building-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl
Build effective detection rules using Splunk Search Processing Language
v1.03 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni36,3K StelleApache-2.0sincronizzato 12 ore fa
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FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchetto84cab45d…ddeae4e9
84cab45da888…2d75ddeae4e98 file · 15.8 KBScansioneMedio8 segnalazioni
- command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:139
- command.base64_execSKILL.md:139
- Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
Sorgentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/building-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl@54a7988
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
Overview
Splunk Search Processing Language (SPL) is the primary query language used in Splunk Enterprise Security for building correlation searches that detect suspicious events and patterns. A well-crafted detection rule aggregates, correlates, and enriches security events to generate actionable notable events for SOC analysts. Enterprise SIEMs on average cover only 21% of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, making skilled SPL rule writing essential for closing detection gaps.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring building detection rule with splunk spl capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- Splunk Enterprise Security (ES) deployed and configured
- Access to Splunk Search & Reporting app with appropriate roles
- Understanding of Common Information Model (CIM) data models
- Familiarity with MITRE ATT&CK framework techniques
- Knowledge of the organization's log sources and data flows
Core SPL Detection Rule Patterns
1. Threshold-Based Detection
Detects events exceeding a defined count within a time window.
index=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4625
| stats count as failed_logins dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users by src_ip
| where failed_logins > 10 AND unique_users > 3
| eval severity="high"
| eval description="Brute force attack detected from ".src_ip." with ".failed_logins." failed logins across ".unique_users." accounts"2. Sequence-Based Detection (Failed Login Followed by Success)
Correlates a sequence of events indicating a successful brute force attack.
index=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security (EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624)
| eval login_status=case(EventCode=4625, "failure", EventCode=4624, "success")
| stats count(eval(login_status="failure")) as failures count(eval(login_status="success")) as successes latest(_time) as last_event by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where failures > 5 AND successes > 0
| eval description="Account ".TargetUserName." compromised via brute force from ".src_ip
| eval urgency="critical"3. Anomaly Detection with Baseline Comparison
Compares current activity against a baseline period to detect spikes.
index=proxy sourcetype=squid
| bin _time span=1h
| stats count as current_count by src_ip, _time
| join src_ip type=left [
search index=proxy sourcetype=squid earliest=-7d@d latest=-1d@d
| stats avg(count) as avg_count stdev(count) as stdev_count by src_ip
]
| eval threshold=avg_count + (3 * stdev_count)
| where current_count > threshold
| eval deviation=round((current_count - avg_count) / stdev_count, 2)
| eval description="Anomalous web traffic from ".src_ip." - ".deviation." standard deviations above baseline"4. Lateral Movement Detection
Identifies potential lateral movement using Windows logon events.
index=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
| where NOT match(TargetUserName, ".*\$$")
| stats dc(dest) as unique_hosts values(dest) as hosts by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_hosts > 5
| eval severity=case(unique_hosts > 20, "critical", unique_hosts > 10, "high", true(), "medium")
| eval description=TargetUserName." accessed ".unique_hosts." unique hosts from ".src_ip." via network logon"5. Data Exfiltration Detection
Monitors for large outbound data transfers.
index=firewall sourcetype=pan:traffic action=allowed direction=outbound
| stats sum(bytes_out) as total_bytes_out dc(dest_ip) as unique_destinations by src_ip, user
| eval total_mb=round(total_bytes_out/1048576, 2)
| where total_mb > 500 OR unique_destinations > 50
| lookup asset_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT asset_category, asset_owner
| eval severity=case(total_mb > 2000, "critical", total_mb > 1000, "high", true(), "medium")
| eval description=user." transferred ".total_mb."MB to ".unique_destinations." unique destinations"6. PowerShell Suspicious Execution Detection
Detects encoded or obfuscated PowerShell commands.
