hardware-radio-sdr
Authorized RF/SDR security research on non-Wi-Fi radio signals — identify a signal's frequency and modulation receive-only, demodulate and reverse the protocol, and assess replay feasibility in a shielded lab. Load for wireless remotes, key fobs, sensors, telemetry, ISM-band devices, ADS-B, or any s
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c52 instalaciones+2 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/hardware-radio-sdrEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete369244bb…73b6f8a0
369244bb0c68…a34373b6f8a01 archivo · 2.5 KBEscaneoBajo1 hallazgo
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/hardware/hardware-radio-sdr@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
The scope includes a radio device that isn't Wi-Fi — a wireless remote, key fob, alarm sensor,
telemetry link, or ISM-band gadget — and you need to know whether an attacker can eavesdrop on,
forge, or replay its traffic. Spectrum use and transmission are heavily regulated: load
tradecraft-scope-roe and make scope.txt state the exact devices, frequency bands, and whether
transmitting is permitted at all — the default is receive-only. Classic Wi-Fi attacks belong to
the wireless domain (wireless-wpa2-attacks, wireless-evil-twin); this skill is generic SDR RF.
Why it works
Cheap SDR hardware (RTL-SDR for receive, HackRF for transmit) turns a wide slice of spectrum into raw I/Q samples. Most low-cost remotes and sensors use simple, unauthenticated modulation (OOK/ASK/2-FSK) with fixed or rolling codes, so the entire protocol is recoverable from a capture: demodulate to symbols, read the bit pattern, and you know exactly what a receiver trusts. Replay and forgery feasibility then falls out of whether the code is fixed, rolling, or challenge-response.
Method
- Confirm the legal envelope before powering anything on. Note the licensed bands, protected services (aviation, emergency — stay far away), and the authorization reference for any TX. Receive-only is the default; transmitting happens only in a shielded room (Faraday cage) with written permission.
- Survey receive-only. Sweep the expected band in
gqrx(orrtl_powerfor a wide passive sweep) and note the center frequency, bandwidth, and duty cycle of the target signal. ISM defaults worth checking first: 315 / 433.92 / 868 / 915 MHz. - Capture I/Q. Record the raw signal for offline work:
hackrf_transfer -r capture.cs8 -f 433920000 -s 2000000(-r= receive to file,-fHz,-ssample rate; 2 Msps covers most narrowband remotes). - Analyze the capture. Open it in Inspectrum to see the symbol timing and modulation visually, then demodulate and decode in URH (Universal Radio Hacker) — it auto-detects OOK/ASK/FSK, slices symbols to bits, and lets you diff transmissions to separate the fixed preamble/address from the counter/button fields. GNU Radio flowgraphs handle protocols URH can't.
- Classify the code scheme. Fixed code (identical bits every press) = trivially replayable. Rolling code = replay fails but look for rollback/jam-and-replay weaknesses and predictable counters. Document which class you observed with capture evidence.
- Assess replay/transmit only under the lab rules: shielded room, written TX authorization,
the target device as the only receiver.
hackrf_transfer -t replay.cs8 -f 433920000 -s 2000000retransmits a capture — outside a shielded environment this can be a criminal offense regardless of engagement scope. - Report the control question, not the capture. The finding is "an unauthenticated attacker can open / arm / spoof this" plus hardening advice (rolling codes, encryption, RX timeouts), not a dump of RF trivia.
Gotchas
- Default to RX and write the legal boundary into your notes — which bands, which devices, TX yes/no, and the authorization reference. If it's not written, it's receive-only.
- Never jam or interfere with public communications, and never transmit outside the shielded lab — including "just a quick replay test" on the bench.
- Sanitize evidence: don't publish unsanitized frequency + location combinations where the pairing itself is sensitive (site layouts, alarm frequencies).
- Rolling codes defeat naive replay — don't report "replayable" from a single capture; diff several transmissions first.
- Sample rate too low aliases the signal away — if you can't find a known transmitter, widen
the sweep and raise
-sbefore concluding it's absent.
Verify success
From receive-only analysis you can state the center frequency, modulation, symbol rate, and code scheme (fixed/rolling/encrypted) of the target signal, backed by labeled captures — and a clear verdict on whether unauthorized control is possible, with any transmit/replay test done strictly inside the authorized shielded setup.
References
URH and GNU Radio documentation; Inspectrum; the wireless domain skills for Wi-Fi targets.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md5.1 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 369244bb | Firmada | – |
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