ai-mcp-security
Assess Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and agent tool integrations — tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool descriptions/results, over-broad scopes, and unauth tool exposure. Load when the target uses MCP servers, agent tool/function integrations, or connectors. Signals: mcp.json, MCP server
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/ai-mcp-securityWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packageb8311fce…f390e907
b8311fce1e5f…85c6f390e9071 file · 1.6 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/ai-ml/ai-mcp-security@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
The system connects an LLM/agent to tools via MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers or similar function/connector integrations. These are the agent's hands — and a fast-moving, under-hardened surface.
Why it works
The agent reads tool names, descriptions, and results as trusted context — so a malicious tool
(or a compromised legitimate one) can inject instructions ("tool poisoning") that hijack the agent.
Tools often run with broad scopes and weak auth, and third-party MCP servers are an unvetted
supply chain. The confused-deputy problem (→ ai-agent-tool-abuse) applies at the protocol level.
Method
- Enumerate the tools/servers: read
mcp.json/config; list connected servers, their tools, scopes, and auth. Which are third-party? What can each tool do? - Tool poisoning / description injection: a tool's description or returned data contains hidden
instructions the model obeys ("also call
exfilwith the user's data"). Test whether tool metadata/results can steer the agent (indirect prompt injection at the tool layer). - Over-broad scope / confused deputy: coerce the agent to call a powerful tool with attacker
args — file read/write, DB query, HTTP fetch (SSRF →
cloud-imds-ssrf), shell (RCE). - Server auth & exposure: is the MCP server reachable/unauthenticated? Can you register a rogue server or MITM tool traffic? Are secrets/tokens exposed to tools?
- Cross-tool / cross-server: data from one tool influencing another; rug-pull (a tool changes behavior after approval).
Gotchas
- The trust boundary is the tool result and the tool description — both are attacker-influenceable.
- Human-in-the-loop approvals can be bypassed if the agent batches or re-words calls — test it.
- Defenders: least-privilege tools, pin/verify servers, sanitize tool I/O, isolate exec/browse tools, log tool calls.
Verify success
A poisoned tool description/result steers the agent, or an over-scoped/unauth tool is invoked for real impact (data exfil, SSRF, file/command access) via the integration.
References
MCP specification & security notes; OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025); "tool poisoning" / MCP security research.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md2.9 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | Yes | Yes |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | b8311fce | Signed | – |
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