detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon
Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process
v1.03 instalações+3 em 7 dias36,3 mil EstrelasApache-2.0sincronizado há 13 horas
Instalar
Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmonGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacote9edc83d4…f5b3b36d
9edc83d4d688…6fe2f5b3b36d8 arquivos · 12.5 KBVarreduraMédio3 achados
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
- Links para domínios externos
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon@54a7988
Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.
Nesta página
When to Use
- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes
- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation
- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes
- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants
- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection
Prerequisites
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25
- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection
- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters
- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection
- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+
- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting
Workflow
- Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8): Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.
- Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10): Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.
- Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7): Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.
- Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25): Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).
- Correlate with Process Creation: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.
- Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).
- Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |
| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |
| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |
| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |
| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |
| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |
| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |
| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |
| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |
| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |
| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |
| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |
| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |
| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed/injected code |
| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |
| Splunk / Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |
| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |
| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation
index=sysmon EventCode=8
| where SourceImage!=TargetImage
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\.exe$")
| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, "(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\.exe$"), "high_value_target", "normal_target")
| where suspicious="high_value_target"
| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadIdSplunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns
index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where SourceImage!=TargetImage
| where match(GrantedAccess, "(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)")
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\.exe$")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTraceKQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "CreateRemoteThreadApiCall"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("csrss.exe", "lsass.exe", "services.exe", "svchost.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("svchost.exe", "explorer.exe", "lsass.exe", "winlogon.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
FileName, ProcessCommandLineSigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection
title: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
category: create_remote_thread
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\explorer.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\winlogon.exe'
filter_legitimate:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\services.exe'
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
level: high
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055Common Scenarios
- Classic DLL Injection: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.
- Process Hollowing (RunPE): Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.
- APC Injection: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.
- Reflective DLL Injection: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.
- Process Doppelganging: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Source Process: [Injecting process path]
Source PID: [Process ID]
Target Process: [Target process path]
Target PID: [Process ID]
Injection Type: [DLL/Shellcode/Hollowing/APC]
Sysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]
Access Mask: [Granted access value]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
ATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]Arquivos desta versão
assets/1978 B
- template.md978 B
references/38.9 KB
- api-reference.md2.7 KB
- standards.md3.2 KB
- workflows.md3.0 KB
scripts/211.2 KB
- agent.py5.4 KB
- process.py5.9 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md7.7 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Sim | Sim |
| Roda comandos no shell | Sim | Sim |
| Usa a rede | Sim | Sim |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
- InfoLink · Links para domínios externos
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | 54a7988 | 9edc83d4 | Assinada | – |
Mais de mukul975
Tudo deste publicador- testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilitiesmukul975/testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilities5
- testing-for-sensitive-data-exposuremukul975/testing-for-sensitive-data-exposure5
- performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attackmukul975/performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attack5
- detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehogmukul975/detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog5
Mais em Relatórios e compliance
Ver a categoria- skillduty1g/skill5
- rea-ci-tests-auditmorluto/rea-ci-tests-audit4
- tracking-threat-actor-infrastructuremukul975/tracking-threat-actor-infrastructure4
- performing-authenticated-scan-with-openvasmukul975/performing-authenticated-scan-with-openvas4
- slicing-code-contexttrailofbits/slicing-code-context4
- 1337aeondave/13374
Pergunte tudo o que o seu escopo permite.
Crie a conta, adicione créditos e faça a primeira pergunta no chat ou no terminal.
- 1/3
Crie a conta
Individual ou empresa. Dá para virar empresa depois sem perder saldo nem chaves.
Pessoa físicaEmpresa - 2/3
Adicione créditos
No cartão. Você paga por token, sem assinatura.
$5.00recarga mínima - 3/3
Pergunte
No chat, ou instale o CLI e rode notholy login no terminal.
$ notholy login