hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse
Hunts for stolen-session and OAuth/PRT token replay (T1550.001) by correlating Microsoft Entra ID SigninLogs SessionId/UniqueTokenIdentifier fields and Okta System Log sso/session events to spot impossible travel, refresh-token reuse, and token use from anomalous ASNs. Use when hunting MFA-bypass vi
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FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete03516262…3706f138
0351626227ce…9d403706f1385 archivos · 11.1 KBEscaneoMedio2 hallazgos
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse@54a7988
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Overview
Adversaries increasingly bypass MFA not by defeating it but by stealing the artifacts issued after a successful authentication — session cookies, OAuth access/refresh tokens, and Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs). With a stolen token an attacker replays the existing session ("pass-the-cookie" / token replay), inheriting the victim's authenticated state across federated SaaS without ever prompting for credentials or MFA. Mandiant's M-Trends reporting and Microsoft/Okta incident data both highlight token theft as a dominant cloud lateral-movement technique, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token.
Detection relies on correlating identity telemetry rather than watching for failed logins. In Microsoft Entra ID the key tables are SigninLogs (interactive), AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs (where replayed cookies/refresh tokens commonly surface), and AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs. Entra now exposes linkable identifiers — SessionId and UniqueTokenIdentifier — that let a hunter stitch every artifact derived from one root authentication event together and spot a single session being used from multiple IPs, ASNs, or device fingerprints. In Okta the System Log carries authentication.sso, policy.evaluate_sign_on, and user.session.start events with a deviceToken/session context; the same session token appearing from divergent IPs/user-agents is the tell. Okta Identity Threat Protection (ITP) can natively flag "suspected session hijacking."
This skill provides a hypothesis-driven hunt: baseline normal session behavior, then look for impossible travel within a single session, refresh-token reuse, token use from anomalous infrastructure (hosting/VPS ASNs), and SaaS access patterns inconsistent with the user's device. Source: MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001; Microsoft Entra ID sign-in log documentation; Okta System Log reference; Mandiant M-Trends.
When to Use
- Threat hunting for MFA-bypass via stolen tokens/cookies across Entra ID and SaaS
- Investigating an alert for impossible travel, anomalous OAuth grant, or token reuse
- Validating detection coverage for T1550.001 after a phishing/AiTM incident
- Building Sentinel/Splunk/Okta detections for session-token replay
- Post-incident hunting to scope SaaS lateral movement from a compromised identity
Prerequisites
- Entra ID sign-in logs flowing to a queryable store (Microsoft Sentinel / Log Analytics):
bash # Confirm the diagnostic settings export SigninLogs + non-interactive logs to a workspace az monitor diagnostic-settings list --resource \ /providers/Microsoft.aadiam/diagnosticSettings -o table - Okta System Log access via API or SIEM ingestion:
bash curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS $OKTA_API_TOKEN" \ "https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType eq \"user.session.start\"&since=2026-06-01T00:00:00Z" - An IP enrichment source (GeoIP + ASN/hosting-provider classification)
- Read access to the SIEM (KQL for Sentinel, SPL for Splunk)
- Python 3.9+ for the helper script (
requestsfor the Okta API)
Objectives
- Baseline normal per-user session behavior (IPs, ASNs, devices, SaaS apps)
- Correlate Entra sign-in artifacts by
SessionId/UniqueTokenIdentifier - Detect a single session used from multiple IPs/ASNs (token replay)
- Detect impossible travel within one authenticated session
- Detect refresh-token reuse and anomalous OAuth grants
- Hunt Okta System Log for reused session tokens across contexts
- Produce findings and feed confirmed patterns into standing detections
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| ID | Name | Use in this skill |
|---|---|---|
| T1550.001 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token | Core technique — replaying stolen OAuth tokens/cookies |
| T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | The cookie theft that precedes pass-the-cookie replay |
| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | Acquisition of OAuth tokens via phishing/illicit consent |
| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Replayed tokens grant valid-account access to SaaS |
| T1098.001 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | Follow-on persistence after token abuse |
Workflow
1. Correlate Entra sign-in artifacts by session
Stitch interactive, non-interactive, and SP sign-ins for one session to see the full chain.
union SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where isnotempty(SessionId)
| summarize IPs=make_set(IPAddress), Apps=make_set(AppDisplayName),
Locations=make_set(tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)),
Count=count() by SessionId, UserPrincipalName
| where array_length(IPs) > 12. Detect a single session used from multiple ASNs (token replay)
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| extend ASN = tostring(parse_json(tostring(NetworkLocationDetails))[0].networkType)
| summarize distinctIPs = dcount(IPAddress),
ipset = make_set(IPAddress) by SessionId, UserPrincipalName
| where distinctIPs >= 23. Detect impossible travel within one authenticated session
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress,
City=tostring(LocationDetails.city),
Country=tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion), SessionId
| order by UserPrincipalName, TimeGenerated asc
| serialize
| extend prevCountry = prev(Country), prevTime = prev(TimeGenerated),
prevUser = prev(UserPrincipalName)
| where UserPrincipalName == prevUser and Country != prevCountry
and datetime_diff('minute', TimeGenerated, prevTime) < 604. Detect token use from hosting/VPS infrastructure
Replayed tokens are frequently used from datacenter ASNs, unlike the user's residential/corporate ranges.
