validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery
Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification,
v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 11 hours ago
Install
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/validating-backup-integrity-for-recoveryWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packageca0a17f8…8ab32609
ca0a17f800c0…b4ee8ab326094 files · 11.0 KBScanMedium4 findings
- injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:179
- injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:204
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery@54a7988
On this page
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Verifying backup integrity before relying on backups for ransomware recovery
- Building automated backup validation pipelines that run after each backup job
- Auditing backup infrastructure to confirm recoverability for compliance (SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIST CSF RC.RP-03)
- Detecting silent data corruption (bit rot) in backup storage before a disaster occurs
- Validating that immutable or air-gapped backups have not been tampered with
Do not use for initial backup configuration or scheduling. This skill focuses on post-backup validation.
Prerequisites
- Access to backup storage (local, NAS, S3, Azure Blob, GCS)
- Python 3.9+ with
hashlib(standard library) - Backup manifests or baseline hash files for comparison
- Isolated restore environment for restore testing
- Backup tool CLI access (restic, borgbackup, rclone, or vendor-specific)
Workflow
Step 1: Generate Baseline Hash Manifest
Create a cryptographic fingerprint of every file at backup time:
# Generate SHA-256 manifest for a directory
find /data/production -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > /manifests/prod_baseline_$(date +%Y%m%d).sha256
# Verify manifest format
head -5 /manifests/prod_baseline_20260319.sha256
# e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924... /data/production/config.yaml
# a7ffc6f8bf1ed76651c14756a061d662... /data/production/database.sqlStep 2: Verify Backup Archive Integrity
Check that the backup archive itself is not corrupted:
# Restic: verify backup repository integrity
restic -r s3:s3.amazonaws.com/backup-bucket check --read-data
# Borg: verify backup archive
borg check --verify-data /backup/repo::archive-2026-03-19
# Tar with gzip: verify archive integrity
gzip -t backup_20260319.tar.gz && echo "Archive OK" || echo "Archive CORRUPTED"
# AWS S3: verify object checksums
aws s3api head-object --bucket backup-bucket --key daily/2026-03-19.tar.gz \
--checksum-mode ENABLEDStep 3: Perform Restore Test to Isolated Environment
# Restore to isolated test directory
restic -r s3:s3.amazonaws.com/backup-bucket restore latest --target /restore-test/
# Generate hash manifest of restored data
find /restore-test -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > /manifests/restored_$(date +%Y%m%d).sha256
# Compare baseline and restored manifests
diff <(sort /manifests/prod_baseline_20260319.sha256) \
<(sort /manifests/restored_20260319.sha256)Step 4: Validate Data Completeness
# Count files in original vs restored
echo "Original: $(find /data/production -type f | wc -l) files"
echo "Restored: $(find /restore-test -type f | wc -l) files"
# Check total size
echo "Original: $(du -sh /data/production | cut -f1)"
echo "Restored: $(du -sh /restore-test | cut -f1)"
# Database consistency check after restore
pg_restore --list backup.dump | wc -l # Count objects in dump
psql -c "SELECT schemaname, tablename FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public';" restored_dbStep 5: Detect Ransomware Artifacts in Backups
Before trusting a backup for recovery, scan for ransomware indicators:
# Check for common ransomware file extensions
find /restore-test -type f \( \
-name "*.encrypted" -o -name "*.locked" -o -name "*.crypt" \
-o -name "*.ransom" -o -name "*.pay" -o -name "*.wncry" \
-o -name "*.cerber" -o -name "*.locky" -o -name "*.zepto" \
\) -print
# Check for ransom notes
find /restore-test -type f \( \
-name "README_TO_DECRYPT*" -o -name "HOW_TO_RECOVER*" \
-o -name "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS*" -o -name "HELP_DECRYPT*" \
\) -print
# Check file entropy (high entropy = possible encryption)
# Files with entropy > 7.9 out of 8.0 are likely encrypted
python agent.py --entropy-scan /restore-testStep 6: Automate and Schedule Validation
# cron-based validation schedule
# Run nightly after backup window
0 4 * * * /opt/backup-validator/agent.py --validate-latest --notify-on-failure
# Weekly full restore test
0 6 * * 0 /opt/backup-validator/agent.py --full-restore-test --config /etc/backup-validator/config.jsonKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Hash Manifest | File containing cryptographic hashes (SHA-256) for every file in a dataset, used as integrity baseline |
| Bit Rot | Gradual data corruption on storage media that silently alters file contents |
| Immutable Backup | Backup that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period |
| Restore Test | Process of recovering data from backup to an isolated environment to verify recoverability |
| File Entropy | Measure of randomness in file contents; encrypted files have entropy near 8.0 bits/byte |
| 3-2-1 Rule | Keep 3 copies of data, on 2 different media types, with 1 offsite copy |
| Backup Chain | Sequence of full and incremental backups that must all be intact for recovery |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Restic | Encrypted, deduplicated backup with built-in integrity verification |
| BorgBackup | Deduplicating backup with archive verification |
| Rclone | Cloud storage sync with checksum verification |
| AWS S3 Object Lock | Immutable backup storage with WORM compliance |
| Azure Immutable Blob | Tamper-proof backup storage for compliance |
| sha256sum | Standard hash computation for file integrity |
| pg_restore | PostgreSQL backup validation and restore testing |
Common Pitfalls
- Never testing restores: The most common failure mode. Backups that are never restored are untested assumptions.
- Checking only archive integrity, not data integrity: A valid tar.gz can contain corrupted file contents. Always hash individual files.
- Trusting last backup without scanning for ransomware: Backups may contain encrypted files if the infection predates the backup.
- Ignoring incremental chain integrity: A single corrupted incremental backup can break the entire restore chain.
- No alerting on validation failures: Backup validation must be monitored with alerts, not just logged silently.
- Using MD5 for integrity: MD5 is cryptographically broken. Use SHA-256 or SHA-3 for integrity verification.
References
- NIST SP 800-184: Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery
- NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-03: Backup Integrity Verification
- CIS Controls v8: Control 11 - Data Recovery
- CISA Ransomware Guide: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware
Files in this version
references/13.9 KB
- api-reference.md3.9 KB
scripts/110.5 KB
- agent.py10.5 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md7.6 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | Yes | Yes |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:179
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:204
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | 54a7988 | ca0a17f8 | Signed | – |
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