ai-agent-tool-abuse
Abuse an LLM agent's tools/functions — coerce it to call tools with attacker-chosen args for SSRF, RCE, data exfil, or privilege abuse. Load when the target is an agent with tools/ function-calling/plugins, MCP servers, code interpreters, or "the assistant can do X". Signals: function-calling, tool
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa
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FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchettob6fe48c7…946d752c
b6fe48c70192…3cce946d752c1 file · 1.5 KBScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/ai-ml/ai-agent-tool-abuse@ee0e0c5
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
When it applies
The target isn't just a chatbot — it can act: call functions, browse, run code, query databases, send email, hit internal APIs, or chain MCP tools. Impact jumps from "bad text" to real actions taken with the agent's privileges.
Why it works
The model decides which tool to call and with what arguments, driven by text it can't fully trust (user input or fetched content). If tools are over-permissioned or arguments aren't validated, attacker text steers real actions — the classic "confused deputy".
Method
- Enumerate the tools: get the agent to reveal its tools/functions and schemas (often it just lists them), or read the app/MCP config.
- Coerce a call (direct or via
ai-prompt-injection/ai-rag-poisoning): craft input so the agent invokes a tool with your arguments. - Route to impact:
- SSRF/internal reach: a browse/fetch tool → internal URLs, cloud metadata (→
cloud-imds-ssrf). - RCE: a code-interpreter/shell tool → command execution.
- Data exfil: a query/email/file tool → dump data to you (markdown-image beacon, an email to your address).
- Privilege abuse: an admin/action tool called on behalf of a victim (confused deputy).
- SSRF/internal reach: a browse/fetch tool → internal URLs, cloud metadata (→
- Chaining: poisoned content the agent reads later triggers the tool call (indirect, multi-user).
Gotchas
- The severity is the action, tied to the tool's real privilege — demonstrate the effect, not just intent.
- Guardrails on the model don't cover tool arg-validation — the bug is often at the tool boundary.
- Defenders: least-privilege tools, human-in-the-loop for sensitive actions, validate/allowlist args, isolate the browser/exec.
Verify success
The agent performs an attacker-directed action via a tool — an SSRF hit, code execution, data exfiltrated, or a privileged action taken — traceable to your input.
References
OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) LLM06/LLM01; MCP security guidance; agent "confused deputy" research.
File di questa versione
- SKILL.md2.6 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | No | No |
| Esegue comandi shell | No | No |
| Usa la rete | No | No |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | b6fe48c7 | Firmata | – |
Altro da NoorQureshi
Tutto da questo editoreAltro in IA, agenti e MCP
Vai alla categoria- fal-assetsrehan-remade/fal-assets5
- ai-system-prompt-leakagenoorqureshi/ai-system-prompt-leakage4
- ai-prompt-injectionnoorqureshi/ai-prompt-injection4
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- implementing-llm-guardrails-for-securitymukul975/implementing-llm-guardrails-for-security4
- defending-llms-with-guardrailsmukul975/defending-llms-with-guardrails4
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