testing-ransomware-recovery-procedures
Tests and validates ransomware recovery procedures - backup restore operations
v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 11 hours ago
Install
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/testing-ransomware-recovery-proceduresWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package4f6bd2f7…294f49ca
4f6bd2f7766d…5a9a294f49ca4 files · 11.2 KBScanMedium2 findings
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/testing-ransomware-recovery-procedures@54a7988
On this page
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Validating that ransomware recovery plans actually work under realistic conditions
- Measuring RTO (Recovery Time Objective) and RPO (Recovery Point Objective) against business requirements
- Testing backup restore operations to confirm data integrity and completeness after simulated encryption
- Conducting tabletop exercises or live recovery drills for ransomware scenarios
- Auditing disaster recovery readiness as part of compliance or cyber insurance requirements
Do not use for active incident response during a live ransomware attack. Use dedicated IR playbooks instead.
Prerequisites
- Isolated recovery test environment (air-gapped or network-segmented lab)
- Access to backup infrastructure (Veeam, Commvault, Rubrik, AWS Backup, Azure Backup)
- Documented RTO/RPO targets per application tier from business impact analysis
- Backup copies available for restore testing (production replicas or test snapshots)
- Recovery runbooks with step-by-step procedures for each critical system
Workflow
Step 1: Define Recovery Test Scope
Identify critical systems and their tiered recovery targets:
| Tier | System Type | RTO Target | RPO Target | Example |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 | Mission-critical | < 1 hour | < 15 min | Active Directory, core database |
| Tier 2 | Business-critical | < 4 hours | < 1 hour | ERP, email, CRM |
| Tier 3 | Business-operational | < 24 hours | < 4 hours | File shares, internal apps |
| Tier 4 | Non-critical | < 72 hours | < 24 hours | Dev/test, analytics |
Step 2: Prepare Test Environment
# Verify isolated recovery network is segmented
# No routes to production should exist
ip route show | grep -v "192.168.100.0/24" # recovery VLAN only
# Verify backup catalog is accessible
restic snapshots --repo s3:s3.amazonaws.com/backup-bucket --password-file /etc/restic/pw
# Or for Veeam:
# Get-VBRBackup | Where-Object {$_.JobType -eq "Backup"} | Select Name, LastPointCreationTimeStep 3: Execute Restore and Measure RTO
For each tiered system, measure the full recovery timeline:
- Detection to Decision - Time from simulated alert to restore decision
- Backup Locate - Time to identify and select the correct clean restore point
- Restore Execution - Time to restore data/VM/application from backup
- Validation - Time to verify data integrity and application functionality
- Service Restoration - Time until the system is fully operational
Recovery Timeline Measurement:
T0: Incident declared (simulated ransomware detection)
T1: Recovery team assembled and backup identified
T2: Restore initiated from clean backup
T3: Restore completed, integrity checks passed
T4: Application validated and service restored
Actual RTO = T4 - T0
Actual RPO = T0 - backup_timestampStep 4: Validate Data Integrity Post-Restore
# Compare file counts between backup manifest and restored data
find /restored/data -type f | wc -l
# Compare against pre-backup manifest
# Verify database consistency after restore
pg_isready -h localhost -p 5432
psql -c "SELECT count(*) FROM critical_table;" -d restored_db
# Hash verification of critical files
sha256sum /restored/data/critical_config.xml
# Compare against known-good hash from backup manifestStep 5: Test Credential Rotation and Security Hardening
After restore, validate that security controls are re-established:
- Rotate all service account passwords and API keys
- Verify MFA is enabled on all administrative accounts
- Confirm EDR/AV agents are running and reporting to management console
- Validate firewall rules block known C2 indicators
- Check that restored systems have latest security patches
Step 6: Document Results and Calculate Gap
Recovery Test Report:
System: [Name]
Tier: [1-4]
RTO Target: [target] Actual RTO: [measured] Gap: [delta]
RPO Target: [target] Actual RPO: [measured] Gap: [delta]
Data Integrity: [PASS/FAIL]
Application Validation: [PASS/FAIL]
Security Controls Restored: [PASS/FAIL]
Status: [MEETS TARGET / EXCEEDS TARGET / FAILS TARGET]
Remediation Required: [description if FAILS]Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| RTO | Recovery Time Objective: maximum acceptable downtime for a system after a disaster |
| RPO | Recovery Point Objective: maximum acceptable data loss measured in time |
| WRT | Work Recovery Time: time to verify system integrity after restore completes |
| MTD | Maximum Tolerable Downtime: absolute limit before unacceptable business impact |
| Clean Restore Point | A backup verified to be free of ransomware artifacts or encryption |
| Recovery Sequencing | The order in which interdependent systems must be restored |
| Air-Gapped Backup | Backup stored on media physically disconnected from the network |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Veeam Backup & Replication | VM and physical server backup and restore |
| Commvault | Enterprise data protection and recovery orchestration |
| Rubrik | Cloud-native backup with ransomware recovery SLA |
| AWS Backup | Centralized backup for AWS services |
| Azure Backup | Microsoft cloud backup with immutable vault |
| Restic | Open-source encrypted backup tool |
| Velero | Kubernetes cluster backup and restore |
Common Pitfalls
- Not testing restores regularly: Backups that are never tested often fail when needed. Test quarterly at minimum.
- Ignoring recovery sequencing: Restoring an application before its database dependency causes cascading failures.
- Skipping credential rotation: Restored systems may contain compromised credentials that allow re-infection.
- Using production network for testing: Recovery tests on production networks risk spreading simulated or real infections.
- Measuring RTO without WRT: Restore completion is not recovery completion. Include validation and hardening time.
- No immutable backups: If ransomware can encrypt or delete backups, recovery is impossible. Use air-gapped or immutable storage.
References
- NIST SP 800-184: Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery
- CISA Ransomware Guide: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware
- Veeam RTO/RPO Best Practices: https://www.veeam.com/blog/recovery-time-recovery-point-objectives.html
- NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP (Recovery Planning)
Files in this version
references/13.8 KB
- api-reference.md3.8 KB
scripts/111.3 KB
- agent.py11.3 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md7.6 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | Yes | Yes |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | 54a7988 | 4f6bd2f7 | Signed | – |
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