analyzing-ransomware-encryption-behavior
Analyzes how a ransomware sample encrypts files: identifying the crypto scheme
v1.0.03 installs+3 in 7 days24 StarsApache-2.0synced 10 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install meltedinhex/analyzing-ransomware-encryption-behaviorWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packagec7aa0b89…54144625
c7aa0b896431…ff91541446254 files · 3.7 KBScanMedium2 findings
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/analyst.py
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/tree/main/skills/analyzing-ransomware-encryption-behavior@da7600a
On this page
When to Use
- You need to understand how a ransomware sample encrypts data and whether recovery without the key is feasible.
- You are documenting file targeting, markers, and the ransom workflow for an IR report.
- You want to identify the crypto primitives to assess decryptability and detection points.
Do not use this to attempt key recovery on production data without backups; analyze in the lab on disposable test files only.
Prerequisites
- Isolated lab with disposable test files of varied types/sizes.
- Static/RE tools (see the Ghidra and crypto-identification skills) and the dynamic-analysis setup.
- A clean snapshot to revert.
Safety & Handling
- Detonate only against throwaway files in the isolated victim VM; never real data.
- Treat the sample and any dropped components as live; revert after each run.
Workflow
Step 1: Identify the crypto scheme statically
Locate crypto constants and APIs to classify the scheme:
Symmetric only (AES/ChaCha/RC4) -> key may be derivable/recoverable if mishandled
Asymmetric (RSA/ECC) wrapping -> per-file symmetric key wrapped with attacker pubkey
Hybrid (typical) -> AES per file, RSA-wrapped key in the encrypted file/footerLook for AES S-boxes, ChaCha constants ("expand 32-byte k"), and CryptImportKey/BCrypt*.
Step 2: Trace key generation and handling
Determine where the symmetric key comes from (CSPRNG vs weak source), whether it is stored, and how it is protected. Weak/reused keys or keys left in memory are recovery opportunities.
Step 3: Map file targeting
Identify which directories/extensions are targeted or skipped (allowlist of system paths), size thresholds, and partial-vs-full encryption (many encrypt only the first N bytes/blocks for speed).
Step 4: Capture markers and metadata
Most families append an extension, write a per-file footer/magic marker, and store the wrapped key or IV there. The script fingerprints before/after test files to extract markers.
python scripts/analyst.py compare plain/ encrypted/Step 5: Document recovery-relevant facts
Note shadow-copy/backup deletion (vssadmin delete shadows), the ransom note, and any
cryptographic mistakes that affect decryptability.
Validation
- The identified scheme matches observed file changes (e.g. hybrid → high-entropy body + a fixed-size footer).
- File markers/extensions are consistent across encrypted test files.
- Shadow-copy deletion and note-drop are confirmed dynamically.
Pitfalls
- Assuming decryptability from the algorithm name; correct AES/RSA usage is not recoverable. Recovery hinges on implementation flaws or leaked keys.
- Missing partial-encryption schemes, leading to wrong impact assessment.
- Running against real files instead of disposable test data.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the file-marker comparison tool. - No More Ransom and NIST crypto standards (linked in frontmatter).
Files in this version
references/11.2 KB
- api-reference.md1.2 KB
scripts/12.7 KB
- analyst.py2.7 KB
- LICENSE340 B
- SKILL.md3.8 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/analyst.py
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | da7600a | c7aa0b89 | Signed | – |
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