index=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4104
| where match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)(encodedcommand|invoke-expression|iex|downloadstring|frombase64string|net\.webclient|invoke-webrequest|bitstransfer|invoke-mimikatz|invoke-shellcode)")
| eval decoded_length=len(ScriptBlockText)
| stats count values(ScriptBlockText) as commands by Computer, UserName
| where count > 0
| eval severity="high"
| eval mitre_technique="T1059.001"
| eval description="Suspicious PowerShell execution on ".Computer." by ".UserNameBuilding Correlation Searches in Splunk ES
Step-by-Step Process
- Define the Use Case: Map to MITRE ATT&CK technique and define what behavior to detect
- Identify Data Sources: Determine which indexes and sourcetypes contain relevant events
- Write the Base Search: Build SPL that extracts relevant events
- Add Aggregation: Use
stats,eventstats, orstreamstatsto summarize - Apply Thresholds: Set conditions with
whereclause that distinguish normal from anomalous - Enrich Context: Add lookups for asset information, identity data, and threat intelligence
- Configure Notable Event: Set severity, urgency, and description fields
- Schedule and Test: Run against historical data and validate detection accuracy
Correlation Search Configuration Template
| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Authentication
where Authentication.action=failure
by Authentication.src, Authentication.user, _time span=5m
| rename "Authentication.*" as *
| stats count as total_failures dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as targeted_users by src
| where total_failures > 20 AND unique_users > 5
| lookup dnslookup clientip as src OUTPUT clienthost as src_dns
| lookup asset_lookup ip as src OUTPUT priority as asset_priority, category as asset_category
| eval urgency=case(asset_priority=="critical", "critical", asset_priority=="high", "high", true(), "medium")
| eval rule_name="Brute Force Against Multiple Accounts"
| eval rule_description="Multiple authentication failures from ".src." targeting ".unique_users." unique accounts"
| eval mitre_attack="T1110.001 - Password Guessing"Enrichment Best Practices
| lookup identity_lookup identity as user OUTPUT department, manager, risk_score as user_risk
| lookup asset_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT asset_name, asset_category, asset_priority, asset_owner
| lookup threatintel_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT threat_type, threat_confidence, threat_source
| eval context=case(
isnotnull(threat_type), "Known threat: ".threat_type,
user_risk > 80, "High-risk user: risk score ".user_risk,
asset_priority=="critical", "Critical asset: ".asset_name,
true(), "Standard context"
)Performance Optimization
Use Data Models with tstats
| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
where All_Traffic.action=allowed
by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.dest_port, _time span=1h
| rename "All_Traffic.*" as *Limit Time Ranges and Use Indexed Fields
index=wineventlog source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4688
earliest=-15m latest=now()
| where NOT match(New_Process_Name, "(?i)(svchost|csrss|lsass|services)")Use Summary Indexing for Historical Baselines
| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.src, _time span=1h
| collect index=summary source="auth_failure_baseline" marker="report_name=auth_failure_hourly"Testing and Validation
Test Against Known Attack Patterns
| makeresults count=1
| eval src_ip="10.0.0.50", failed_logins=25, unique_users=8, severity="high"
| eval description="Test brute force detection"
| append [
search index=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4625
earliest=-24h latest=now()
| stats count as failed_logins dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users by src_ip
| where failed_logins > 10 AND unique_users > 3
| eval severity="high"
]Calculate Detection Metrics
index=notable
| search rule_name="Brute Force*"
| stats count as total_alerts count(eval(status_label="Closed - True Positive")) as true_positives count(eval(status_label="Closed - False Positive")) as false_positives by rule_name
| eval precision=round(true_positives / (true_positives + false_positives) * 100, 2)
| eval fpr=round(false_positives / total_alerts * 100, 2)MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique ID | Technique Name | SPL Detection Approach |
|---|---|---|
| T1110.001 | Password Guessing | Threshold on EventCode 4625 by src_ip |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Pattern match on EventCode 4104 ScriptBlockText |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Logon Type 3 with dc(dest) threshold |
| T1048 | Exfiltration Over C2 | bytes_out aggregation over time window |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | EventCode 4698 with suspicious command patterns |
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | Process access to lsass.exe via Sysmon EventCode 10 |
References
File di questa versione
assets/11.9 KB
- template.md1.9 KB
references/35.8 KB
- api-reference.md1.5 KB
- standards.md2.3 KB
- workflows.md2.0 KB
scripts/220.2 KB
- agent.py6.0 KB
- process.py14.2 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md10.4 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | No | No |
| Esegue comandi shell | Sì | Sì |
| Usa la rete | Sì | Sì |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:139
- MediaComando · command.base64_execSKILL.md:139
- MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
- MediaComando · command.base64_execscripts/agent.py:29
- MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/process.py:268
- MediaComando · command.base64_execscripts/process.py:268
- InfoLink · Link a domini esterni
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 84cab45d | Firmata | – |
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