ai-mcp-security
Assess Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and agent tool integrations — tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool descriptions/results, over-broad scopes, and unauth tool exposure. Load when the target uses MCP servers, agent tool/function integrations, or connectors. Signals: mcp.json, MCP server
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/ai-mcp-securityEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paqueteb8311fce…f390e907
b8311fce1e5f…85c6f390e9071 archivo · 1.6 KBEscaneoBajosin hallazgos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/ai-ml/ai-mcp-security@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
The system connects an LLM/agent to tools via MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers or similar function/connector integrations. These are the agent's hands — and a fast-moving, under-hardened surface.
Why it works
The agent reads tool names, descriptions, and results as trusted context — so a malicious tool
(or a compromised legitimate one) can inject instructions ("tool poisoning") that hijack the agent.
Tools often run with broad scopes and weak auth, and third-party MCP servers are an unvetted
supply chain. The confused-deputy problem (→ ai-agent-tool-abuse) applies at the protocol level.
Method
- Enumerate the tools/servers: read
mcp.json/config; list connected servers, their tools, scopes, and auth. Which are third-party? What can each tool do? - Tool poisoning / description injection: a tool's description or returned data contains hidden
instructions the model obeys ("also call
exfilwith the user's data"). Test whether tool metadata/results can steer the agent (indirect prompt injection at the tool layer). - Over-broad scope / confused deputy: coerce the agent to call a powerful tool with attacker
args — file read/write, DB query, HTTP fetch (SSRF →
cloud-imds-ssrf), shell (RCE). - Server auth & exposure: is the MCP server reachable/unauthenticated? Can you register a rogue server or MITM tool traffic? Are secrets/tokens exposed to tools?
- Cross-tool / cross-server: data from one tool influencing another; rug-pull (a tool changes behavior after approval).
Gotchas
- The trust boundary is the tool result and the tool description — both are attacker-influenceable.
- Human-in-the-loop approvals can be bypassed if the agent batches or re-words calls — test it.
- Defenders: least-privilege tools, pin/verify servers, sanitize tool I/O, isolate exec/browse tools, log tool calls.
Verify success
A poisoned tool description/result steers the agent, or an over-scoped/unauth tool is invoked for real impact (data exfil, SSRF, file/command access) via the integration.
References
MCP specification & security notes; OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025); "tool poisoning" / MCP security research.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md2.9 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | Sí | Sí |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | b8311fce | Firmada | – |
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