linpeas
Auth/lab ref: LinPEAS Linux privilege review; weak permissions, services, env/config exposure, kernel hints, report triage.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 installs+3 in 7 days39 StarsGPL-3.0synced 10 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/linpeasWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package0cff1e33…77fac9e3
0cff1e338fec…7a5577fac9e32 files · 5.4 KBScanMedium2 findings
- command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:19
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/linux/linpeas@21cd568
On this page
Linux Privilege Escalation Awesome Suite — comprehensive system audit for privilege escalation assessment.
Quick Start
# Download and run in one line
curl -L https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh | bash
# Or local file
bash linpeas.sh
# Quiet mode (critical findings only)
bash linpeas.sh -q
# Export to file
bash linpeas.sh > enum_full.txt 2>&1
# Aggressive all-checks mode
bash linpeas.sh -a 2>&1 | tee linpeas_full.out
# Run as root (more thorough)
sudo bash linpeas.shKey Enumeration Areas
| Category | What's Checked | Critical Findings |
|---|---|---|
| System Info | Kernel version, distro, architecture, hostname | Unpatched kernel (CVE), old distro |
| Users & Groups | All users, sudoers, groups, sudo access | Overprivileged users, sudo without password |
| Network | Network interfaces, open ports, connections | Listening privileged ports, root services |
| Services & Daemons | Running services, startup scripts, service perms | World-writable service binaries, root scripts |
| Cron Jobs | Crontab entries, cron.d scripts, anacron | Root crons with weak perms, writable scripts |
| SUID/SGID Binaries | SUID/SGID files, permissions, known vulns | Exploitable binaries (nmap, cp, sudo) |
| Capabilities | Linux capabilities on binaries | cap_setuid, cap_net_raw on user tools |
| File Permissions | Writable directories, SGID abuse, world-writable | Writable /etc/, /root, /home paths |
| Credentials | /etc/shadow readable, .bashrc creds, SSH keys | Readable shadow, hardcoded passwords |
| SSH | SSH keys in home dirs, SSH configs, authorized_keys | Private keys, known_hosts data |
| Containers | Docker group membership, container escape paths | Docker socket, privileged containers |
| PAM & NSS | PAM config, LDAP/NIS bindings | Weak auth mechanisms, credential stores |
| Kernel Exploits | CVEs matching kernel version | Exploitable kernel bugs (DirtyCOW, OverlayFS) |
| Sudo Config | NOPASSWD entries, sudoers misconfigs | sudo without password, wildcards in sudoers |
| Application Configs | Database configs, web app secrets, API keys | Plaintext DB creds, API keys in configs |
Core Flags
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
-q |
Quiet mode (only critical findings) |
-P <pass> |
Try supplied password against sudo prompts where relevant |
-s |
Search for passwords in common files |
-g |
Search common paths for hidden files |
-p |
Password list for bruteforcing (optional) |
-t <N> |
Time limit (seconds) |
-a |
All checks (aggressive mode) |
Common Workflows
Initial user-space enumeration
bash linpeas.sh -q 2>/dev/null | grep -i "root\|sudo\|exploit"
# Quick summary of exploitable pathsFull audit (from low-priv user)
bash linpeas.sh | tee /tmp/lp.txt
# Review output for:
# 1. SUID/SGID binaries with known exploits
# 2. Sudo entries without password
# 3. Writable system files / cron scripts
# 4. Kernel vulnerabilities
# 5. Unpatched services running as rootAfter gaining root, check for persistence vectors
sudo bash linpeas.sh
# Identify ways to maintain access:
# - Backdoor cron jobs
# - SSH key insertion
# - Rootkit opportunities
# - Hidden user accountsCredential harvesting preparation
bash linpeas.sh -s
# Scans for plaintext passwords in common locations:
# - /home/*/.*profile / .bashrc / .zshrc
# - /etc/mysql/my.cnf
# - /etc/postgresql/postgresql.conf
# - Application configsKey Findings Priority
🔴 CRITICAL — Immediate escalation:
- SUID binary with known public exploit matching kernel
- Sudo entry with NOPASSWD + command
- Unpatched kernel with PoC available
- World-writable cron script running as root
- Plaintext root password in config file
🟠 HIGH — Likely exploitable:
- SUID binary (even without known exploit, reverse engineer)
- Writable system binary / script
- Capability-based (cap_setuid on user tool)
- Sudo with wildcard or glob expansion
- /etc/shadow readable by current user
🟡 MEDIUM — Context-dependent:
- Weak cron script perms (depends on what it does)
- SSH keys with weak perms
- Database credentials in config
Output Interpretation
LinPEAS color codes findings:
- 🟢 Green — Not exploitable or low risk
- 🟡 Yellow — Worth investigating, potentially exploitable
- 🔴 Red — High priority, likely exploitable
- 💛 Red with [!] — Critical, exploitable now
Also prioritize lines flagged like 99% PE or equivalent high-confidence markers before spending time on weaker leads.
Findings are grep excerpts, not proof — read the full file before acting. LinPEAS often prints only the matching line (e.g. just the auth ... pam_permit.so line of /etc/pam.d/common-auth, or a single sudoers/cron line), which can read like a misconfiguration or auth bypass the complete file does not actually support. Confirm the whole file first. Its version-based CVE hits (Kernel Exploit Registry, and service LPEs like PackageKit/pkexec/sudo) are stronger, verifiable leads — a held-back package version is often the intended path.
Post-LinPEAS Workflow
- Triage findings — focus on red/critical items first
- Verify exploitability — manually test (can you write to that file? does sudo work?)
- Build exploit — craft shell script, compile, or use existing tool (e.g.,
sudo -l,findSUID abuse) - Execute escalation — run exploit, verify root shell
- Check for further privesc — re-run LinPEAS at root level, identify lateral movement or persistence
Combining with Other Tools
| Tool | Use Case |
|---|---|
| linux-exploit-suggester | Map kernel version to CVEs; compare with LinPEAS findings |
| mimipenguin | Dump memory for credentials; use LinPEAS to find process PIDs |
| pwncat | Catch shell + automatic privilege escalation attempt |
| BeRoot | Lighter alternative; quick SUID/capabilities scan |
Resources
| File | When to load |
|---|---|
references/ |
Kernel exploit compilation, SUID abuse techniques, sudo exploitation |
Files in this version
references/16.8 KB
- suid-capability-exploitation.md6.8 KB
- SKILL.md6.3 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | Yes | Yes |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumCommand · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:19
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | Nov 13, 2026 | 21cd568 | 0cff1e33 | Signed | – |
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