure-Sentinel hunting repo Community KQL detections https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel
Okta System Log API Event hunting source https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
Mandiant M-Trends Token-theft threat landscape https://www.mandiant.com/m-trends
AzureAD-Attack-Defense PRT/token replay detection guidance https://github.com/Cloud-Architekt/AzureAD-Attack-Defense

Preventive Controls to Recommend

Detection should pair with controls that make stolen tokens far less useful:

  • Entra Conditional Access "token protection" binds the sign-in session to the device, so an exfiltrated cookie/PRT cannot be replayed off-device.
  • Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) revokes access in near-real-time on risk events instead of waiting for token expiry.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) blocks the AiTM proxy phishing that harvests tokens in the first place.
  • Short token lifetimes + refresh-token rotation shrink the replay window and turn refresh-token reuse into an unambiguous compromise signal.
  • Okta Identity Threat Protection (ITP) flags suspected session hijacking natively.

False-Positive Tuning

Benign cause Tuning
Corporate VPN/proxy egress (many users, few IPs) Allowlist known egress IPs/ASNs
Mobile carrier IP rotation Widen impossible-travel time/distance thresholds
Legitimate multi-device users Correlate device IDs, not just IPs
Backend/API calls within one session Exclude expected service principals

Key Indicators

Indicator Signal
One SessionId across multiple IPs/ASNs Token/cookie replay
Non-interactive sign-in from new datacenter IP Replayed refresh token
Impossible travel within < 1h Concurrent session use
Refresh-token reuse after rotation Strong compromise signal
New OAuth consent to unfamiliar app Illicit-consent token theft
Okta session token from divergent user-agents Session hijack

Validation Criteria

  • Entra SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs queryable
  • Okta System Log accessible via API or SIEM
  • Per-session correlation by SessionId produces results
  • Multi-IP / multi-ASN single-session query implemented
  • Impossible-travel-within-session query implemented
  • Anomalous OAuth consent hunt implemented
  • Okta reused-session-token hunt implemented
  • Confirmed findings triaged and sessions revoked
  • Effective queries promoted to standing detection rules
  • False-positive baseline (VPN/proxy egress) documented

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileSìSì
Esegue comandi shellSìSì
Usa la reteSìSì
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
  2. InfoLink · Link a domini esterni

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v1.013 nov 202654a798803516262Firmata–

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