detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon
Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process
v1.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 13 horas
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmonEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete9edc83d4…f5b3b36d
9edc83d4d688…6fe2f5b3b36d8 archivos · 12.5 KBEscaneoMedio3 hallazgos
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon@54a7988
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When to Use
- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes
- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation
- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes
- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants
- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection
Prerequisites
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25
- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection
- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters
- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection
- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+
- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting
Workflow
- Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8): Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.
- Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10): Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.
- Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7): Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.
- Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25): Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).
- Correlate with Process Creation: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.
- Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).
- Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |
| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |
| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |
| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |
| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |
| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |
| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |
| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |
| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |
| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |
| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |
| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |
| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |
| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed/injected code |
| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |
| Splunk / Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |
| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |
| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation
index=sysmon EventCode=8
| where SourceImage!=TargetImage
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\.exe$")
| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, "(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\.exe$"), "high_value_target", "normal_target")
| where suspicious="high_value_target"
| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadIdSplunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns
index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where SourceImage!=TargetImage
| where match(GrantedAccess, "(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)")
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\.exe$")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTraceKQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "CreateRemoteThreadApiCall"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("csrss.exe", "lsass.exe", "services.exe", "svchost.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("svchost.exe", "explorer.exe", "lsass.exe", "winlogon.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
FileName, ProcessCommandLineSigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection
title: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
category: create_remote_thread
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\explorer.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\winlogon.exe'
filter_legitimate:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\services.exe'
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
level: high
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055Common Scenarios
- Classic DLL Injection: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.
- Process Hollowing (RunPE): Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.
- APC Injection: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.
- Reflective DLL Injection: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.
- Process Doppelganging: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Source Process: [Injecting process path]
Source PID: [Process ID]
Target Process: [Target process path]
Target PID: [Process ID]
Injection Type: [DLL/Shellcode/Hollowing/APC]
Sysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]
Access Mask: [Granted access value]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
ATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]Archivos de esta versión
assets/1978 B
- template.md978 B
references/38.9 KB
- api-reference.md2.7 KB
- standards.md3.2 KB
- workflows.md3.0 KB
scripts/211.2 KB
- agent.py5.4 KB
- process.py5.9 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md7.7 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | Sí | Sí |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | Sí | Sí |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 9edc83d4 | Firmada | – |
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