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Cómo funciona
mukul975/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logsDFIR y threat hunting

detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs

⁨Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory using Splunk and KQL queries⁩

v1.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 13 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
18XmrfGVit…WPz7EIDg==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquetebc8f0912…6949de51
bc8f0912e656…80036949de514 archivos · ⁦8.1 KB⁩
EscaneoMedio2 hallazgos
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  • Enlaces a dominios externos
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs@54a7988

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When to Use

  • When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction
  • When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access
  • After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level
  • When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)
  • During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use

Prerequisites

  • Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers
  • Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)
  • Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations
  • SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs

Workflow

  1. Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768): Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ/AS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.
  2. Detect Encryption Type Anomalies: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.
  3. Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.
  4. Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.
  5. Detect TGS Without Prior TGT: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP/account, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.
  6. Monitor KRBTGT Password Age: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.
  7. Validate PAC Signatures: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.

Detection Queries

Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS

spl
index=wineventlog EventCode=4769
| where TicketEncryptionType="0x17"
| where ServiceName!="krbtgt"
| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer
| where count > 5
| sort -count

Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT

spl
index=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)
| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode
| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress
| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt < tgt_time)
| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time

KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators

kql
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4769
| where TicketEncryptionType == "0x17"
| where ServiceName != "krbtgt"
| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName
| where Count > 5

Common Scenarios

  1. Post-DCSync Golden Ticket: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.
  2. RC4 Downgrade: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.
  3. Cross-Domain Golden Ticket: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains/forests.
  4. Persistence After Remediation: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Suspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]
Source IP: [Client IP]
Target Service: [SPN accessed]
Encryption Type: [RC4/AES128/AES256]
Anomaly: [No prior TGT/RC4 in AES environment/Extended lifetime]
KRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]
Risk Level: [Critical]

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosNoNo
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  2. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v1.013 nov 202654a7988bc8f0912Firmada–

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