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Como funciona
noorqureshi/defense-forensicsDFIR e threat hunting

defense-forensics

⁨Deep forensic artifact analysis after triage — memory dumps (Volatility 3), disk and super-timelines (Plaso), PCAP (tshark), and Windows host artifacts (Zimmerman toolset) — with hashing and chain of custody. Load when an incident moves past first response into "prove what the attacker did on this i⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalações+3 em 7 dias27 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 22 horas

Instalar

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/defense-forensics

Grava em ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.

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Fontegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/defense/defense-forensics@ee0e0c5

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

When it applies

Triage (defense-dfir-triage) has scoped the incident and you now hold preserved evidence — a memory dump, a disk image (E01/raw), a PCAP, or exported host artifacts — and must prove, artifact by artifact, what the attacker did: which process ran, what persisted, what left the network. This is deep analysis of dead-box/dead-disk evidence, not live first response.

Why it works

Attackers can delete logs, but memory, filesystem metadata ($MFT, USN journal), and packet captures retain artifacts the attacker never controlled. Parsing them with purpose-built tools reconstructs execution, persistence, and exfiltration even after the live system was cleaned — and hashing plus chain of custody makes the conclusions defensible.

Method

  1. Preserve before you parse. SHA-256 every image/capture, record timezone + acquisition command, work on a copy with the original read-only. Write chain-of-custody notes into your timeline as you go — every conclusion must trace back to an artifact path.
  2. Memory (Volatility 3) — situational awareness first, then chase anomalies:
    bash
    vol -f mem.dmp windows.info      # OS profile, build, timezone
    vol -f mem.dmp windows.pslist    # processes — unknown names, odd parents
    vol -f mem.dmp windows.netscan   # connections — beacons, lateral SMB/RDP
    vol -f mem.dmp windows.cmdline   # full command lines
    Follow with windows.malfind (injected code) and dlllist/handles on suspects; dump a suspicious PID (--pid <pid> --dump) for defense-malware-triage / reverse-eng-malware.
  3. Disk & super-timeline — run Plaso (log2timeline.py) over the image and filter around the known-bad window in Timeline Explorer; correlate $MFT, USN journal, Shimcache, Amcache, and Prefetch into one ordered view. Autopsy / FTK Imager for carving and deleted files.
  4. Windows host artifacts (Eric Zimmerman's toolset) — the execution/persistence core:
    • Execution: Amcache, Prefetch, BAM, Shimcache.
    • Persistence: Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions.
    • Logs: Security, PowerShell 4104 script-block, Sysmon — feed defense-log-analysis.
  5. Network (PCAP) — tshark conversation/protocol/DNS statistics first, then carve suspicious streams and export objects. Custom protocol payloads → reverse-eng-protocol; C2 implants → defense-malware-triage.
  6. Hand off — extract IOCs with confidence + provenance, map to ATT&CK, feed detections to defense-detection-sigma, and run reporting-evidence-review before the incident report.

Gotchas

  • Never analyze the original — one mount without a write blocker and the evidence is challengeable. Hash first, analyze a copy, re-hash after to prove nothing changed.
  • Timezone skew kills timelines — Volatility, Plaso, and event logs each default differently; normalize everything to UTC before correlating.
  • Wrong Volatility profile = garbage output — confirm windows.info before trusting pslist. Linux/macOS dumps need symbol tables (ISF) built for that exact kernel.
  • Prefetch proves execution happened, not who ran it — corroborate with logs/accounts.
  • Absent artifact ≠ absent activity — log clearing and timestomping are themselves findings; record gaps explicitly instead of reading them as "clean".
  • Raw IOCs can tip the attacker or leak victim data — grade and redact before sharing.

Verify success

A reviewable timeline (Time | Host | Artifact | Finding | Confidence | Evidence path) where every claim names the artifact that proves it, before/after analysis hashes match, and IOCs + ATT&CK mapping are ready for detection engineering and reporting.

References

Volatility 3 docs; Plaso/log2timeline; Eric Zimmerman's tools; SANS DFIR posters; NIST SP 800-86.


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.

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Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

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