Saltar al contenido
Nuevo

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash gratis por 7 días: 10M tokens al día tras una recarga de $10 o más. Hasta el 30/11.

Cómo funciona
aeondave/forensic-techniqueDFIR y threat hunting

forensic-technique

⁨Incident forensics: preservation, triage, timelines, artifact correlation, and reporting across disk images, memory, PCAP, and endpoint/SaaS audit logs.⁩

v2026.11.13-21cd5683 instalaciones+3 en 7 días39 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 10 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install aeondave/forensic-technique

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
aZ6MyASqsz…51WLcYAw==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquete6d7fedc8…c29b4b7b
6d7fedc863cd…5eacc29b4b7b11 archivos · ⁦24.1 KB⁩
EscaneoMedio2 hallazgos
  • injection.no_confirmationreferences/timeline-correlation.md:13
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/forensic_triage.py
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-techniques/forensic-technique@21cd568

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

Goal: produce defensible, reproducible findings from heterogeneous evidence.

When this technique applies

  • Potential compromise requiring reconstruction of user/system activity.
  • Evidence includes disk images, ISO media, RAM dumps, PCAP, endpoint logs, or SaaS audit records.
  • Need to correlate endpoint, filesystem, and network timelines.
  • Need report-ready output for incident response, legal, or internal review.

Boundary with offensive-tools

This skill explains methodology and decision flow. Tool-specific syntax belongs to offensive-tools/* skills.

Initial triage

Before extracting deeply, classify the evidence mix and decide what source can answer the objective fastest with the least interpretive risk.

  • Starting state: is the case driven by disk, memory, PCAP, ISO/media, logs, or a mixed evidence set?
  • First questions: what is the investigation objective, which artifacts are most volatile or most probative, and what timeline window and provenance constraints apply?
  • Immediate actions: verify integrity, normalize time and scope, then inspect the highest-value source first instead of carving everything.
  • Tool-family direction: use forensic acquisition/timeline families (sleuth-kit, autopsy, ftk-imager) for disk/media, volatility3 for memory, and zeek/tcpdump/wireshark for network evidence; use yara and capa only after suspicious artifacts are isolated.
  • Escalation rule: require corroboration across sources before claiming compromise, execution, persistence, or exfiltration.

Agent operating model

The agent should keep this loop:

  1. Preserve and scope evidence.
  2. Prioritize by volatility and investigative value.
  3. Examine source-specific artifacts.
  4. Correlate across sources into one timeline.
  5. Validate claims with independent corroboration.
  6. Report facts, interpretation boundaries, and recommendations.

Do not move to deep extraction/carving before timeline framing and hypothesis definition.

Core forensic model

  1. Preserve: isolate evidence, hash, and record provenance needed for reproducibility.
  2. Collect: acquire additional required artifacts with minimal alteration.
  3. Examine: parse artifacts by source type (disk, memory, network).
  4. Correlate: build a unified timeline across sources.
  5. Conclude: state what is supported by evidence vs assumptions.
  6. Report: produce concise, reproducible findings and follow-up actions.

Evidence-first prioritization

Use volatility and value to decide acquisition/examination order.

  1. Live volatile artifacts (RAM, active connections, running processes)
  2. Network evidence at risk of rotation (live captures, ephemeral logs)
  3. Endpoint high-value non-volatile artifacts (event logs, browser data, registry)
  4. Full disk image deep examination
  5. Enrichment sources (threat intel, external context)

Objective-driven workflows

1. Disk image investigation (E01/DD/RAW)

Use when you need file-system artifacts, deleted-content recovery, execution traces, and persistence evidence.

  • Start with integrity + partition mapping.
  • Enumerate file systems and prioritize user/profile, startup, logs, scheduled tasks, shell history.
  • On Windows evidence, prioritize execution artifacts such as Prefetch, LNK, Jump Lists, AmCache, ShimCache, SRUM, PowerShell logs, services, and scheduled tasks.
  • Build an initial timeline before deep carving.
  • Recover/decode only artifacts linked to hypotheses (do not carve everything by default).
  • Validate notable findings in at least one secondary source (e.g., link file + event log + registry).

