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mukul975/validating-backup-integrity-for-recoveryCriptografía y Web3

validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery

⁨Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification,⁩

v1.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 11 horas

Instalar

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$ notholy skills install mukul975/validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

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+UGWi5VF4c…533yC9Ag==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
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ca0a17f800c0…b4ee8ab326094 archivos · ⁦11.0 KB⁩
EscaneoMedio4 hallazgos
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:179
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:204
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery@54a7988

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Verifying backup integrity before relying on backups for ransomware recovery
  • Building automated backup validation pipelines that run after each backup job
  • Auditing backup infrastructure to confirm recoverability for compliance (SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIST CSF RC.RP-03)
  • Detecting silent data corruption (bit rot) in backup storage before a disaster occurs
  • Validating that immutable or air-gapped backups have not been tampered with

Do not use for initial backup configuration or scheduling. This skill focuses on post-backup validation.

Prerequisites

  • Access to backup storage (local, NAS, S3, Azure Blob, GCS)
  • Python 3.9+ with hashlib (standard library)
  • Backup manifests or baseline hash files for comparison
  • Isolated restore environment for restore testing
  • Backup tool CLI access (restic, borgbackup, rclone, or vendor-specific)

Workflow

Step 1: Generate Baseline Hash Manifest

Create a cryptographic fingerprint of every file at backup time:

bash
# Generate SHA-256 manifest for a directory
find /data/production -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > /manifests/prod_baseline_$(date +%Y%m%d).sha256

# Verify manifest format
head -5 /manifests/prod_baseline_20260319.sha256
# e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924...  /data/production/config.yaml
# a7ffc6f8bf1ed76651c14756a061d662...  /data/production/database.sql

Step 2: Verify Backup Archive Integrity

Check that the backup archive itself is not corrupted:

bash
# Restic: verify backup repository integrity
restic -r s3:s3.amazonaws.com/backup-bucket check --read-data

# Borg: verify backup archive
borg check --verify-data /backup/repo::archive-2026-03-19

# Tar with gzip: verify archive integrity
gzip -t backup_20260319.tar.gz && echo "Archive OK" || echo "Archive CORRUPTED"

# AWS S3: verify object checksums
aws s3api head-object --bucket backup-bucket --key daily/2026-03-19.tar.gz \
  --checksum-mode ENABLED

Step 3: Perform Restore Test to Isolated Environment

bash
# Restore to isolated test directory
restic -r s3:s3.amazonaws.com/backup-bucket restore latest --target /restore-test/

# Generate hash manifest of restored data
find /restore-test -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > /manifests/restored_$(date +%Y%m%d).sha256

# Compare baseline and restored manifests
diff <(sort /manifests/prod_baseline_20260319.sha256) \
     <(sort /manifests/restored_20260319.sha256)

Step 4: Validate Data Completeness

bash
# Count files in original vs restored
echo "Original: $(find /data/production -type f | wc -l) files"
echo "Restored: $(find /restore-test -type f | wc -l) files"

# Check total size
echo "Original: $(du -sh /data/production | cut -f1)"
echo "Restored: $(du -sh /restore-test | cut -f1)"

# Database consistency check after restore
pg_restore --list backup.dump | wc -l  # Count objects in dump
psql -c "SELECT schemaname, tablename FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public';" restored_db

Step 5: Detect Ransomware Artifacts in Backups

Before trusting a backup for recovery, scan for ransomware indicators:

bash
# Check for common ransomware file extensions
find /restore-test -type f \( \
  -name "*.encrypted" -o -name "*.locked" -o -name "*.crypt" \
  -o -name "*.ransom" -o -name "*.pay" -o -name "*.wncry" \
  -o -name "*.cerber" -o -name "*.locky" -o -name "*.zepto" \
\) -print

# Check for ransom notes
find /restore-test -type f \( \
  -name "README_TO_DECRYPT*" -o -name "HOW_TO_RECOVER*" \
  -o -name "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS*" -o -name "HELP_DECRYPT*" \
\) -print

# Check file entropy (high entropy = possible encryption)
# Files with entropy > 7.9 out of 8.0 are likely encrypted
python agent.py --entropy-scan /restore-test

Step 6: Automate and Schedule Validation

yaml
# cron-based validation schedule
# Run nightly after backup window
0 4 * * * /opt/backup-validator/agent.py --validate-latest --notify-on-failure
# Weekly full restore test
0 6 * * 0 /opt/backup-validator/agent.py --full-restore-test --config /etc/backup-validator/config.json

Key Concepts

Term Definition
Hash Manifest File containing cryptographic hashes (SHA-256) for every file in a dataset, used as integrity baseline
Bit Rot Gradual data corruption on storage media that silently alters file contents
Immutable Backup Backup that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period
Restore Test Process of recovering data from backup to an isolated environment to verify recoverability
File Entropy Measure of randomness in file contents; encrypted files have entropy near 8.0 bits/byte
3-2-1 Rule Keep 3 copies of data, on 2 different media types, with 1 offsite copy
Backup Chain Sequence of full and incremental backups that must all be intact for recovery

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Restic Encrypted, deduplicated backup with built-in integrity verification
BorgBackup Deduplicating backup with archive verification
Rclone Cloud storage sync with checksum verification
AWS S3 Object Lock Immutable backup storage with WORM compliance
Azure Immutable Blob Tamper-proof backup storage for compliance
sha256sum Standard hash computation for file integrity
pg_restore PostgreSQL backup validation and restore testing

Common Pitfalls

  • Never testing restores: The most common failure mode. Backups that are never restored are untested assumptions.
  • Checking only archive integrity, not data integrity: A valid tar.gz can contain corrupted file contents. Always hash individual files.
  • Trusting last backup without scanning for ransomware: Backups may contain encrypted files if the infection predates the backup.
  • Ignoring incremental chain integrity: A single corrupted incremental backup can break the entire restore chain.
  • No alerting on validation failures: Backup validation must be monitored with alerts, not just logged silently.
  • Using MD5 for integrity: MD5 is cryptographically broken. Use SHA-256 or SHA-3 for integrity verification.

References

  • NIST SP 800-184: Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery
  • NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-03: Backup Integrity Verification
  • CIS Controls v8: Control 11 - Data Recovery
  • CISA Ransomware Guide: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosSíSí
Escribe archivosSíSí
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:179
  2. MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:204
  3. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  4. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v1.013 nov 202654a7988ca0a17f8Firmada–

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