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ResultType == 0
| extend asnOrg = tostring(parse_json(tostring(AutonomousSystemNumber)))
| where IPAddress in (toscalar(externaldata(ip:string)["<hosting-asn-iplist>"]))
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress5. Hunt anomalous OAuth grants / illicit consent (token theft precursor)
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where OperationName in ("Consent to application", "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
"Add delegated permission grant")
| extend app = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, app, Result6. Hunt the Okta System Log for reused session tokens
A single Okta session (deviceToken) used from divergent IPs/clients indicates hijack.
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS $OKTA_API_TOKEN" \
"https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType eq \"policy.evaluate_sign_on\"&since=2026-06-15T00:00:00Z" \
| jq -r '.[] | [.authenticationContext.externalSessionId, .client.ipAddress, .client.userAgent.rawUserAgent] | @tsv' \
| sort | uniq -c | sort -rn7. Splunk equivalent for Okta session reuse
index=okta eventType="policy.evaluate_sign_on"
| stats dc(client.ipAddress) as ip_count
values(client.ipAddress) as ips
values(client.userAgent.rawUserAgent) as agents
by authenticationContext.externalSessionId actor.alternateId
| where ip_count > 18. Triage and respond
For confirmed token abuse, revoke sessions and rotate, then promote the hunt to a rule.
# Revoke all refresh tokens / sessions for the user in Entra
az rest --method POST \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<userId>/revokeSignInSessions"See scripts/agent.py to pull Okta logs and flag reused session tokens automatically.
Tools and Resources
| Resource | Purpose | Link |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001 | Technique reference | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001/ |
| Entra sign-in logs schema | KQL hunting field reference | https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-azure-monitor-sign-ins-log-schema |
| Azure-Sentinel hunting repo | Community KQL detections | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel |
| Okta System Log API | Event hunting source | https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ |
| Mandiant M-Trends | Token-theft threat landscape | https://www.mandiant.com/m-trends |
| AzureAD-Attack-Defense | PRT/token replay detection guidance | https://github.com/Cloud-Architekt/AzureAD-Attack-Defense |
Preventive Controls to Recommend
Detection should pair with controls that make stolen tokens far less useful:
- Entra Conditional Access "token protection" binds the sign-in session to the device, so an exfiltrated cookie/PRT cannot be replayed off-device.
- Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) revokes access in near-real-time on risk events instead of waiting for token expiry.
- Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) blocks the AiTM proxy phishing that harvests tokens in the first place.
- Short token lifetimes + refresh-token rotation shrink the replay window and turn refresh-token reuse into an unambiguous compromise signal.
- Okta Identity Threat Protection (ITP) flags suspected session hijacking natively.
False-Positive Tuning
| Benign cause | Tuning |
|---|---|
| Corporate VPN/proxy egress (many users, few IPs) | Allowlist known egress IPs/ASNs |
| Mobile carrier IP rotation | Widen impossible-travel time/distance thresholds |
| Legitimate multi-device users | Correlate device IDs, not just IPs |
| Backend/API calls within one session | Exclude expected service principals |
Key Indicators
| Indicator | Signal |
|---|---|
One SessionId across multiple IPs/ASNs |
Token/cookie replay |
| Non-interactive sign-in from new datacenter IP | Replayed refresh token |
| Impossible travel within < 1h | Concurrent session use |
| Refresh-token reuse after rotation | Strong compromise signal |
| New OAuth consent to unfamiliar app | Illicit-consent token theft |
| Okta session token from divergent user-agents | Session hijack |
Validation Criteria
- Entra
SigninLogsandAADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogsqueryable - Okta System Log accessible via API or SIEM
- Per-session correlation by
SessionIdproduces results - Multi-IP / multi-ASN single-session query implemented
- Impossible-travel-within-session query implemented
- Anomalous OAuth consent hunt implemented
- Okta reused-session-token hunt implemented
- Confirmed findings triaged and sessions revoked
- Effective queries promoted to standing detection rules
- False-positive baseline (VPN/proxy egress) documented
Archivos de esta versión
references/23.6 KB
- api-reference.md2.2 KB
- standards.md1.4 KB
scripts/15.2 KB
- agent.py5.2 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md11.3 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | Sí | Sí |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | Sí | Sí |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 03516262 | Firmada | – |
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