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Cómo funciona
noorqureshi/network-database-securityRed, wireless y telecom

network-database-security

⁨Assess reachable database services — PostgreSQL/MySQL/MSSQL/MongoDB/Redis — for unauthenticated access, weak/default accounts, over-broad grants, and dangerous features (xp_cmdshell, COPY FROM PROGRAM, UDF, Redis file write) that turn a DB login into OS code execution. Load when recon shows 3306/543⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/network-database-security

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
iocSMw5ers…IEu6ptDQ==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
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7e594ca5be13…3bc89927caee1 archivo · ⁦2.9 KB⁩
EscaneoBajo1 hallazgo
  • Enlaces a dominios externos
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/network/network-database-security@ee0e0c5

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When it applies

An authorized engagement has a reachable database instance — surfaced by network-service-attacks, handed over as a review target, or via app credentials recovered from a config dump. Covers PostgreSQL, MySQL/MariaDB, MSSQL, MongoDB, and Redis. Before touching anything, confirm in scope.txt (see tradecraft-scope-roe): which instances, which accounts, and whether write/delete/exec is permitted. On production systems, default to read-only proofs — no destructive statements unless explicitly allowed.

Why it works

Databases concentrate the crown jewels yet are routinely deployed as "internal-only": bound to 0.0.0.0, default or weak accounts, grants far wider than the app needs, and dangerous features left enabled. Features like xp_cmdshell, COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, UDFs, and Redis's writable config turn a mere database login into OS command execution — so an over-privileged app account is often a quiet path to DBA and then to the host.

Method

  1. Exposure & transport — nmap -sV -p 3306,5432,1433,6379,27017 <range>; check bind address, security groups / firewall rules, and whether TLS is required or enforced. Probe unauthenticated access: redis-cli -h <ip> ping (PONG = unauth — a finding by itself), mongosh --host <ip> --eval 'db.runCommand({listDatabases:1})', mysql -h <ip> -u root, psql -h <ip> -U postgres. nuclei has templates for known exposures.
  2. Authentication — default/test accounts and weak passwords; for broad guessing use network-password-spraying discipline (lockouts apply to MSSQL/MySQL too). Record from which hosts each credential works — host-restricted grants matter for pivoting.
  3. Authorization & roles — enumerate who can do what:
    • MySQL: SELECT user,host FROM mysql.user; SHOW GRANTS; — flag host '%', FILE, SUPER, GRANT OPTION.
    • Postgres: \du, SELECT * FROM pg_roles; — flag superuser, pg_read/write_server_files, pg_execute_server_program.
    • MSSQL: SELECT * FROM sys.server_principals; — flag sysadmin membership for app logins. Check access control on the sensitive tables, not just server-level roles.
  4. Dangerous configuration — the login→OS-command bridges:
    • MSSQL: EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell'; (also Ole Automation / sp_OACreate, CLR).
    • MySQL: secure_file_priv empty, FILE priv, SELECT * FROM mysql.func; for existing UDFs.
    • Postgres: COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, LOAD, untrusted PL languages.
    • Redis: CONFIG GET dir / CONFIG GET dbfilename — writable dir enables the classic webshell / SSH-key write.
  5. Audit & resilience — is logging on (MySQL general_log, pgaudit, SQL Server Audit, MongoDB --auditDestination)? Who can read backups and snapshots?
  6. Verify exploit chains safely — where scope allows writes/exec, prove command execution with a benign command (id, whoami) and stop. Where it doesn't, report the chain as a configuration risk with the exact grant/feature that enables it. Use sqlmap only against an in-scope injection point (→ web-sqli) — never against the DB blindly.

Gotchas

  • Distinguish misconfiguration from proven exploitable chain — report both, but only claim what you demonstrated.
  • Redis reachable only through a web SSRF is a different path — use web-ssrf-gopher-redis-rce.
  • Cloud-managed RDS/Azure SQL/Cloud SQL: most issues live in the control plane (public accessibility, security groups, snapshot sharing, IAM) — review via the provider console and the cloud-* skills instead of hammering the endpoint.
  • MSSQL xp_cmdshell "disabled" is not safe if the login is sysadmin — enabling it is one command (and is logged; note the noise in ROE).
  • Hashes pulled from mysql.user or captured in transit feed network-credential-cracking; app-account → DBA privilege growth often comes from reused passwords, not missing patches.
  • Dumping customer data to "prove impact" is over-collection — a version string or one non-sensitive row proves access.

Verify success

The report states, per instance: network exposure, which credentials work and at what privilege level, which dangerous features are reachable from the app account, and for every claimed chain a benign proof (version string, whoami output). Every write/exec step maps to something scope.txt allowed, and each recommended fix cites the exact grant or setting to change.

References

PayloadsAllTheThings (PostgreSQL/MySQL/MSSQL injection & RCE sections); Redis unauthorized-access write-ups; vendor hardening guides (CIS benchmarks).


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.

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Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c57e594ca5Firmada–

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