crypto-rsa-attacks
Break RSA when parameters or padding are weak — recover plaintext or the private key from a public key and ciphertext. Load when you meet RSA in auth/tokens/TLS/custom crypto and have (n, e) + a ciphertext. Signals: a public key or n/e/c values, small exponent e=3, "textbook RSA", a JWT signed RS256
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/crypto-rsa-attacksEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquetead8308ad…e2824db5
ad8308ad4e23…bc26e2824db51 archivo · 2.0 KBEscaneoBajosin hallazgos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cryptography/crypto-rsa-attacks@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
RSA is used somewhere you can reach on an authorized target — a session token/cookie, a licence
check, a custom API request signature, a JWT (RS256), or an exposed keypair — and you can read the
public key (n, e) and a ciphertext/signature. Real systems get RSA wrong in a handful of
repeatable ways; each has a direct recovery.
Why it works
RSA is only as strong as its parameters and padding. "Textbook" RSA (no OAEP/PSS) is malleable and deterministic, small or shared parameters are mathematically reversible, and a factorable modulus hands you the private key outright. You don't break RSA — you exploit the specific weakness in this key.
Method
- Extract parameters. From a PEM:
openssl rsa -pubin -in key.pem -text -noout(givesn,e). From a JWT: decode the header/key. Noteeand the bit-length ofn. - Match the weakness → attack:
- Factorable
n— look it up on factordb; small/knownnfactors instantly → derived. - Close primes (p≈q) — Fermat factorisation recovers
p,qin milliseconds. - Small
e(e=3) + small message — plaintext may be< n^(1/e); take the integer cube root ofc(no modular reduction happened). Also Håstad broadcast if the same msg is sent to several keys. - Shared prime across two keys —
gcd(n1, n2)yields a common factor → both keys fall. - Common modulus (same
n, twoewith gcd 1 on the same message) — combine with Bézout. - Small private exponent
d— Wiener's attack (continued fractions). - Textbook (no padding) — malleable: forge/blind via
c' = c·r^e mod n; deterministic encryption enables chosen-ciphertext games.
- Factorable
- Automate the triage with RsaCtfTool (
rsactftool --publickey key.pem --uncipher cruns the above battery), then finish by hand once you know which weakness hit. - Recover and use — with
p,q:d = e^-1 mod (p-1)(q-1), decryptc, or re-sign to forge a token/signature.
Gotchas
- Proper padding (OAEP/PSS) with strong random primes ≈ unbreakable — don't burn time; the win is a misconfiguration, not the algorithm. Confirm it's textbook/weak first.
eanddare inverses mod φ(n) — a wrong φ (usingninstead of(p-1)(q-1)) gives a key that "looks" right but fails; verify by decrypting a known value.- JWT RS256 → key confusion is a different bug (alg swap to HS256) — see
web-auth-jwt; this skill is for weak RSA keys themselves. - Endianness / block size when converting the integer back to bytes trips people up
(
long_to_bytes).
Verify success
Recovered plaintext that is meaningful (or a forged signature/token the target accepts), and — when
you factored n — a private key that correctly decrypts a value you can check.
References
RsaCtfTool; factordb; Boneh "Twenty Years of Attacks on RSA"; Wiener's attack; pycryptodome.
Related: web-auth-jwt, crypto-oracle-attacks.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md3.6 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | ad8308ad | Firmada | – |
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