reverse-eng-thick-client
Security-test a desktop thick client end to end: map its trust boundaries, then work the local attack surface (config files, credential storage, IPC, update channel) and the network surface (proxying, certificate pinning, hidden APIs). Load for a C/S desktop app in scope — Electron, Qt, .NET WinForm
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 установки+3 за 7 дней27 ЗвездыMITсинхронизировано 22 часа назад
Установка
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-thick-clientПишет в ~/.notholy/skills после проверки подписи и SHA-256.
ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакет0824e60e…42155b09
0824e60ebdda…acff42155b091 файл · 2.5 KBПроверкаНизкий1 замечание
- Ссылки на внешние домены
Источникgithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-thick-client@ee0e0c5
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
На странице
When it applies
The engagement includes a desktop application — a client-server (C/S) client built on
Electron, Qt, .NET WinForms/WPF, or native code — rather than a pure web app. Typical triggers:
an installer in scope, credentials cached locally, an auto-updater, a loopback port or named
pipe, or API calls the UI never exposes. Record the installer source and the test accounts in
scope.txt (tradecraft-scope-roe); test only machines and accounts you're authorized for.
Why it works
A thick client is a server-side trust boundary shipped to an attacker-controlled machine: everything it stores, every check it enforces locally, and every API it knows how to call is yours to read. The client cannot keep secrets from its operator — so hardcoded keys, hidden admin endpoints, and client-enforced validation are structural findings, not luck.
Method
Work boundary → local surface → network surface → reverse-engineering confirmation.
- Map the trust boundary. Enumerate the process tree and child processes, any services or
drivers it installs, listening ports (a loopback socket bound to
0.0.0.0is an instant finding), outbound domains, and the sensitive paths it touches:%APPDATA%, Keychain, registry hives. Process Monitor and TCPView (Sysinternals) get you this in minutes. - Work the local attack surface. Look for plaintext config and logs, hardcoded keys, leftover debug switches and hidden menus, SQLite databases (permissions and encryption), credential storage (DPAPI / Keychain / plaintext), autostart entries, install/uninstall residue and file permissions, and on Windows DLL search-order hijacking. Check IPC: who can connect to the named pipe / loopback port, and is there any authentication?
- Work the network surface. Determine whether the app honors the system proxy or uses
custom TLS; force it through Burp/mitmproxy. Certificate pinning → the usual bypasses
(
mobile-cert-pinning-bypasstechniques, or Frida on the desktop process). Once traffic is visible, hunt client-hidden API surface: admin functions the UI gates but the server may not — feed the recovered endpoints intoapi-testing-checklist/api-bola. - Reverse to confirm. .NET → dnSpy/ILSpy (deobfuscate with de4dot if needed). Native →
reverse-eng-binary-triage. Electron → extractapp.asar(npx asar extract app.asar out/) and treat it as front-end JS (reverse-eng-js). Verify how licenses, signatures, and integrity checks are enforced — anything checked only client-side is bypassable by design. - Update channel & supply chain. Check the update URL (HTTP vs HTTPS), whether the update package is signature-verified, and whether the check itself runs client-side. A confirmed weak update channel is high-impact — document, don't weaponize, without explicit scope.
Gotchas
- Electron apps are web apps in a trench coat — don't start with a disassembler; the
asarplus DevTools answers most questions in minutes. - .NET obfuscation makes dnSpy output noisy — run de4dot first, and prefer runtime inspection (dnSpy debugger) over static reading for the interesting checks.
- "Server validates too" assumption — never report client-side-only checks without testing the server's response to a tampered request; some are genuinely enforced server-side.
- Clean up your artifacts — remove planted DLLs, proxy certificates, patched binaries, and test accounts when done (house rule: minimize footprint).
Verify success
You have a trust-boundary diagram (processes, ports, files, servers), both local and network
surfaces covered, and at least one concrete, demonstrated finding class — e.g. a recovered
secret, a server-accepted tampered request, or an unauthenticated IPC connection — validated
per reporting-triage-validation.
References
OWASP Desktop Application Security Top 10; Sysinternals suite; dnSpy docs; reverse-eng-js,
reverse-eng-binary-triage, mobile-cert-pinning-bypass in this library.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
Файлы этой версии
- SKILL.md4.9 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Пишет файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Выполняет команды shell | Нет | Нет |
| Ходит в сеть | Да | Да |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
- ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | ee0e0c5 | 0824e60e | Подписана | – |
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