cloud-azure
Attack Azure / Entra ID — managed-identity token theft, Entra (Azure AD) role abuse, and app/ storage misconfig. Load when the target is on Azure, you hold Azure creds/a token, or see Entra/AAD/azurewebsites/blob.core.windows.net. Signals: 169.254.169.254 IMDS, Managed Identity, az cli, Entra roles,
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c52 installs+2 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/cloud-azureWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package8376972e…ada3e113
8376972e7908…b366ada3e1131 file · 1.5 KBScanMedium2 findings
- Link to a raw IP addressSKILL.md:32
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cloud/cloud-azure@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
Target on Azure and you have some access — SSRF into a VM/App Service with a Managed Identity, a leaked service-principal secret/cert, or a foothold. Goal: steal tokens, abuse Entra roles, reach resources.
Why it works
Azure resources authenticate via Managed Identities and service principals; the IMDS hands out OAuth tokens for them. Entra (Azure AD) roles and app permissions are widely over-assigned, and several (adding credentials to a service principal, role assignment, Owner on a subscription) escalate to control.
Method
- Managed Identity → token (via SSRF, or on the host):
GET http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/ oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/with headerMetadata: true(→cloud-imds-ssrf). Also request tokens for Graph, Key Vault, Storage. - Authenticate & enumerate:
az loginwith the SP or token; enumerate roles/resources; map Entra with AzureHound (BloodHound for Azure); ScoutSuite/MicroBurst for misconfig. - Entra / IAM privesc: add credentials to a service principal you can manage → auth as it;
abusive Entra roles (Application/Cloud App Admin, Privileged Role Admin); role assignment
(
Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write) → grant yourself Owner; consent grants. - Resources & secrets: Key Vault (token for
vault.azure.net), Storage blobs (→ storage misconfig), Automation Accounts / runbooks (RCE as their identity), App Service. - Prove impact read-only as the escalated principal; avoid persistent role changes.
Gotchas
- Two planes: ARM (resources) and Microsoft Graph / Entra (identity) — get tokens for the right
resource/audience. - Managed-identity SSRF needs the
Metadata: trueheader — header-less SSRF won't work (that's the mitigation). - AzureHound reveals Entra attack paths you'd miss manually — run it early.
Verify success
Escalated access proven — a token/role letting you act beyond your start (Key Vault secret read, subscription role you granted, resource action as a managed identity).
References
Azure IMDS & Managed Identity docs; AzureHound/BloodHound; MicroBurst; Entra privesc research.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md2.9 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumLink · Link to a raw IP addressSKILL.md:32
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 8376972e | Signed | – |
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