setting-up-an-isolated-malware-analysis-lab
Builds a safe, isolated environment for detonating and analyzing malware
v1.0.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días24 EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 10 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install meltedinhex/setting-up-an-isolated-malware-analysis-labEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquetec3c4e6e3…88eebfb7
c3c4e6e364bb…e42b88eebfb74 archivos · 4.2 KBEscaneoMedio2 hallazgos
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/analyst.py
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/tree/main/skills/setting-up-an-isolated-malware-analysis-lab@da7600a
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When to Use
- You need to run unknown or known-malicious binaries to observe behavior without risk to production systems or the internet.
- You are standing up a repeatable analysis environment for static and dynamic work.
- You want a reverting, snapshot-based workflow so each sample starts from a clean state.
Do not use this as guidance for detonating samples on a host OS or a cloud VM with live egress; that risks self-spreading malware escaping. Use a dedicated, network-isolated hypervisor instead.
Prerequisites
- A host with a type-2 hypervisor (VMware Workstation/Fusion or VirtualBox) or a dedicated type-1 host. At least 16 GB RAM and 200 GB disk for two guests.
- A victim guest (Windows 10/11) for detonation — e.g. built with FLARE-VM tooling.
- An analysis services guest (REMnux, Linux) to simulate internet services and capture traffic.
- Host networking able to provide a host-only / internal network with no NAT or bridged adapter on the victim.
Safety & Handling
- The victim VM must have no bridged or NAT adapter — host-only/internal only. All "internet" is simulated by the REMnux guest running INetSim.
- Disable shared folders, drag-and-drop, and clipboard sharing on the victim before detonation; these are escape and contamination paths.
- Take a clean base snapshot before any sample touches the VM and revert to it after every run.
- Store samples in password-protected archives (
infected) and only extract them inside the victim VM.
Workflow
Step 1: Create and harden the victim VM
Install Windows in a new VM, apply analysis tooling, then strip escape paths:
VM settings (victim):
Network adapter -> Host-only (vmnet1) or Internal network
Shared folders -> Disabled
Clipboard/DnD -> Disabled
USB controller -> Disabled
Snapshots -> enabledStep 2: Stand up simulated internet on REMnux
On the REMnux guest (same host-only network), give it a static IP and run INetSim so the victim's DNS/HTTP/SMTP requests are answered locally:
# REMnux guest, e.g. 10.0.0.2 on the host-only network
sudo nano /etc/inetsim/inetsim.conf # set service_bind_address and dns_default_ip
sudo systemctl start inetsimPoint the victim's DNS and default gateway at the REMnux IP so all resolution and traffic flow to the simulator.
Step 3: Start packet capture
Capture from the REMnux side so the victim never sees a sniffer:
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -w /cases/<sample-sha256>.pcapStep 4: Snapshot, detonate, observe, revert
1. Snapshot victim as "clean-base"
2. Transfer the sample into the victim (read-only ISO or one-way copy)
3. Run procmon / process monitoring, then execute the sample
4. Observe for 3-10 minutes; collect artifacts (pcap, procmon log, dropped files)
5. Revert victim to "clean-base"Use the helper script to verify a victim VM's adapters are isolated before you detonate.
python scripts/analyst.py --check-config vmx/victim.vmxValidation
- From the victim,
nslookup example.comresolves to the REMnux IP (proves DNS is simulated, not real). - A browser request from the victim returns INetSim's default page, not live content.
tcpdumpon REMnux shows the victim's traffic; nothing reaches a real upstream gateway.- Reverting the snapshot returns the victim to the exact clean state (no dropped files persist).
Pitfalls
- Leaving a NAT/bridged adapter "just to download a tool" — malware will use it. Install all tooling before isolating, then remove the adapter.
- Forgetting to disable VMware Tools / guest additions clipboard, which some samples abuse.
- Detonating before snapshotting, so you cannot cleanly revert.
- Some samples detect INetSim's generic responses; if behavior stalls, consider FakeNet-NG or tailored service responses.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the config-check tool and full source list. - INetSim, FLARE-VM, and REMnux documentation (linked in frontmatter).
Archivos de esta versión
references/11.5 KB
- api-reference.md1.5 KB
scripts/12.9 KB
- analyst.py2.9 KB
- LICENSE340 B
- SKILL.md4.8 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | Sí | Sí |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/analyst.py
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | 13 nov 2026 | da7600a | c3c4e6e3 | Firmada | – |
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