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How it works
noorqureshi/crypto-rsa-attacksCryptography and Web3

crypto-rsa-attacks

⁨Break RSA when parameters or padding are weak — recover plaintext or the private key from a public key and ciphertext. Load when you meet RSA in auth/tokens/TLS/custom crypto and have (n, e) + a ciphertext. Signals: a public key or n/e/c values, small exponent e=3, "textbook RSA", a JWT signed RS256⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/crypto-rsa-attacks

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
cRJNmKnMcQ…n0hIhpDw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packagead8308ad…e2824db5
ad8308ad4e23…bc26e2824db51 file · ⁦2.0 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cryptography/crypto-rsa-attacks@ee0e0c5

When it applies

RSA is used somewhere you can reach on an authorized target — a session token/cookie, a licence check, a custom API request signature, a JWT (RS256), or an exposed keypair — and you can read the public key (n, e) and a ciphertext/signature. Real systems get RSA wrong in a handful of repeatable ways; each has a direct recovery.

Why it works

RSA is only as strong as its parameters and padding. "Textbook" RSA (no OAEP/PSS) is malleable and deterministic, small or shared parameters are mathematically reversible, and a factorable modulus hands you the private key outright. You don't break RSA — you exploit the specific weakness in this key.

Method

  1. Extract parameters. From a PEM: openssl rsa -pubin -in key.pem -text -noout (gives n, e). From a JWT: decode the header/key. Note e and the bit-length of n.
  2. Match the weakness → attack:
    • Factorable n — look it up on factordb; small/known n factors instantly → derive d.
    • Close primes (p≈q) — Fermat factorisation recovers p,q in milliseconds.
    • Small e (e=3) + small message — plaintext may be < n^(1/e); take the integer cube root of c (no modular reduction happened). Also Håstad broadcast if the same msg is sent to several keys.
    • Shared prime across two keys — gcd(n1, n2) yields a common factor → both keys fall.
    • Common modulus (same n, two e with gcd 1 on the same message) — combine with Bézout.
    • Small private exponent d — Wiener's attack (continued fractions).
    • Textbook (no padding) — malleable: forge/blind via c' = c·r^e mod n; deterministic encryption enables chosen-ciphertext games.
  3. Automate the triage with RsaCtfTool (rsactftool --publickey key.pem --uncipher c runs the above battery), then finish by hand once you know which weakness hit.
  4. Recover and use — with p,q: d = e^-1 mod (p-1)(q-1), decrypt c, or re-sign to forge a token/signature.

Gotchas

  • Proper padding (OAEP/PSS) with strong random primes ≈ unbreakable — don't burn time; the win is a misconfiguration, not the algorithm. Confirm it's textbook/weak first.
  • e and d are inverses mod φ(n) — a wrong φ (using n instead of (p-1)(q-1)) gives a key that "looks" right but fails; verify by decrypting a known value.
  • JWT RS256 → key confusion is a different bug (alg swap to HS256) — see web-auth-jwt; this skill is for weak RSA keys themselves.
  • Endianness / block size when converting the integer back to bytes trips people up (long_to_bytes).

Verify success

Recovered plaintext that is meaningful (or a forged signature/token the target accepts), and — when you factored n — a private key that correctly decrypts a value you can check.

References

RsaCtfTool; factordb; Boneh "Twenty Years of Attacks on RSA"; Wiener's attack; pycryptodome. Related: web-auth-jwt, crypto-oracle-attacks.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c5ad8308adSigned–

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