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mukul975/detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpointsAnálisis de malware y ransomware

detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints

⁨Detects fileless malware and in-memory attacks that execute entirely⁩

v1.0.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 12 horas

Instalar

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
FNjVt3oujO…vNBbolCA==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquete499d2c30…3f117f71
499d2c3012f5…f7cd3f117f718 archivos · ⁦10.0 KB⁩
EscaneoMedio13 hallazgos
  • command.base64_execSKILL.md:85
  • command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:88
  • command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:89
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints@54a7988

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Building detection rules for fileless malware that operates entirely in memory
  • Hunting for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, and WMI abuse
  • Configuring endpoint telemetry (Sysmon, AMSI, PowerShell logging) to capture fileless indicators
  • Investigating incidents where traditional AV found no malicious files

Do not use for detecting file-based malware or for malware reverse engineering.

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon with process creation and WMI event logging enabled
  • PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging enabled
  • AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) enabled for script content inspection
  • EDR with behavioral detection capabilities (MDE, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne)

Workflow

Step 1: Enable Required Telemetry

powershell
# Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (GPO or registry)
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" `
  -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force

# Enable PowerShell Module Logging
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging" `
  -Name EnableModuleLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force

# Enable PowerShell Transcription
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription" `
  -Name EnableTranscripting -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force

# Sysmon config for fileless detection (key events):
# Event ID 1: Process creation (captures CommandLine)
# Event ID 7: Image loaded (DLL loading)
# Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread (injection)
# Event ID 10: Process access (LSASS access)
# Event ID 19/20/21: WMI events

Step 2: Detect PowerShell-Based Attacks

text
# Indicators of malicious PowerShell:

# Encoded command execution
EventID: 1
CommandLine contains: "powershell" AND ("-enc" OR "-e " OR "-encodedcommand" OR "FromBase64String")

# Download cradle patterns
CommandLine contains: "IEX" AND ("Net.WebClient" OR "DownloadString" OR "Invoke-WebRequest")
CommandLine contains: "Invoke-Expression" AND "New-Object"

# AMSI bypass attempts (Event ID 4104 - Script Block)
ScriptBlock contains: ("Amsi"+"Utils") OR ("amsi"+"InitFailed") OR "SetValue.*amsi"

# Splunk query for suspicious PowerShell:
index=windows source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventCode=4104
| where match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|net\.webclient|frombase64|bypass|amsi.utils)")
| table _time host ScriptBlockText

Step 3: Detect Process Injection Techniques

text
# Reflective DLL injection - loads DLL from memory without touching disk
# Detection: Sysmon Event 7 (ImageLoaded) where image path is unusual
EventID: 7
ImageLoaded NOT starts with: "C:\Windows\" AND NOT starts with: "C:\Program Files"

# Process hollowing - creates process in suspended state, replaces memory
# Detection: Process creation followed by immediate memory write
EventID: 1 + 10 correlation
# Process created then accessed with PROCESS_VM_WRITE

# APC injection - queues code to thread's async procedure call queue
# Detection: Sysmon CreateRemoteThread from non-system process
EventID: 8
SourceImage NOT IN (known_legitimate_sources)

# MDE KQL:
DeviceEvents
| where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("MsMpEng.exe", "svchost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName

Step 4: Detect WMI-Based Persistence

text
# Sysmon Event IDs 19/20/21 for WMI events
EventID: 19  # WmiEventFilter activity detected
EventID: 20  # WmiEventConsumer activity detected
EventID: 21  # WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected

# Any WMI event subscription creation is suspicious unless expected
# Common malicious WMI persistence:
Consumer contains: "CommandLineEventConsumer" OR "ActiveScriptEventConsumer"

# Query for WMI subscriptions via osquery or PowerShell:
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventConsumer
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding

Step 5: Detect Registry-Based Execution

text
# Malware stored in registry values and executed via PowerShell
# Sysmon Event 13 - Registry value set with encoded content
EventID: 13
TargetObject contains: "CurrentVersion\Run"
Details: unusually long value or Base64-encoded content

# Detection query:
index=sysmon EventCode=13
| where match(Details, "[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{100,}")
| table _time host TargetObject Details Image

Key Concepts

Term Definition
Fileless Malware Malware that operates entirely in memory without writing executable files to disk
AMSI Antimalware Scan Interface; Windows API allowing security products to inspect script content before execution
Reflective DLL Injection Loading a DLL from memory rather than disk, avoiding file-based detection
Process Hollowing Creating a legitimate process in suspended state and replacing its memory with malicious code
Script Block Logging PowerShell logging feature that captures deobfuscated script content (Event ID 4104)

Tools & Systems

  • Sysmon: Kernel-level process, DLL, and WMI monitoring
  • AMSI: Windows script content inspection API
  • PowerShell Logging: Script Block, Module, and Transcription logging
  • Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: Behavioral detection for fileless techniques
  • Volatility 3: Memory forensics for post-incident fileless malware analysis

Common Pitfalls

  • Relying on file-based AV: Traditional AV that scans files on disk will miss fileless attacks entirely. Behavioral detection and AMSI are required.
  • Disabled PowerShell logging: Without Script Block Logging, deobfuscated PowerShell commands are invisible to defenders.
  • AMSI bypass not detected: Sophisticated attackers bypass AMSI before executing payloads. Detect AMSI bypass attempts as a high-priority alert.
  • Not monitoring WMI events: WMI persistence is a favored technique of APT groups. Sysmon events 19-21 must be enabled.

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosNoNo
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaComando · command.base64_execSKILL.md:85
  2. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:88
  3. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:89
  4. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:96
  5. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellreferences/api-reference.md:28
  6. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellreferences/api-reference.md:43
  7. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  8. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:19
  9. MediaComando · command.base64_execscripts/agent.py:23
  10. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
  11. MediaComando · command.base64_execscripts/process.py:9
  12. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/process.py:15
  13. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v1.0.013 nov 202654a7988499d2c30Firmada–

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