analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence
Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence (SPI flash implants, ESP modifications,
v1.0.03 установки+3 за 7 дней36,3 тыс. ЗвездыApache-2.0синхронизировано 13 часов назад
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ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакет7d06a973…df987fdf
7d06a973f538…07a6df987fdf4 файла · 16.2 KBПроверкаСредний2 замечания
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- Ссылки на внешние домены
Источникgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence@54a7988
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
На странице
When to Use
- A compromised system re-establishes C2 communication after OS reinstallation or disk replacement
- Secure Boot has been tampered with, disabled, or shows unexpected Machine Owner Key (MOK) enrollment
- Firmware integrity verification fails against vendor-provided baselines
- Memory forensics reveals rootkit components loading during early boot phase
- Investigating advanced persistent threat (APT) campaigns known to deploy UEFI implants
- Auditing firmware security posture for enterprise endpoint hardening
Do not use for standard MBR-based bootkits on legacy BIOS systems without UEFI; use MBR/VBR bootkit analysis instead.
Prerequisites
- chipsec framework for SPI flash dumping, UEFI variable inspection, and firmware security modules
- UEFITool / UEFIExtract for firmware volume parsing and DXE driver extraction
- Python 3.8+ with struct, hashlib, subprocess, and os modules
- Bootable Linux live USB for offline analysis (avoid running compromised OS)
- Volatility 3 for memory forensics of boot-phase artifacts
- YARA with UEFI malware rule sets for pattern-based detection
- Access to vendor firmware baselines for integrity comparison
Workflow
Step 1: Dump SPI Flash Firmware
Acquire the UEFI firmware from the SPI flash chip for offline analysis:
# Using chipsec to dump SPI flash contents
python chipsec_util.py spi dump firmware_dump.rom
# Using flashrom as an alternative
flashrom -p internal -r firmware_dump.rom
# Verify dump integrity
sha256sum firmware_dump.rom
# Read SPI flash descriptor information
python chipsec_util.py spi info
# Check SPI flash region access permissions
python chipsec_main.py -m common.spi_access
# Verify BIOS write protection is enabled
python chipsec_main.py -m common.bios_wp
# Check SPI flash controller lock
python chipsec_main.py -m common.spi_lockStep 2: Inspect UEFI Variables
Enumerate and analyze UEFI variables for unauthorized modifications:
# List all UEFI variables on a live system
python chipsec_util.py uefi var-list
# List UEFI variables from a SPI flash dump
python chipsec_util.py uefi var-list-spi firmware_dump.rom
# Read specific Secure Boot variables
python chipsec_util.py uefi var-read SecureBoot 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C
python chipsec_util.py uefi var-read SetupMode 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C
python chipsec_util.py uefi var-read PK 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C
python chipsec_util.py uefi var-read KEK 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C
python chipsec_util.py uefi var-read db D719B2CB-3D3A-4596-A3BC-DAD00E67656F
# Dump UEFI key databases for analysis
python chipsec_util.py uefi keys
# Check Secure Boot configuration module
python chipsec_main.py -m common.secureboot.variablesStep 3: Analyze EFI System Partition (ESP)
Inspect the ESP for unauthorized or modified boot components:
# Mount ESP (typically the first FAT32 partition, ~100-500MB)
mkdir /mnt/esp
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/esp
# List all files on ESP with timestamps
find /mnt/esp -type f -exec ls -la {} \;
# Check for BlackLotus indicators - custom directory under ESP:/system32/
ls -la /mnt/esp/system32/ 2>/dev/null
# Verify Windows Boot Manager signature
sigcheck -a /mnt/esp/EFI/Microsoft/Boot/bootmgfw.efi
# Hash all EFI binaries for comparison against known-good values
find /mnt/esp -name "*.efi" -exec sha256sum {} \;
# Check for unauthorized .efi files outside standard directories
find /mnt/esp -name "*.efi" | grep -v "Microsoft\|Boot\|ubuntu\|grub"
# Look for grubx64.efi planted by BlackLotus
find /mnt/esp -name "grubx64.efi" -exec sha256sum {} \;
# Examine MeasuredBoot logs for anomalies (Windows)
# Logs located at C:\Windows\Logs\MeasuredBoot\Step 4: Scan Firmware for Known Bootkit Signatures
Analyze the firmware dump for known UEFI malware patterns:
# Extract all firmware modules with UEFIExtract
UEFIExtract firmware_dump.rom all
# Generate firmware module whitelist from vendor baseline
python chipsec_main.py -m tools.uefi.whitelist -a generate,baseline.json,firmware_vendor.rom
# Compare current firmware against whitelist
python chipsec_main.py -m tools.uefi.whitelist -a check,baseline.json,firmware_dump.rom
# Scan firmware with UEFI-specific YARA rules
yara -r uefi_bootkits.yar firmware_dump.rom
