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How it works
noorqureshi/defense-cloud-detectionLinux, cloud and containers

defense-cloud-detection

⁨Detect and respond to attacks in cloud control planes — credential abuse, IMDS theft, persistence, and privilege escalation — from audit logs. Load for "detect cloud attacks", "CloudTrail/GuardDuty", "someone used our keys", AWS/Azure/GCP monitoring, or cloud IR. The defensive counterpart to the clo⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/defense-cloud-detection

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
uxRPJhiIQm…pzlYM6Bw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package9f0189d0…6781564e
9f0189d0cb90…7cbb6781564e1 file · ⁦1.6 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/defense/defense-cloud-detection@ee0e0c5

When it applies

Your assets live in AWS/Azure/GCP and you need to catch control-plane abuse — stolen keys, a role assumed from a strange place, new persistence — using the provider's audit logs.

Why it works

Every cloud API call is logged (CloudTrail / Azure Activity / GCP Admin Activity). Attacks that are invisible on the host (assuming a role, reading a secret, adding a key) are loud in the control plane — if you're actually reading it. The identity and the calling context are in every event.

Method

  1. Guarantee the telemetry: CloudTrail (all regions + management & data events), Azure Activity
    • Entra sign-in logs, GCP audit logs — centralised and immutable. No logs → no detection.
  2. Credential-theft tells: an IAM user/role key used from a new ASN/region/UA, especially sts:GetCallerIdentity then enumeration bursts — classic stolen-key triage. IMDS-sourced role creds used off the instance (compare the session's source IP to the instance).
  3. Persistence: CreateAccessKey, CreateUser, new login profile, CreateRole with a broad trust policy, new identity provider — alert on these in prod accounts.
  4. Privilege escalation: AttachUserPolicy/PutUserPolicy granting *, iam:PassRole + service launch, AssumeRole chains that cross accounts.
  5. Managed signals: enable GuardDuty / Defender for Cloud / SCC as a baseline, then tune and layer custom queries (Athena over CloudTrail) on top.
  6. Respond: disable the key/session, revoke role sessions, snapshot for forensics, rotate, and review what the identity could reach (tradecraft-attack-path-mapping).

Gotchas

  • CloudTrail data events (S3 object-level, Lambda) are off by default — you miss exfil without them.
  • Roles blur "who did it" — correlate the session name and source, not just the principal.
  • Automation (CI/CD, Terraform) generates the same API calls; baseline service identities first.

Verify success

A simulated key-abuse / privilege-escalation sequence (e.g. via a lab) surfaces from the audit logs with the identity, source, and action, and the response revokes access and preserves evidence.

References

AWS CloudTrail & GuardDuty; Azure Monitor / Entra sign-in logs; GCP audit logs; MITRE ATT&CK Cloud matrix.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c59f0189d0Signed–

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