performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass
Bypasses SSL/TLS certificate pinning implementations in Android and
v1.0.03 установки+3 за 7 дней36,3 тыс. ЗвездыApache-2.0синхронизировано 12 часов назад
Установка
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypassПишет в ~/.notholy/skills после проверки подписи и SHA-256.
ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакет4d4d96ee…7f05c8dc
4d4d96eea901…c3917f05c8dc8 файлов · 11.3 KBПроверкаСредний3 замечания
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
- Ссылки на внешние домены
Источникgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass@54a7988
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
На странице
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Mobile app refuses connections through a proxy due to certificate pinning
- Performing authorized security testing requiring HTTPS traffic interception
- Assessing the strength and bypass difficulty of pinning implementations
- Evaluating defense-in-depth of mobile app network security
Do not use to bypass pinning on apps without explicit testing authorization.
Prerequisites
- Burp Suite configured as proxy with listener on all interfaces
- Rooted Android device or jailbroken iOS device
- Frida server running on target device
- Objection installed (
pip install objection) - Target app installed and reproducing the pinning behavior
Workflow
Step 1: Identify Pinning Implementation
Android pinning methods to identify:
1. Network Security Config (res/xml/network_security_config.xml)
<pin-set> with certificate hash pins
2. OkHttp CertificatePinner
CertificatePinner.Builder().add("api.target.com", "sha256/...")
3. Custom TrustManager
X509TrustManager overrides in code
4. Third-party libraries
- TrustKit
- Certificate Transparency checksiOS pinning methods:
1. NSURLSession delegate (URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:)
2. ATS (App Transport Security) with custom trust evaluation
3. TrustKit framework
4. Alamofire ServerTrustPolicy
5. Custom SecTrust evaluationStep 2: Bypass with Objection (Quickest Approach)
# Android
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
android sslpinning disable
# iOS
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
ios sslpinning disableObjection hooks common pinning implementations including OkHttp CertificatePinner, TrustManagerImpl, NSURLSession delegate methods, and SecTrust evaluation.
Step 3: Bypass with Custom Frida Scripts
Android - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:
// android_ssl_bypass.js
Java.perform(function() {
// Bypass TrustManagerImpl
var TrustManagerImpl = Java.use("com.android.org.conscrypt.TrustManagerImpl");
TrustManagerImpl.verifyChain.implementation = function(untrustedChain, trustAnchorChain,
host, clientAuth, ocspData, tlsSctData) {
console.log("[+] Bypassing TrustManagerImpl for: " + host);
return untrustedChain;
};
// Bypass OkHttp3 CertificatePinner
try {
var CertificatePinner = Java.use("okhttp3.CertificatePinner");
CertificatePinner.check.overload("java.lang.String", "java.util.List").implementation =
function(hostname, peerCertificates) {
console.log("[+] Bypassing OkHttp3 pinning for: " + hostname);
return;
};
} catch(e) {}
// Bypass custom X509TrustManager
var X509TrustManager = Java.use("javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager");
var TrustManager = Java.registerClass({
name: "com.bypass.TrustManager",
implements: [X509TrustManager],
methods: {
checkClientTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},
checkServerTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},
getAcceptedIssuers: function() { return []; }
}
});
// Bypass SSLContext
var SSLContext = Java.use("javax.net.ssl.SSLContext");
SSLContext.init.overload("[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;",
"[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;", "java.security.SecureRandom").implementation =
function(km, tm, sr) {
console.log("[+] Replacing TrustManagers in SSLContext.init");
this.init(km, [TrustManager.$new()], sr);
};
// Bypass NetworkSecurityConfig (Android 7+)
try {
var NetworkSecurityConfig = Java.use(
"android.security.net.config.NetworkSecurityConfig");
NetworkSecurityConfig.isCleartextTrafficPermitted.implementation = function() {
return true;
};
} catch(e) {}
console.log("[*] SSL pinning bypass loaded");
});frida -U -f com.target.app -l android_ssl_bypass.js --no-pauseiOS - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:
// ios_ssl_bypass.js
if (ObjC.available) {
// Bypass NSURLSession delegate
var resolver = new ApiResolver("objc");
resolver.enumerateMatches(
"-[* URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:completionHandler:]", {
onMatch: function(match) {
Interceptor.attach(match.address, {
onEnter: function(args) {
var completionHandler = new ObjC.Block(args[4]);
var NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential = 0;
var trust = new ObjC.Object(args[3])
.protectionSpace().serverTrust();
var credential = ObjC.classes.NSURLCredential
.credentialForTrust_(trust);
completionHandler.invoke(NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential,
credential);
}
});
},
onComplete: function() {}
});
// Bypass SecTrustEvaluate
var SecTrustEvaluateWithError = Module.findExportByName(
"Security", "SecTrustEvaluateWithError");
if (SecTrustEvaluateWithError) {
Interceptor.replace(SecTrustEvaluateWithError, new NativeCallback(
function(trust, error) {
return 1; // Always return true
}, "bool", ["pointer", "pointer"]
));
}
console.log("[*] iOS SSL pinning bypass loaded");
}Step 4: Handle Advanced Pinning
For apps using advanced pinning (TrustKit, custom binary checks):
# Identify the specific pinning library
frida-trace -U -n TargetApp -m "*[*Trust*]" -m "*[*Pin*]" -m "*[*SSL*]" -m "*[*Certificate*]"
# Hook the identified validation function
# Custom Frida script targeting the specific implementationStep 5: Verify Bypass Success
After applying the bypass:
- Configure device proxy to Burp Suite
- Open target app and navigate through authenticated flows
- Verify HTTPS traffic appears in Burp Suite HTTP History
- Check for any remaining pinned connections that are not captured
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Certificate Pinning | Restricting accepted server certificates to a known set, preventing MITM via rogue CA certificates |
| Public Key Pinning | Pinning the server's public key hash rather than the full certificate, surviving certificate rotation |
| Network Security Config | Android XML configuration for declaring trust anchors, pins, and cleartext policy per-domain |
| TrustKit | Open-source library implementing certificate pinning with reporting for both Android and iOS |
| HPKP Deprecation | HTTP Public Key Pinning header was deprecated in browsers but concept persists in mobile apps |
Tools & Systems
- Objection: Pre-built pinning bypass for common libraries (OkHttp, NSURLSession, TrustKit)
- Frida: Custom JavaScript hooks targeting specific pinning implementations
- apktool: APK decompilation for identifying pinning in Network Security Config
- SSLUnpinning (Xposed): Xposed framework module for system-wide pinning bypass on Android
- ssl-kill-switch2: iOS tweak for disabling SSL pinning system-wide on jailbroken devices
Common Pitfalls
- Certificate transparency: Some apps check CT logs in addition to pinning. May need to bypass CT verification separately.
- Multi-layer pinning: Apps may implement pinning at multiple levels (OkHttp + custom TrustManager). Bypass all layers.
- Binary-level pinning: Some apps validate certificates in native C/C++ code, which requires Interceptor.attach at native function addresses rather than Java/ObjC hooks.
- Dynamic pinning updates: Apps using TrustKit or similar may fetch updated pins from a server. Monitor for pin rotation during testing.
Файлы этой версии
assets/1560 B
- template.md560 B
references/33.7 KB
- api-reference.md1.5 KB
- standards.md760 B
- workflows.md1.5 KB
scripts/212.0 KB
- agent.py6.7 KB
- process.py5.3 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md8.5 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Да | Да |
| Пишет файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Выполняет команды shell | Да | Да |
| Ходит в сеть | Да | Да |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
- ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | 54a7988 | 4d4d96ee | Подписана | – |
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