Deep forensic artifact analysis after triage — memory dumps (Volatility 3), disk and super-timelines (Plaso), PCAP (tshark), and Windows host artifacts (Zimmerman toolset) — with hashing and chain of custody. Load when an incident moves past first response into "prove what the attacker did on this i
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 התקנות+3 ב-7 ימים★ 27 כוכביםMITסונכרן לפני 22 שעות
התקנה
עדיין אין לכם את ה-CLI של NotHoly? התקינו אותו קודם.
Triage (defense-dfir-triage) has scoped the incident and you now hold preserved evidence —
a memory dump, a disk image (E01/raw), a PCAP, or exported host artifacts — and must prove,
artifact by artifact, what the attacker did: which process ran, what persisted, what left the
network. This is deep analysis of dead-box/dead-disk evidence, not live first response.
Attackers can delete logs, but memory, filesystem metadata ($MFT, USN journal), and packet
captures retain artifacts the attacker never controlled. Parsing them with purpose-built tools
reconstructs execution, persistence, and exfiltration even after the live system was cleaned —
and hashing plus chain of custody makes the conclusions defensible.
Preserve before you parse. SHA-256 every image/capture, record timezone + acquisition
command, work on a copy with the original read-only. Write chain-of-custody notes into your
timeline as you go — every conclusion must trace back to an artifact path.
Memory (Volatility 3) — situational awareness first, then chase anomalies:bash
Follow with windows.malfind (injected code) and dlllist/handles on suspects; dump a
suspicious PID (--pid <pid> --dump) for defense-malware-triage / reverse-eng-malware.
Disk & super-timeline — run Plaso (log2timeline.py) over the image and filter around
the known-bad window in Timeline Explorer; correlate $MFT, USN journal, Shimcache, Amcache,
and Prefetch into one ordered view. Autopsy / FTK Imager for carving and deleted files.
Windows host artifacts (Eric Zimmerman's toolset) — the execution/persistence core:
Execution: Amcache, Prefetch, BAM, Shimcache.
Persistence: Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions.
Hand off — extract IOCs with confidence + provenance, map to ATT&CK, feed detections to
defense-detection-sigma, and run reporting-evidence-review before the incident report.
Never analyze the original — one mount without a write blocker and the evidence is
challengeable. Hash first, analyze a copy, re-hash after to prove nothing changed.
Timezone skew kills timelines — Volatility, Plaso, and event logs each default
differently; normalize everything to UTC before correlating.
Wrong Volatility profile = garbage output — confirm windows.info before trusting
pslist. Linux/macOS dumps need symbol tables (ISF) built for that exact kernel.
Prefetch proves execution happened, not who ran it — corroborate with logs/accounts.
Absent artifact ≠ absent activity — log clearing and timestomping are themselves
findings; record gaps explicitly instead of reading them as "clean".
Raw IOCs can tip the attacker or leak victim data — grade and redact before sharing.
A reviewable timeline (Time | Host | Artifact | Finding | Confidence | Evidence path) where
every claim names the artifact that proves it, before/after analysis hashes match, and IOCs +
ATT&CK mapping are ready for detection engineering and reporting.