# Scan extracted modules individually
find firmware_dump.rom.dump -name "*.efi" -exec yara -r uefi_bootkits.yar {} \;
# Check for modified CORE_DXE module (targeted by MoonBounce, CosmicStrand)
# Compare GUID and hash against vendor baselineStep 5: Detect Secure Boot Bypass Mechanisms
Check for known Secure Boot bypass techniques:
# Check if Secure Boot is enabled
python chipsec_main.py -m common.secureboot.variables
# Verify SMM (System Management Mode) protections
python chipsec_main.py -m common.smm
# Check SMM BIOS write protection
python chipsec_main.py -m common.bios_smi
# On Windows - check boot configuration for bypass indicators
bcdedit /enum firmware
bcdedit /v
# Check for testsigning/nointegritychecks/debug flags
bcdedit | findstr /i "testsigning nointegritychecks debug"
# Verify HVCI (Hypervisor-enforced Code Integrity) is not disabled
# BlackLotus sets HKLM:\...\DeviceGuard\...\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity Enabled=0
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v Enabled
# Check Secure Boot state via PowerShell
# Confirm-SecureBootUEFI returns True if properly enabledStep 6: Perform Boot Chain Integrity Verification
Verify every component in the boot chain from firmware through kernel:
# Verify firmware integrity against vendor hash
sha256sum firmware_dump.rom
# Compare with vendor-published hash
# Verify bootloader signatures
sigcheck -a C:\Windows\Boot\EFI\bootmgfw.efi
sigcheck -a C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi
sigcheck -a C:\Windows\System32\ntoskrnl.exe
# Check for unsigned or invalid boot drivers
sigcheck -u -e C:\Windows\System32\drivers\
# Analyze Measured Boot logs for unexpected EFI_Boot_Services_Application entries
# BlackLotus components appear as EV_EFI_Boot_Services_Application
# Memory forensics for boot-phase artifacts
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.modules
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.driverscanStep 7: Document UEFI Bootkit Analysis Findings
Compile a comprehensive analysis report:
Report should include:
- Firmware version, vendor, and platform identification
- SPI flash protection status (write protect, lock bits, access control)
- Secure Boot configuration and any bypass indicators detected
- UEFI variable anomalies (unauthorized keys, modified db/dbx, MOK enrollment)
- ESP contents inventory with hash verification against known-good baselines
- Firmware module comparison against vendor whitelist (added, modified, removed)
- Known bootkit family attribution with confidence level
- Boot chain integrity verification results for each component
- Remediation steps (reflash, key rotation, hardware replacement)
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping (T1542.001 - System Firmware, T1542.003 - Bootkit)Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| UEFI Bootkit | Malware that persists in UEFI firmware or the boot process, executing before the operating system loads and surviving OS reinstallation |
| SPI Flash | Serial Peripheral Interface flash memory chip on the motherboard storing UEFI firmware; firmware-level bootkits like LoJax and MoonBounce modify SPI flash contents |
| EFI System Partition (ESP) | FAT32 partition containing EFI bootloaders and drivers; bootkits like BlackLotus and ESPecter modify files on the ESP for persistence |
| Secure Boot | UEFI security feature that verifies digital signatures of boot components; can be bypassed via vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-21894) or MOK enrollment |
| DXE Driver | Driver Execution Environment driver loaded during UEFI boot; firmware implants inject malicious DXE drivers that execute before the OS |
| Machine Owner Key (MOK) | User-installable Secure Boot key; BlackLotus enrolls attacker-controlled MOKs to sign malicious bootloaders |
| chipsec | Intel platform security assessment framework for analyzing SPI flash, UEFI variables, Secure Boot, and hardware security configurations |
| HVCI | Hypervisor-enforced Code Integrity, a Windows security feature that bootkits disable to load unsigned kernel drivers |
Tools & Systems
- chipsec: Intel framework for dumping SPI flash, reading UEFI variables, verifying firmware write protection, and Secure Boot configuration auditing
- UEFITool: Open-source UEFI firmware image parser for inspecting firmware volumes, extracting DXE drivers, and comparing module GUIDs
- sigcheck: Sysinternals utility for verifying digital signatures of EFI binaries and boot chain components
- flashrom: Open-source SPI flash programmer for reading and writing firmware chips on supported platforms
- YARA: Pattern matching engine used with UEFI-specific rule sets to detect known bootkit signatures in firmware dumps
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation
Context: An enterprise endpoint was reimaged after a confirmed breach, but identical C2 beaconing resumed within hours. The endpoint has UEFI firmware with Secure Boot enabled, and a TPM 2.0 chip. The security team suspects a UEFI-level implant similar to BlackLotus or LoJax.
