defense-cloud-detection
Detect and respond to attacks in cloud control planes — credential abuse, IMDS theft, persistence, and privilege escalation — from audit logs. Load for "detect cloud attacks", "CloudTrail/GuardDuty", "someone used our keys", AWS/Azure/GCP monitoring, or cloud IR. The defensive counterpart to the clo
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/defense-cloud-detectionWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package9f0189d0…6781564e
9f0189d0cb90…7cbb6781564e1 file · 1.6 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/defense/defense-cloud-detection@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
Your assets live in AWS/Azure/GCP and you need to catch control-plane abuse — stolen keys, a role assumed from a strange place, new persistence — using the provider's audit logs.
Why it works
Every cloud API call is logged (CloudTrail / Azure Activity / GCP Admin Activity). Attacks that are invisible on the host (assuming a role, reading a secret, adding a key) are loud in the control plane — if you're actually reading it. The identity and the calling context are in every event.
Method
- Guarantee the telemetry: CloudTrail (all regions + management & data events), Azure Activity
- Entra sign-in logs, GCP audit logs — centralised and immutable. No logs → no detection.
- Credential-theft tells: an IAM user/role key used from a new ASN/region/UA, especially
sts:GetCallerIdentitythen enumeration bursts — classic stolen-key triage. IMDS-sourced role creds used off the instance (compare the session's source IP to the instance). - Persistence:
CreateAccessKey,CreateUser, new login profile,CreateRolewith a broad trust policy, new identity provider — alert on these in prod accounts. - Privilege escalation:
AttachUserPolicy/PutUserPolicygranting*,iam:PassRole+ service launch,AssumeRolechains that cross accounts. - Managed signals: enable GuardDuty / Defender for Cloud / SCC as a baseline, then tune and layer custom queries (Athena over CloudTrail) on top.
- Respond: disable the key/session, revoke role sessions, snapshot for forensics, rotate, and
review what the identity could reach (
tradecraft-attack-path-mapping).
Gotchas
- CloudTrail data events (S3 object-level, Lambda) are off by default — you miss exfil without them.
- Roles blur "who did it" — correlate the session name and source, not just the principal.
- Automation (CI/CD, Terraform) generates the same API calls; baseline service identities first.
Verify success
A simulated key-abuse / privilege-escalation sequence (e.g. via a lab) surfaces from the audit logs with the identity, source, and action, and the response revokes access and preserves evidence.
References
AWS CloudTrail & GuardDuty; Azure Monitor / Entra sign-in logs; GCP audit logs; MITRE ATT&CK Cloud matrix.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md2.9 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 9f0189d0 | Signed | – |
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