Primary tool families:

  • offensive-tools/forensic/sleuth-kit/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/autopsy/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/ftk-imager/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/yara/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/capa/ — capability detection on extracted executables (identifies malware families, TTPs, embedded shellcode)

2. ISO media investigation

Use when the evidence is installer-like media, archives, or mounted image content.

  • Verify hash and mount read-only.
  • Inventory executable/script content and autorun-related metadata.
  • Extract Office/PDF/archive payload chains, embedded objects, external template references, shortcut chains, and script launchers before any dynamic handling.
  • Compare bundle contents against expected vendor structure and signatures.
  • Extract suspicious binaries/configs for static triage and rule scanning.
  • Correlate ISO-delivered artifacts with host execution traces from endpoint evidence.

Primary tool families:

  • offensive-tools/forensic/sleuth-kit/
  • offensive-tools/rev/binwalk/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/yara/

3. PCAP/network forensics

Use when reconstructing communication, exfiltration paths, C2 patterns, or lateral movement.

  • Build traffic summary first (top talkers, protocols, unusual destinations).
  • Pivot by DNS, TLS metadata, HTTP objects, and transfer channels.
  • Identify sequencing: initial access indicators, staging, beaconing, bulk transfer.
  • Tie network sessions to endpoint process/user context when possible.

Primary tool families:

  • offensive-tools/forensic/zeek/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/tcpdump/
  • offensive-tools/network/wireshark/

4. Memory-centered investigation

Use when malware is fileless/injected, or when disk evidence is incomplete.

  • Enumerate processes/parents, command lines, sockets, loaded modules.
  • Hunt for injected regions and anomalous memory protections.
  • Extract process artifacts and correlate with on-disk binaries and PCAP events.
  • Treat memory findings as high-confidence for “what was running now,” then confirm persistence on disk.

Primary tool families:

  • offensive-tools/forensic/volatility3/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/yara/
  • offensive-tools/forensic/capa/ — classify extracted process dumps or unpacked binaries against malware capability ruleset

5. Mixed-source incident reconstruction

Use when you have disk + PCAP + memory and need a single chronology.

  • Create source-local timelines first.
  • Normalize to a single timezone and clock offset model.
  • Merge into one chronology with confidence tags:
    • Direct evidence (observed in source)
    • Corroborated evidence (confirmed by second source)
    • Inference (plausible but unconfirmed)
  • Explicitly record competing explanations for ambiguous events.

6. Log-centric and objective-driven investigations

Use when evidence is mostly EVTX, registry hives, MFT snapshots, API traces, or SaaS audit records, including records inspected through a SIEM UI.

  • Build an objective-to-artifact map first (which artifact can answer each objective decisively).
  • Prefer deterministic extraction over broad hunting (exact key, exact event id, exact stream, exact record).
  • Interpret coded values using the provider's documentation for the full field path and applicable schema/version. Do not transfer enum meanings between fields.
  • After each UI row selection or query change, verify the raw record matches the intended event id and the relevant host/user before saving or interpreting it. A cleared loading indicator does not prove the displayed row is the intended record; discard mismatched extracts and reacquire.
  • For Windows log-heavy cases, prioritize: PowerShell ScriptBlock (4104), process creation (4688/Sysmon 1), service/task creation, Defender/AV alerts, and relevant registry keys. When an ETW trace (.etl) is provided, treat provider name + event id as the primary pointer (e.g. Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell, Microsoft-Antimalware-Scan-Interface, Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process).
  • For Linux hosts, prioritize journalctl output from /var/log/journal/* (auth, sshd, sudo, systemd unit start/stop) and /var/log/audit/audit.log (auditd) for structured process/command evidence.
  • For macOS hosts, use the Unified Log system (log collect, log show --predicate ..., or an .logarchive bundle) for process, network, and security signals; classic /var/log text logs are largely deprecated.
  • For "who was logged on / usage timeline" questions, reconstruct sessions from Security 4624 logon types and pair logon/logoff by Logon ID; see references/windows-execution-indicators.md.
  • For API trace cases, reconstruct sequence by API dependency chain (enumeration → allocation/write → execution).
  • Mark each conclusion as direct artifact fact or inferred interpretation. Scenario descriptions and threat intelligence guide hypotheses; they do not establish activity absent from the inspected records.