Approach:
- Boot the system from a trusted Linux live USB to avoid executing any compromised OS components
- Dump SPI flash firmware using
chipsec_util.py spi dumpfor offline analysis - Mount the ESP and hash all
.efifiles for comparison against known-good values from identical hardware - Check for the
ESP:/system32/directory (BlackLotus indicator) and unauthorizedgrubx64.efi - Extract firmware modules with UEFIExtract and compare GUID inventory against vendor baseline
- Verify Secure Boot variables -- look for unauthorized MOK enrollment or modified db/dbx
- Check SPI flash write protection and lock bits using chipsec modules
- Scan firmware dump and extracted modules with UEFI-specific YARA rules
- If BlackLotus is suspected, check registry for HVCI disabled and MeasuredBoot logs for anomalous entries
Pitfalls:
- Running analysis from the compromised OS (rootkit components hide from live analysis)
- Only checking the ESP without examining SPI flash firmware (misses firmware-level implants like LoJax, MoonBounce)
- Assuming Secure Boot prevents all bootkits (CVE-2022-21894 and other bypasses exist)
- Not preserving the original firmware dump before remediation (critical forensic evidence)
- Reflashing firmware without verifying the vendor image is authentic and unmodified
Output Format
UEFI BOOTKIT PERSISTENCE ANALYSIS REPORT
============================================
System: Lenovo ThinkPad X1 Carbon Gen 11
Firmware: N3HET82W (1.54) - Lenovo UEFI BIOS
Platform: Intel 13th Gen (Raptor Lake)
TPM: 2.0 (Infineon SLB 9672)
Secure Boot: ENABLED (BYPASSED via CVE-2022-21894)
Analysis Method: Linux live USB + chipsec + UEFITool
SPI FLASH PROTECTION STATUS
BIOS Write Protection: DISABLED [!]
SPI Flash Lock (FLOCKDN): SET [OK]
SMM BIOS Write Protect: DISABLED [!]
SPI Protected Ranges: Region 0 only (descriptor)
UEFI VARIABLE ANALYSIS
SecureBoot: Enabled (value=1)
SetupMode: Disabled (value=0)
PK: Lenovo Ltd. (legitimate)
KEK: Microsoft + Lenovo (legitimate)
db: MODIFIED - contains unauthorized entry [!]
[!] Unknown certificate: CN=Secure Boot Signing, O=Unknown
[!] Not present in vendor baseline db
MOK: 1 unauthorized key enrolled [!]
[!] MOK enrolled: CN=shim, self-signed, not from distro vendor
ESP PARTITION ANALYSIS
Total EFI binaries: 12
Verified (signed): 9
Modified (hash mismatch): 2 [!]
Unauthorized: 1 [!]
[!] EFI/Microsoft/Boot/bootmgfw.efi - MODIFIED
Expected SHA-256: a3f2c8...
Current SHA-256: 7b1e4d...
Signature: Valid (signed with unauthorized MOK)
[!] EFI/Microsoft/Boot/grubx64.efi - UNAUTHORIZED
SHA-256: e9c1a7...
Not present in vendor baseline
Matches BlackLotus stage-2 loader signature
[!] system32/ directory present on ESP (BlackLotus artifact)
Directory empty (files deleted post-installation)
FIRMWARE MODULE ANALYSIS
Total firmware modules: 312
Vendor baseline modules: 312
Added modules: 0
Modified modules: 0
SPI flash integrity: CLEAN (no firmware-level implant detected)
BOOTKIT ATTRIBUTION
Family: BlackLotus
Confidence: HIGH
Persistence: ESP-based (not SPI flash)
Bypass Method: CVE-2022-21894 (baton drop)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1542.003 (Bootkit), T1553.006 (Code Signing Policy Modification)
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
- ESP:/system32/ directory (empty, post-cleanup artifact)
- ESP:/EFI/Microsoft/Boot/grubx64.efi (unauthorized, BlackLotus loader)
- Modified bootmgfw.efi (re-signed with attacker MOK)
- HVCI disabled via registry: DeviceGuard\...\Enabled = 0
- Unauthorized MOK enrollment in UEFI variable store
- MeasuredBoot log shows EV_EFI_Boot_Services_Application for grubx64.efi
REMEDIATION
1. Replace bootmgfw.efi with authentic copy from Windows installation media
2. Delete unauthorized grubx64.efi and system32/ directory from ESP
3. Reset Secure Boot keys to factory defaults (clear MOK, restore PK/KEK/db)
4. Enable BIOS write protection and verify SPI flash lock bits
5. Apply firmware update to latest version (patches CVE-2022-21894)
6. Enable HVCI and verify via Group Policy
7. Reimport only trusted certificates into Secure Boot db
8. Monitor MeasuredBoot logs for anomalous boot component loadingФайлы этой версии
references/15.6 KB
- api-reference.md5.6 KB
scripts/121.8 KB
- agent.py21.8 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md14.4 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Да | Да |
| Пишет файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Выполняет команды shell | Да | Да |
| Ходит в сеть | Да | Да |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | 54a7988 | 7d06a973 | Подписана | – |
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