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How it works
noorqureshi/cloud-gcpLinux, cloud and containers

cloud-gcp

⁨Attack Google Cloud Platform — metadata/SA token theft, IAM privilege escalation, and storage/ function misconfig. Load when the target runs on GCP, you hold a GCP SA key/token, or see gcp/gcloud/GCE/GKE/appspot. Signals: metadata.google.internal, service-account.json, storage.googleapis.com, cloudf⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c54 installs+4 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/cloud-gcp

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
CFwdZu/6Xv…s0sdYXDg==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package0f159f8a…af9b86ff
0f159f8a54d9…94acaf9b86ff1 file · ⁦1.5 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cloud/cloud-gcp@ee0e0c5

When it applies

The target is on GCP and you have some access — an SSRF into a GCE/GKE instance, a leaked service account (SA) key, or a foothold in a workload. Goal: steal credentials, escalate IAM, reach data.

Why it works

GCP identity centers on service accounts and IAM bindings that are frequently over-granted. The metadata server hands SA tokens to anything on the instance, and a small set of permissions (actAs, setIamPolicy, deploy roles) form known escalation paths to owner.

Method

  1. Metadata → SA token (via SSRF, or on the host): GET metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/ instance/service-accounts/default/token with header Metadata-Flavor: Google (→ cloud-imds-ssrf). Also grab .../scopes and project info.
  2. Authenticate & enumerate: gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=sa.json; gcloud projects get-iam-policy, list what the SA can do; ScoutSuite for the landscape.
  3. IAM privesc paths: iam.serviceAccounts.actAs + deploy (Cloud Functions/Run/Compute) to run as a higher-priv SA; iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken/signJwt/implicitDelegation; setIamPolicy (editor→owner); deploymentmanager running as the default SA.
  4. Data & services: enumerate GCS buckets (→ cloud-s3-exposure equivalents), Cloud SQL, secrets in Secret Manager, and GKE (→ cloud-kubernetes).
  5. Prove impact with a read-only call as the escalated identity; don't create lasting bindings.

Gotchas

  • SA scopes (legacy) can restrict a token even with broad IAM — check both scope and IAM.
  • actAs + a deploy permission is the classic privesc — hunt for it specifically.
  • Org policies/VPC-SC may block exfil paths; note them rather than forcing.

Verify success

Escalated access proven — a call succeeding as a higher-priv SA, secret/data read you shouldn't have, or gcloud acting with permissions beyond your starting identity.

References

GCP IAM docs; Rhino Security GCP privesc research; ScoutSuite; "hacking GCP" guides.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c50f159f8aSigned–

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