Saltar al contenido
Nuevo

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash gratis por 7 días: 10M tokens al día tras una recarga de $10 o más. Hasta el 30/11.

Cómo funciona
noorqureshi/exploit-memory-corruptionIngeniería inversa y fuzzing

exploit-memory-corruption

⁨Turn a memory-corruption bug in a native binary into code execution — stack overflows, format strings, and ROP against modern mitigations. Load when you control input to a compiled program and it crashes or misbehaves: a network daemon, a thick client, a setuid/SUID helper, or extracted firmware. Si⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c52 instalaciones+2 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/exploit-memory-corruption

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
4fUSnHR4eT…rwub8WAw==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquetec8d4ac9f…2019f550
c8d4ac9fc80d…53972019f5501 archivo · ⁦2.1 KB⁩
EscaneoBajosin hallazgos
El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/exploit-dev/exploit-memory-corruption@ee0e0c5

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When it applies

You have a native binary or service on an authorized target that mishandles your input — a network-facing daemon, a thick-client, a setuid helper found during privesc, or a binary carved from firmware (reverse-eng-firmware). reverse-eng-binary-triage located the bug; this skill turns that crash into controlled execution. Pentest-only — this is destructive and can crash the service.

Why it works

C/C++ has no memory safety: writing past a buffer overwrites saved return addresses and pointers, and a user-controlled format string reads/writes arbitrary memory. Redirect execution to your code or to existing code (ROP) and the process does your bidding. Modern mitigations (NX, ASLR, PIE, stack canaries) don't remove the bug — they shape the technique.

Method

  1. Check protections first — checksec ./bin (or pwntools): NX, PIE, RELRO, canary. This decides everything. No canary + NX → ROP; PIE → you need a leak; no PIE, no NX → maybe shellcode.
  2. Find the offset — send a cyclic pattern (cyclic 200 / pattern_create), crash it under gdb+GEF/pwndbg, read the value in $rip/$eip, and cyclic -l <value> for the exact offset to the saved return address.
  3. Pick the primitive by protections:
    • ret2win — a target function already in the binary; overwrite the return address with it.
    • ret2libc / ROP — with NX, chain gadgets: leak a libc address (call puts(puts@got) via the PLT), compute the libc base, return to system("/bin/sh") or a one_gadget. Build gadgets with ROPgadget/ropper, the chain with pwntools ROP().
    • Format string (printf(user)) — leak stack/canary/PIE base with %p, then do arbitrary writes with %n (GOT overwrite → redirect a call to system). fmtstr_payload automates it.
  4. Defeat mitigations with leaks — ASLR/PIE need a leaked address (from a format string or an info-leak bug) to rebase; a stack canary must be leaked (or brute-forced byte-by-byte on a forking server) and replayed in your overflow so the check passes.
  5. Build it with pwntools — a repeatable script: process()/remote(), recvuntil, pack with p64(), stage the leak, then send the final chain; iterate locally, then fire at the target.
  6. Land a shell — reuse payloads-reverse-shells for what to run once you have execution.

Gotchas

  • Match the exact libc — remote exploitation fails on the wrong libc version/offsets; identify it (leaked addresses → a libc-database lookup) before computing system/one_gadget.
  • Bad bytes — \x00, \x0a, \x20 can truncate input depending on the read function; check and avoid them in addresses/payload.
  • Local works, remote doesn't — environment/stack alignment differs; the movaps alignment crash before system is fixed by an extra ret gadget.
  • This crashes the target — it's inherently disruptive; only on authorized pentest targets, never a live bug-bounty production service, and note the risk in the RoE.

Verify success

Reliable control of execution demonstrated on the target — a returned shell, a run command, or a controlled $rip with a working ROP chain — reproducible from your pwntools script.

References

pwntools docs & tutorials; checksec; GEF/pwndbg; ROPgadget/ropper; one_gadget; libc-database. Find the bug with reverse-eng-binary-triage; shell payloads in payloads-reverse-shells.

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosNoNo
Ejecuta comandos de shellNoNo
Usa la redNoNo
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c5c8d4ac9fFirmada–

Pregunta todo lo que tu alcance permite.

Crea la cuenta, añade créditos y haz la primera pregunta en el chat o en la terminal.

  1. 1/3

    Crea la cuenta

    Individual o empresa. Puedes pasar a empresa después sin perder saldo ni claves.

    IndividualEmpresa
  2. 2/3

    Añade créditos

    Con tarjeta. Pagas por token, sin suscripción.

    $5.00recarga mínima
  3. 3/3

    Pregunta

    En el chat, o instala el CLI y ejecuta notholy login en tu terminal.

    $ notholy login