ctf-web
CTF web challenge playbook — the recurring shapes jeopardy web challenges take: source disclosure (.git, backups, flask debug), SSTI/SSRF in their CTF forms, PHP quirks (type juggling, wrappers, filters), cookie/JWT games, and chained primitives to read /flag. Load on any CTF challenge whose handout
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c54 installazioni+4 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/ctf-webScrive in ~/.notholy/skills dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.
FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchetto1ebede65…313aa3e3
1ebede65b50d…8d0a313aa3e31 file · 3.2 KBScansioneMedio3 segnalazioni
- Link a un indirizzo IP direttoSKILL.md:66
- Link a un indirizzo IP direttoSKILL.md:66
- Link a domini esterni
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/ctf/ctf-web@ee0e0c5
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
When it applies
The handout is a URL (sometimes plus source). The goal is almost always to read a flag file
(/flag, /flag.txt, an env var, or a DB row) — so every bug you find should be steered toward
read a file, run a command, or become admin. This skill is the CTF routing layer; work the
deep techniques with web-ssti, web-ssrf, web-sqli, web-lfi-path-traversal, web-auth-jwt,
web-deserialization, web-command-injection, web-file-upload.
Why it works
CTF web challenges strip an app to one intended bug plus decorations, so the surface is small and the bug is findable by enumeration, not luck. Provided source turns black-box guessing into reading comprehension; the framework banner (Flask/PHP/Express) predicts the bug class before you send a request.
Method
- Enumerate the obvious first (5 minutes).
curl -sS -D-the root; read every HTML comment, JS file, cookie, and header. Hitrobots.txt,/sitemap.xml, common admin paths, and run a quickffuf -w raft-small-words -u <url>/FUZZ. Check the HTTP methods (OPTIONS, tryPUT/POSTwhere GET works). CTF apps hide routes in comments and robots more than real ones. - Grab source if it exists — it usually does.
- Provided zip /
Dockerfile: read it; the bug is visible, and the Dockerfile tells you the flag's location and any sandbox (read-only fs, seccomp). .gitexposed:git-dumper <url>/.git out/then read history (recon-github-code-leaks).- Backups:
index.php~,index.php.bak,.index.php.swp,app.py.bak— ffuf for them. - PHP filters as source oracle:
?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index(web-lfi-path-traversal). - Flask/Werkzeug debugger page exposed → the PIN is crackable from machine-id + boot-id + username (leak them via an LFI) or is printed in console output you can reach.
- Provided zip /
- Work the framework's favorite bug:
- Flask/Jinja2 → SSTI:
{{7*7}}then climb to{{ self.__init__.__globals__ }}/config/cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('cat /flag').read(). Filter bypasses:|attr(), request-args gadgets, hex/octal string building (web-ssti,web-python-sandbox-escape). - PHP → the quirks are the challenge: loose comparison type juggling (
==with"0e..."magic hashes,0 == "password", array params to skipstrcmp/md5checks —?a[]=1), wrapper chains (php://filter,data://,phar://),preg_replace /e, unserialize with a provided class → POP chain (web-deserialization). - Node/Express → prototype pollution (
web-prototype-pollution), SSTI in EJS/Pug,evalon JSON fields, NoSQL injection ({"$gt":""}on login forms).
- Flask/Jinja2 → SSTI:
- Play the cookie games. Flask session cookie →
flask-unsign --decode, brute the secret (flask-unsign --unsign --wordlist rockyou.txt) then re-sign{'is_admin': True}. JWT →alg:none, RS256→HS256 confusion with a reachable public key, weak HMAC secret brute (web-auth-jwt). Homegrown base64/hex cookies → decode, flip therolefield, handle the MAC withcrypto-oracle-attacks. - SSRF, the CTF shape. Any URL fetcher (webhook tester, PDF renderer, image proxy) →
http://127.0.0.1/for internal-only routes,http://169.254.169.254/only when the Docker setup hints cloud,file:///flag, andgopher://to hit internal Redis/MySQL (web-ssrf,web-ssrf-gopher-redis-rce). In CTF, the internal service on a weird port is the challenge — scan127.0.0.1ports through the SSRF. - Chain to the flag. One primitive rarely suffices: LFI → source → secret → signed cookie →
admin panel → SSTI → RCE →
cat /flag. Treat each confirmed bug as a key that unlocks the next stage (exploit-chaining).
Gotchas
{{7*7}}rendering as{{7*7}}doesn't rule out SSTI — some challenges only evaluate in error pages, emails, or PDF exports. Try the sink contexts, and try${7*7},#{7*7},<%= 7*7 %>for other engines.- PHP
assert/evalchallenges filter obvious words; build strings dynamically ($_GET['x']($_GET['y'])withx=system&y=cat /flag) instead of fighting the blocklist. - Provided source != deployed source occasionally — verify a behavior against the live app before building an exploit on the reading.
- The flag may need root — RCE as www-data with
/flagreadable only by root means a second stage: look for setuid binaries, cron, or a SUID flag-reader you must exploit (privescdomain). - Rate-limited login / captcha in CTF usually hides race conditions (
web-race-conditions) or SQLi in the login query, not a brute-force task.
Verify success
The flag string in the correct format, read from the target (file, env, or DB) — not a local
reproduction. If you got RCE, id; cat /flag output is the proof.
References
Deep techniques: web-ssti, web-ssrf, web-auth-jwt, web-deserialization,
web-lfi-path-traversal, web-python-sandbox-escape, web-command-injection, web-sqli;
source-leak hunting: recon-content-discovery, recon-github-code-leaks; token attacks:
crypto-oracle-attacks. Triage via ctf-methodology.
File di questa versione
- SKILL.md5.9 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | Sì | Sì |
| Scrive file | Sì | Sì |
| Esegue comandi shell | No | No |
| Usa la rete | Sì | Sì |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
- MediaLink · Link a un indirizzo IP direttoSKILL.md:66
- MediaLink · Link a un indirizzo IP direttoSKILL.md:66
- InfoLink · Link a domini esterni
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 1ebede65 | Firmata | – |
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