implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts
Implements code signing for build artifacts (binaries, packages, containers)
v1.0.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 12 horas
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/implementing-code-signing-for-artifactsEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete11951b43…fb54dec4
11951b435684…2ec3fb54dec48 archivos · 12.0 KBEscaneoMedio3 hallazgos
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts@54a7988
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When to Use
- When establishing artifact integrity verification to prevent supply chain tampering
- When compliance requires cryptographic proof that build artifacts are authentic and unmodified
- When distributing software to customers who need to verify publisher identity
- When implementing zero-trust deployment pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts
- When meeting SLSA Level 2+ requirements for provenance and integrity
Do not use for encrypting artifacts (signing provides integrity, not confidentiality), for container image signing specifically (use cosign), or for source code authentication (use commit signing).
Prerequisites
- GPG key pair for traditional signing or Sigstore account for keyless signing
- Code signing certificate from a Certificate Authority for public distribution
- CI/CD pipeline with access to signing keys or identity provider
- Verification infrastructure in deployment pipelines
Workflow
Step 1: Generate and Manage Signing Keys
# Generate GPG key for artifact signing
gpg --full-generate-key --batch <<EOF
Key-Type: eddsa
Key-Curve: ed25519
Subkey-Type: eddsa
Subkey-Curve: ed25519
Name-Real: CI Build System
Name-Email: [email protected]
Expire-Date: 1y
%no-protection
EOF
# Export public key for distribution
gpg --armor --export [email protected] > signing-key.pub
# Export private key for CI/CD (store in secrets manager)
gpg --armor --export-secret-keys [email protected] > signing-key.privStep 2: Sign Build Artifacts in CI/CD
# .github/workflows/build-sign.yml
name: Build and Sign
on:
push:
tags: ['v*']
jobs:
build-sign:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
id-token: write # For Sigstore keyless signing
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Build artifacts
run: |
make build
sha256sum dist/* > dist/checksums.sha256
- name: Import GPG Key
run: |
echo "${{ secrets.GPG_PRIVATE_KEY }}" | gpg --batch --import
gpg --list-secret-keys
- name: Sign artifacts
run: |
for file in dist/*; do
gpg --detach-sign --armor --local-user [email protected] "$file"
done
- name: Install cosign for keyless signing
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3
- name: Keyless sign with Sigstore
run: |
for file in dist/*.tar.gz; do
cosign sign-blob "$file" \
--output-signature "${file}.sig" \
--output-certificate "${file}.cert" \
--yes
done
- name: Create Release with signed artifacts
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
files: |
dist/*
dist/*.asc
dist/*.sig
dist/*.certStep 3: Verify Signatures in Deployment Pipeline
# Verify GPG signature
gpg --import signing-key.pub
gpg --verify artifact.tar.gz.asc artifact.tar.gz
# Verify Sigstore keyless signature
cosign verify-blob artifact.tar.gz \
--signature artifact.tar.gz.sig \
--certificate artifact.tar.gz.cert \
--certificate-identity [email protected] \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
# Verify checksums
sha256sum --check checksums.sha256Step 4: Sign npm Packages with Provenance
{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "npm run build && npm run test"
},
"publishConfig": {
"provenance": true
}
}# Publish npm package with provenance attestation
npm publish --provenanceKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Code Signing | Cryptographic process of signing software artifacts to verify publisher identity and artifact integrity |
| Detached Signature | Signature stored in a separate file from the artifact, allowing independent distribution |
| Keyless Signing | Sigstore's approach using short-lived certificates tied to OIDC identities instead of long-lived keys |
| Provenance | Metadata describing how, where, and by whom an artifact was built |
| Transparency Log | Append-only log (Rekor) that records all signing events for public auditability |
| Trust Chain | Hierarchical chain from root CA to signing certificate establishing trust in the signer's identity |
| SLSA | Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts — framework defining levels of supply chain security |
Tools & Systems
- GPG/PGP: Traditional asymmetric cryptography tool for signing and verifying artifacts
- Sigstore (cosign): Modern keyless signing infrastructure using OIDC identity and transparency logs
- Rekor: Sigstore's transparency log recording all signing events immutably
- Fulcio: Sigstore's certificate authority issuing short-lived certificates bound to OIDC identities
- notation: Microsoft's artifact signing tool for OCI registries (Project Notary v2)
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Establishing Signed Release Pipeline
Context: An open-source project needs to sign release artifacts so users can verify authenticity and detect tampering.
Approach:
- Use Sigstore keyless signing in GitHub Actions (no key management overhead)
- Sign all release binaries with
cosign sign-blobusing OIDC identity - Generate and sign checksums file for bulk verification
- Upload signatures, certificates, and checksums alongside release artifacts
- Document verification instructions in the project README
- Add verification step to the Homebrew formula or apt repository
Pitfalls: GPG key compromise requires revoking and re-signing all artifacts. Sigstore keyless signing avoids this by using ephemeral keys. Long-lived signing keys in CI/CD secrets are a supply chain risk if the CI system is compromised.
Output Format
Artifact Signing Report
========================
Pipeline: Build and Sign v2.3.0
Date: 2026-02-23
Signing Method: Sigstore Keyless + GPG
SIGNED ARTIFACTS:
app-v2.3.0-linux-amd64.tar.gz
GPG: PASS ([email protected], EdDSA/Ed25519)
Sigstore: PASS (Rekor entry: 24658135, Fulcio cert issued)
SHA256: a1b2c3d4...
app-v2.3.0-darwin-arm64.tar.gz
GPG: PASS
Sigstore: PASS (Rekor entry: 24658136)
SHA256: e5f6g7h8...
checksums.sha256
GPG: PASS (detached signature)
TRANSPARENCY LOG:
Entries recorded: 3
Log index range: 24658135-24658137
Verification: https://search.sigstore.devArchivos de esta versión
assets/11.2 KB
- template.md1.2 KB
references/35.1 KB
- api-reference.md1.8 KB
- standards.md1.5 KB
- workflows.md1.8 KB
scripts/213.1 KB
- agent.py5.9 KB
- process.py7.3 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md7.2 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | Sí | Sí |
| Escribe archivos | Sí | Sí |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | Sí | Sí |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 11951b43 | Firmada | – |
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