code-review-iac
Security review of infrastructure-as-code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Ansible, Kubernetes/Helm manifests. Load when reviewing IaC in a repo/PR, on .tf/.yaml/.yml infra files, or "review our Terraform". Signals: *.tf, cloudformation/*.yaml, playbooks, k8s manifests, Helm charts, module registries.
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-iacEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete7c4531b8…665cb1ee
7c4531b80fc6…2eed665cb1ee1 archivo · 1.8 KBEscaneoBajosin hallazgos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-iac@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
Reviewing the code that provisions cloud/infra. IaC misconfigurations become real, exploitable
exposure the moment they apply — a single line can make a bucket public or an SG world-open — so
this pairs directly with the offensive cloud-* skills.
Why it works
IaC is declarative and repeatable: the same insecure default gets deployed everywhere it's
referenced. Scanning the definitions catches the exposure before it exists, and the patterns
(public access, 0.0.0.0/0, plaintext secrets, missing encryption/logging) are consistent across
providers.
Sinks & patterns (scan, then reason about blast radius)
- Public exposure: S3/GCS/Blob
acl = "public-read"/ public access blocks disabled; security groups / firewall rules0.0.0.0/0on 22/3389/DB ports; public RDS/ELB;publiclyAccessible=true. - Over-broad IAM:
Action:"*"/Resource:"*",iam:PassRolewildcards,AssumeRoletrust to"*", admin-equivalent managed policies attached broadly. - Secrets in code: hardcoded keys/passwords/tokens in
.tf/vars/playbooks; secrets committed in state or plan output;sensitive = falseon secret outputs. - Missing protections: encryption at rest/in transit off (EBS/S3/RDS/SNS), logging/audit disabled (CloudTrail, flow logs, GCP audit), no MFA-delete/versioning, public snapshots/AMIs.
- Kubernetes/Helm:
privileged: true,hostNetwork/hostPID, nosecurityContext/runAsNonRoot, wide RBAC (cluster-admin), secrets as env/plaintext,latestimages, no network policies. - Ansible:
shell/commandwith unquoted vars,no_logmissing on secret tasks, world-readable file modes,validate_certs: no.
Method
- Run
checkov/tfsec/kicsfor a broad first pass; they cover hundreds of provider rules. rg '0.0.0.0/0|public|Action.*\*|password|secret|privileged: true'and review each hit's context.- Trace module inputs/variables — an insecure default in a reused module multiplies everywhere.
- Check state handling (remote, encrypted, access-controlled) and CI that applies it (
code-review-cicd).
Gotchas
- A finding's severity depends on blast radius — a public dev sandbox ≠ a public prod data store.
- Scanners miss cross-resource logic (an SG that's fine until paired with a public subnet) — reason about the whole graph.
- Secrets belong in a manager (Vault/SSM/KMS), never in variables or state — flag any inline secret.
References
CIS Benchmarks (AWS/Azure/GCP/Kubernetes); Checkov/tfsec/KICS rule sets; provider well-architected security pillars.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md3.1 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 7c4531b8 | Firmada | – |
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