network-database-security
Assess reachable database services — PostgreSQL/MySQL/MSSQL/MongoDB/Redis — for unauthenticated access, weak/default accounts, over-broad grants, and dangerous features (xp_cmdshell, COPY FROM PROGRAM, UDF, Redis file write) that turn a DB login into OS code execution. Load when recon shows 3306/543
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/network-database-securityEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete7e594ca5…9927caee
7e594ca5be13…3bc89927caee1 archivo · 2.9 KBEscaneoBajo1 hallazgo
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/network/network-database-security@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
An authorized engagement has a reachable database instance — surfaced by network-service-attacks,
handed over as a review target, or via app credentials recovered from a config dump. Covers
PostgreSQL, MySQL/MariaDB, MSSQL, MongoDB, and Redis. Before touching anything, confirm in
scope.txt (see tradecraft-scope-roe): which instances, which accounts, and whether
write/delete/exec is permitted. On production systems, default to read-only proofs — no
destructive statements unless explicitly allowed.
Why it works
Databases concentrate the crown jewels yet are routinely deployed as "internal-only": bound to
0.0.0.0, default or weak accounts, grants far wider than the app needs, and dangerous features
left enabled. Features like xp_cmdshell, COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, UDFs, and Redis's writable
config turn a mere database login into OS command execution — so an over-privileged app account
is often a quiet path to DBA and then to the host.
Method
- Exposure & transport —
nmap -sV -p 3306,5432,1433,6379,27017 <range>; check bind address, security groups / firewall rules, and whether TLS is required or enforced. Probe unauthenticated access:redis-cli -h <ip> ping(PONG= unauth — a finding by itself),mongosh --host <ip> --eval 'db.runCommand({listDatabases:1})',mysql -h <ip> -u root,psql -h <ip> -U postgres.nucleihas templates for known exposures. - Authentication — default/test accounts and weak passwords; for broad guessing use
network-password-sprayingdiscipline (lockouts apply to MSSQL/MySQL too). Record from which hosts each credential works — host-restricted grants matter for pivoting. - Authorization & roles — enumerate who can do what:
- MySQL:
SELECT user,host FROM mysql.user;SHOW GRANTS;— flag host'%',FILE,SUPER,GRANT OPTION. - Postgres:
\du,SELECT * FROM pg_roles;— flag superuser,pg_read/write_server_files,pg_execute_server_program. - MSSQL:
SELECT * FROM sys.server_principals;— flag sysadmin membership for app logins. Check access control on the sensitive tables, not just server-level roles.
- MySQL:
- Dangerous configuration — the login→OS-command bridges:
- MSSQL:
EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell';(also Ole Automation /sp_OACreate, CLR). - MySQL:
secure_file_privempty,FILEpriv,SELECT * FROM mysql.func;for existing UDFs. - Postgres:
COPY ... FROM PROGRAM,LOAD, untrusted PL languages. - Redis:
CONFIG GET dir/CONFIG GET dbfilename— writable dir enables the classic webshell / SSH-key write.
- MSSQL:
- Audit & resilience — is logging on (MySQL
general_log,pgaudit, SQL Server Audit, MongoDB--auditDestination)? Who can read backups and snapshots? - Verify exploit chains safely — where scope allows writes/exec, prove command execution with
a benign command (
id,whoami) and stop. Where it doesn't, report the chain as a configuration risk with the exact grant/feature that enables it. Usesqlmaponly against an in-scope injection point (→web-sqli) — never against the DB blindly.
Gotchas
- Distinguish misconfiguration from proven exploitable chain — report both, but only claim what you demonstrated.
- Redis reachable only through a web SSRF is a different path — use
web-ssrf-gopher-redis-rce. - Cloud-managed RDS/Azure SQL/Cloud SQL: most issues live in the control plane (public
accessibility, security groups, snapshot sharing, IAM) — review via the provider console and the
cloud-*skills instead of hammering the endpoint. - MSSQL
xp_cmdshell"disabled" is not safe if the login is sysadmin — enabling it is one command (and is logged; note the noise in ROE). - Hashes pulled from
mysql.useror captured in transit feednetwork-credential-cracking; app-account → DBA privilege growth often comes from reused passwords, not missing patches. - Dumping customer data to "prove impact" is over-collection — a version string or one non-sensitive row proves access.
Verify success
The report states, per instance: network exposure, which credentials work and at what privilege
level, which dangerous features are reachable from the app account, and for every claimed chain a
benign proof (version string, whoami output). Every write/exec step maps to something scope.txt
allowed, and each recommended fix cites the exact grant or setting to change.
References
PayloadsAllTheThings (PostgreSQL/MySQL/MSSQL injection & RCE sections); Redis unauthorized-access write-ups; vendor hardening guides (CIS benchmarks).
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md5.5 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 7e594ca5 | Firmada | – |
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