hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows
Systematically hunts for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows
v1.03 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni36,3K StelleApache-2.0sincronizzato 12 ore fa
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FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchetto6d5bf4b6…35bc7d27
6d5bf4b6b1bb…0f1535bc7d278 file · 14.1 KBScansioneMedio5 segnalazioni
- Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
- command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:30
- Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
Sorgentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows@54a7988
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
When to Use
- During periodic proactive threat hunts for dormant backdoors
- After an incident to identify all persistence mechanisms an attacker planted
- When investigating unusual services, scheduled tasks, or startup entries
- When threat intel reports describe new persistence techniques in the wild
- During security posture assessments to identify unauthorized persistent software
Prerequisites
- Sysmon deployed with Event IDs 12/13/14 (Registry), 19/20/21 (WMI), 1 (Process Creation)
- Windows Security Event forwarding for 4697 (Service Install), 4698 (Scheduled Task)
- EDR with registry and file monitoring capabilities
- PowerShell script block logging enabled (Event ID 4104)
- Autoruns or equivalent baseline of legitimate persistent entries
Workflow
- Enumerate Known Persistence Locations: Build a comprehensive list of Windows persistence points (Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI, startup folder, DLL search order, COM hijacks, AppInit DLLs, Image File Execution Options).
- Collect Endpoint Data: Use EDR, Sysmon, or Velociraptor to collect current persistence artifacts from endpoints across the environment.
- Baseline Legitimate Persistence: Compare collected data against known-good baselines (Autoruns snapshots, GPO-deployed entries, SCCM configurations).
- Identify Anomalies: Flag new, unsigned, or unknown entries in persistence locations that deviate from the baseline.
- Investigate Suspicious Entries: For each anomaly, examine the binary it points to, its digital signature, file hash, and creation timestamp.
- Correlate with Process Activity: Link persistence entries to process execution, network activity, and user login events.
- Document and Remediate: Record findings, remove malicious persistence, and update detection rules.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
| T1543.003 | Windows Service (Create or Modify) |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task |
| T1546.003 | WMI Event Subscription |
| T1546.015 | Component Object Model (COM) Hijacking |
| T1546.012 | Image File Execution Options Injection |
| T1546.010 | AppInit DLLs |
| T1547.004 | Winlogon Helper DLL |
| T1547.005 | Security Support Provider |
| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |
| TA0003 | Persistence Tactic |
| Autoruns | Sysinternals tool showing persistent entries |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sysinternals Autoruns | Comprehensive persistence enumeration |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint-wide persistence artifact collection |
| CrowdStrike Falcon | Real-time persistence monitoring |
| Sysmon | Registry and WMI event monitoring |
| OSQuery | SQL-based persistence queries |
| RECmd | Registry Explorer for forensic analysis |
| Splunk | SIEM correlation of persistence events |
Common Scenarios
- Registry Run Key Backdoor: Malware adds
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runentry pointing to payload in%APPDATA%. - WMI Event Subscription: Adversary creates WMI consumer/filter pair that executes PowerShell on system boot.
- Malicious Service: Attacker creates Windows service with
sc createpointing to a backdoor binary. - COM Object Hijack: Legitimate COM CLSID InprocServer32 path replaced with malicious DLL.
- IFEO Debugger Injection: Image File Execution Options key set with debugger pointing to implant for common utilities.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-PERSIST-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Persistence Type: [Registry/Service/Task/WMI/COM/Other]
MITRE Technique: T1547.xxx / T1543.xxx / T1053.xxx
Location: [Full registry key / service name / task path]
Value: [Binary path / command line]
Host(s): [Affected endpoints]
Signed: [Yes/No]
Hash: [SHA256]
Creation Time: [Timestamp]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Verdict: [Malicious/Suspicious/Benign]File di questa versione
assets/12.0 KB
- template.md2.0 KB
references/39.7 KB
- api-reference.md2.0 KB
- standards.md4.3 KB
- workflows.md3.3 KB
scripts/220.1 KB
- agent.py6.2 KB
- process.py14.0 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md4.7 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | Sì | Sì |
| Esegue comandi shell | Sì | Sì |
| Usa la rete | Sì | Sì |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
- MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:30
- MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/process.py:309
- InfoLink · Link a domini esterni
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 6d5bf4b6 | Firmata | – |
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