Primary tool families:

  • offensive-tools/forensic/chainsaw/ — fast triage across EVTX, $MFT, ShimCache, SRUM, and registry hives with Sigma and built-in detection rules; produces multi-source execution timelines

For cloud/SaaS audit records (AWS CloudTrail, Microsoft 365/Entra unified audit log, Google Workspace, Okta), load references/cloud-saas-audit-logs.md for per-provider record/field semantics and event-time vs ingestion-time handling.

Practical quality gates

  • Provenance and hash records exist for all primary evidence.
  • At least one key claim is corroborated across two independent sources.
  • Timeline includes both malicious and benign context to avoid narrative bias.
  • Every IOC or behavioral claim has exact source pointer (artifact + timestamp).
  • Report distinguishes fact, interpretation, and recommendation.

Anti-patterns

  • Starting with deep carving before timeline and hypothesis framing.
  • Treating one artifact as conclusive without corroboration.
  • Mixing local-time and UTC evidence without explicit normalization.
  • Writing conclusion-first reports and backfilling evidence.

Required deliverables from the agent

  1. Evidence inventory with integrity state.
  2. Source-specific findings with exact pointers.
  3. Correlated timeline with confidence labels.
  4. High-confidence claims vs inference boundary.
  5. Report-ready conclusions and next actions.

Resources

  • references/evidence-preservation.md — Load for provenance, hashing, read-only workflow, and evidence-handling order.
  • references/disk-and-iso-analysis.md — Load for filesystem/media triage, startup paths, selective extraction, and validation.
  • references/windows-execution-indicators.md — Load for Prefetch, LNK, Jump Lists, AmCache, ShimCache, SRUM, execution artifacts, user logon/session reconstruction, and timestamp-integrity (timestomping) checks.
  • references/document-malware-analysis.md — Load for Office, PDF, archive, embedded-object, and external-template payload chains.
  • references/pcap-analysis.md — Load for protocol triage, session reconstruction, transfer paths, and network chronology.
  • references/memory-analysis.md — Load for process/module/socket triage, injected regions, transient secrets, and disk/network correlation.
  • references/timeline-correlation.md — Load for timestamp-field semantics, timestamp-integrity checks, clock normalization, data-reduction/pivot workflow, and merging source-local timelines with confidence labels.
  • references/cloud-saas-audit-logs.md — Load for AWS CloudTrail, Microsoft 365/Entra, Google Workspace, and Okta audit-record and timestamp-field semantics.
  • references/lessons-learned-patterns.md — Load for mixed-artifact heuristics and fast-answer investigation patterns.
  • scripts/forensic_triage.py — Run to classify an evidence file and get the first forensic workflow/tool-family recommendation.

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosSíSí
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redNoNo
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationreferences/timeline-correlation.md:13
  2. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/forensic_triage.py

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.11.13-21cd56813 nov 202621cd5686d7fedc8Firmada–

Pregunta todo lo que tu alcance permite.

Crea la cuenta, añade créditos y haz la primera pregunta en el chat o en la terminal.

  1. 1/3

    Crea la cuenta

    Individual o empresa. Puedes pasar a empresa después sin perder saldo ni claves.

    IndividualEmpresa
  2. 2/3

    Añade créditos

    Con tarjeta. Pagas por token, sin suscripción.

    $5.00recarga mínima
  3. 3/3

    Pregunta

    En el chat, o instala el CLI y ejecuta notholy login en tu terminal.

    $ notholy login